Castro v. People

23 Citing cases

  1. People v. Herrera

    87 P.3d 240 (Colo. App. 2004)   Cited 16 times
    Finding that "the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by a court-ordered mental examination when the information obtained therefrom is admitted only on the issue of mental condition," and use of a defendant's statements during a court-ordered sanity evaluation does not force him to choose between self-incrimination or loss of the right to present a defense

    Hence, the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated when psychiatrists who have examined a defendant testify regarding the defendant's statements to them in that context. See Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); People v. Bielecki, supra; People v. Vialpando, 954 P.2d 617 (Colo.App. 1997).

  2. People v. Bielecki

    964 P.2d 598 (Colo. App. 1999)   Cited 38 times

    Our supreme court has held that holding a single trial on insanity and guilt does not violate a defendant's due process right or his right against self-incrimination. See Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P.2d 987 (1945). It has also rejected assertions that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when psychiatrists who have examined a defendant testify regarding the defendant's statements to them.

  3. United States ex Rel. Edney v. Smith

    425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)   Cited 57 times
    In Smith, Judge Weinstein in fact acknowledged that the communication of such a link results in substantial prejudice to the defendant, 425 F. Supp. at 1053.

    45 N.J. at 11, 210 A.2d at 767 (citations omitted). See also, e.g., State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E.2d 387 (1954); Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506, 32 A.L.R.2d 430 (1951); People v. Spencer, 60 Cal.2d 64, 31 Cal.Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 134 (1963). A similar argument would seem to support an implication of waiver in this case.

  4. People v. Low

    732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 45 times
    In Low, this Court noted that ingesting large quantities of “HOLD” cough drops (which contain the drug dextromethorphan hydrobromide) could, in certain circumstances, support the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.

    Between 1951 and 1983, the definition of insanity in Colorado was the "M'Naghten right and wrong" test augmented by the "irresistible impulse" test. See e.g., Ch. 144, sec. 2, § 507(2), 1951 Colo. Sess. Laws 321, 325; § 16-8-101, 8 C.R.S. (1973); Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 847 (1960); Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959). In 1983, the General Assembly amended the definition of insanity by deleting all references to the irresistible impulse test.

  5. People v. Giles

    662 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 8 times

    We stated in Chavez: "Section 16-8-105(2) provides that `[e]very person is presumed to be sane; but, once any evidence of insanity is introduced, the people have the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.' See People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972); People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, [ 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968)]; Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); Leick v. People, supra. In one sense an adjudication of insanity represents a judicial determination that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . "In another sense, however, particularly in view of the statutory presumption of sanity in the first instance, it is not unreasonable to infer from an insanity adjudication that the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time he engaged in the proscribed conduct.

  6. People v. Chavez

    629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 63 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting an equal protection challenge to differences between commitment and release procedures

    Section 16-8-105(2) provides that "[e]very person is presumed to be sane; but, once any evidence of insanity is introduced, the people have the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." See People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972); People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, supra; Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); Leick v. People, supra. In one sense an adjudication of insanity represents a judicial determination that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

  7. Hester v. State

    262 Ind. 284 (Ind. 1974)   Cited 78 times
    In Hester v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 284, 315 N.E.2d 351, this Court held that while a bifurcated trial is permissible under our trial rules, a plea of insanity does not, in the [9] absence of other compelling circumstances, entitle a defendant to such a trial.

    Several states have statutes authorizing bifurcated trials, but they are not mandatory and the granting of a motion for such lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Wells (1949), 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53; Bennett v. State (1883), 57 Wis. 69, 14 N.W. 912; Castro v. People (1959), 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020. Our rules of procedure would authorize a bifurcated trial upon such issues, in a proper case.

  8. State v. Sturdivan

    497 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1973)   Cited 39 times

    The legislature is empowered to enact statutes defining criminal responsibility and standards for determination of legal insanity. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-801, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Colo. 1959); State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. banc 1950). Chapter 552, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., particularly Sections 552.010, 552.020, and 552.030, adapted from ALI Model Penal Code, does not specify any particular mental disease or defect, but considers all classifications and symptoms of mental disease.

  9. McCune v. People

    179 Colo. 262 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 21 times

    [5] We agree with defendant's contention that in a murder case, a wide latitude should be permitted on cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. It is our view, however, that regardless of the limitation placed upon the scope of this testimony, the defendant was not prejudiced by the rulings of the trial court. See e.g., Raullerson v. People, 157 Colo. 462, 404 P.2d 149 (1965); Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); and Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 6 P.2d 455 (1931). [6] The scope and limits of cross-examination are determined by the trial judge, and absent an abuse of discretion his rulings will not be disturbed on review.

  10. State v. Lamb

    209 Kan. 453 (Kan. 1972)   Cited 75 times
    Acknowledging that Mr. Lamb's crimes against Ms. Kemmerly and Ms. Childs were "widely covered and reported by the news media"

    There are a few jurisdictions within the United States where a bifurcated trial is authorized by statute alone. (See People v. Cordova, 14 C.2d 308, 94 P.2d 40; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N.W. 912; Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020; and People v. Wells, 33 C.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied 338 U.S. 836, 94 L.Ed. 510, 70 S.Ct. 43.) The appellant's argument is that in presenting his defense on the issue of insanity it would become necessary for him to incriminate himself.