Opinion
B165483.
10-22-2003
ROXANA CASTRO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Office of David C. Tardiff and David C. Tardiff for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Richard M. Helgeson, Senior Assistant City Attorney for Water and Power, and Lisa S. Berger, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Roxana Castro appeals the trial courts decision sustaining the City of Los Angeles demurrer to plaintiffs first amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiffs were injured in a car crash at an intersection where traffic lights operated by the City were not working. Plaintiffs allege the City maintained a dangerous condition of public property at the intersection on the date of the accident. We find plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action against the City, even after they were given an opportunity to amend their complaint to do so. Accordingly, we affirm the trial courts decision sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
The other plaintiff in this action, Jose Jair Castro Lopez, is not a party to this appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is not the first time this matter has been before us. Castro and the other plaintiff in this action, Jose Jair Castro Lopez, previously appealed the trial courts decision sustaining the Citys demurrer to the original complaint without leave to amend. We reversed that decision, concluding plaintiffs might be able to state a cause of action against the City for dangerous condition of public property if given an opportunity to amend their complaint.
Lopez v. Hutchins (July 23, 2002, B153148) [nonpub. opn.].
Plaintiffs first amended complaint alleges as follows: On January 29, 2001, at about 3:25 p.m., plaintiffs were driving westbound when they came to the intersection of Fulton Avenue and Chandler Boulevard. Plaintiffs noticed "the tri-light signal" at the intersection "was not functioning." Plaintiffs brought their vehicle to "a complete stop" before proceeding into the intersection. Defendant Joanna Paz Hutchins drove her Ford Explorer into the intersection, "fail[ing] to yield or stop for [p]laintiffs who [already] had entered the intersection." The vehicles collided and plaintiffs were injured. The City was "responsible for the care and maintenance" of the signals at the intersection.
The second cause of action in the first amended complaint is a negligence claim against the City, Spinello Companies and William A. Dukes. Plaintiffs allege, sometime before January 29, 2001, the City hired Spinello Companies to perform construction work at the above-described intersection. Spinello Companies hired Dukes "to do concrete cutting at the intersection." According to plaintiffs, Dukes "negligently and carelessly cut through the power lines supplying electricity to the tri-light signals at the . . . intersection which in turn caused the tri-light signal to cease functioning." After he finished his work, Dukes failed to check to see whether the signals were working. He did not notify the City about the power outage. Nor did he place "moveable stop signs at each corner of the intersection" or "otherwise direct traffic until the [City] could repair the traffic signals." Plaintiffs allege the City "had a non delegable [sic] duty to properly maintain the tri-light signals at this intersection," and Dukes negligence "is imputed to" the City.
Plaintiffs first cause of action asserts a negligence claim against Hutchins only.
Incorporating all of the other allegations in the first amended complaint, plaintiffs third cause of action against the City for dangerous condition of public property alleges: "Due to the actions of the [City] and their contractors and employees . . . the [City] maintained a dangerous and defective condition of public property at the above described intersection on the date indicated above. [¶] Because the dangerous and defective condition described above was created by the [City] through their employees and contractors[,] the [City] is charged with notice of that dangerous and defective condition."
The City demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing plaintiffs failed to allege the existence of a dangerous condition of public property. In opposing the demurrer, plaintiffs argued this courts prior opinion in this matter is law of the case and stands for the proposition the City cannot "escape possible liability under the facts of the present case . . . ." Plaintiffs requested sanctions against the City for "making the exact argument in this demurrer that it made previously." The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
Lopez v. Hutchins, supra, B153148.
As discussed more fully below, plaintiffs have misinterpreted our prior opinion.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we accept as true the properly pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and consider matters which may be judicially noticed. The allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer.
Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 746; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.
Code of Civil Procedure section 452; King v. Central Bank (1977) 18 Cal.3d 840, 843.
Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879.
When a trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff."
Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at page 318.
II. CASTRO HAS NOT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY.
Castro contends plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action against the City for maintenance of a dangerous and defective condition of public property, based on this courts prior opinion. The City disagrees, arguing plaintiffs failed to amend their complaint to allege sufficient additional facts necessary to state a cause of action, as required by this courts prior opinion.
To state a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property, Castro must allege facts showing (1) the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of her injury, (2) the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of her injury, (3) the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the type of injury she sustained and (4) the City had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition "a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition." "The existence of a dangerous condition is usually a question of fact, but may be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion."
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1194.
The Government Code defines "dangerous condition" as "a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." A plaintiff must allege facts showing a condition of public property "create[d] a substantial risk of harm when used with due care by the public generally, as distinguished from the particular person charged as a concurrent tortfeasor." A "third partys negligent use [of the property] does not negate the existence of a dangerous condition." The plaintiff need not show "the property was actually being used with due care at the time of the injury, either by himself or by a third party."
Government Code section 830, subdivision (a). All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
Morris v. State of California (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 962, 966 (footnote omitted).
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 116, 121.
Alexander v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 890, 899.
The absence of operating traffic signals at a busy intersection undoubtedly is viewed as a "dangerous condition" by motorists and pedestrians crossing that intersection. Section 830.4, however, states it is not a dangerous condition when a government entity merely fails "to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code." This immunity applies only where a "failure to provide a stop sign [or other traffic control signal] . . . is the only basis for fixing liability . . . ." "If an intersection is dangerous because of the failure to provide warning or regulatory signs and also because of the `conjunction of other factors, section 830.4 is no bar to liability."
Vehicle Code section 21460 regulates traffic crossing "double parallel lines" on the road.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 971, 976.
Washington v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1538-1539.
Moreover, section 830.8 provides a city is not immune from liability for a failure to provide "a signal, sign, marking or device (other than one described in Section 830.4) [which] was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care." Thus, a city "is liable for injury where its failure to provide traffic regulatory or warning signals, of a type other than those described in section 830.4 , constitutes a concealed trap for those exercising due care, assuming the conditions of its liability under section 835 are otherwise met."
Washington v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at pages 1536-1537.
In the prior appeal, the parties treated the case of Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles as the focal point of the analysis of whether a dangerous condition existed at the intersection at the time of plaintiffs accident. In that case, the traffic lights at 15 intersections in a seven-block radius of the City were "extinguished" due to a power outage which occurred one morning at about 1:00 a.m. Shortly thereafter, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power notified the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (DOT) about the power outage. A DOT repairman learned about the problem with the signals about an hour and a half after the power outage occurred. He arrived in the area of the blackout sometime after 3:42 a.m. At the first affected intersection he came to, he placed eight temporary, "pedestal stop signs." Before he proceeded to the next affected intersection, he had to go to a city yard to pick up more temporary stop signs because he had placed all the signs he was carrying in his truck.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1187.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1191.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1192.
At about 4:40 a.m., decedent Chowdhury drove up to an intersection where the traffic lights were out and the DOT repairman had not yet placed any temporary stop signs. Witnesses saw Chowdhury bring his vehicle to a stop before proceeding into the intersection. A van traveling 41 to 62 miles per hour did not stop before entering the intersection and it collided with Chowdhurys vehicle. The driver of the van thought he saw a green light when he approached the intersection. He acknowledged the traffic lights were out at another intersection he drove through, and he stopped when he saw the temporary stop signs the repairman had placed there. He said he would have stopped at the intersection where the accident occurred if he had seen temporary stop signs there as well.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1193.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1193.
After a bench trial, the court entered a judgment awarding damages to Chowdhurys wife and daughter. The court found: "DOT had a duty to place stop signs during a power outage or to call for traffic control officers if signs could not be placed. The repairman in this instance failed to seek assistance from traffic control officers or the police department despite the outage." The trial court concluded a dangerous condition of public property was the cause of the accident: "By placing signs at only one intersection, . . . DOT created a `trap for motorists."
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pages 1193-1194.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1194.
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, concluding "obviously inoperative traffic signals during a power outage do not amount to a dangerous condition as a matter of law." Finding the section 830.4 immunity applicable, the appellate court reasoned: "The City elected to install traffic signals at the intersection in question here. However, when the signals were extinguished during the power outage, the City did not invite the public to rely on the signals as a means of controlling the right-of-way at the intersection. The signals did not give a false indication to `go. Rather, they gave no indication at all, and did not mislead or misdirect motorists. [¶] Under the circumstances, motorists approaching the intersection were bound not by the Citys inoperative light, but by the provisions of the Vehicle Code, which effectively transform an inoperative signal light into a stop sign. (Veh[icle] Code, [section] 21800.) Once the signals failed, the City could reasonably foresee that motorists using due care would obey the provisions of the Vehicle Code and make a full stop before proceeding when it was safe to do so." The Court of Appeal also concluded the intersection did not constitute a "concealed trap" within the meaning of section 830.8, as "[t]here is no evidence to support [plaintiffs] claim that posting stop signs at a distant intersection was a substantial factor in causing this accident."
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1194.
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1195 (footnote omitted); see also Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834 ("when the traffic lights failed [flashing stop and go at the same time] and notice was given, . . . a duty arose to do one of two things within a reasonable time; either to correct the defective condition of the traffic lights or to take action to protect the public against the condition caused by the faulty operation of the lights. This the city did when it turned them off. The dangerous or defective condition so far as the traffic lights were concerned was simply that they confused traffic. This was remedied by turning them off").
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1197.
Similarly, in City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal followed the Chowdhury case and concluded there was no dangerous condition of public property at an intersection where a stop sign had been knocked down earlier in the day before the accident at issue. Before the date of the accident, stop signs controlled traffic approaching the intersection from the east and the west, but not from the north or the south. Plaintiff Huff was traveling westbound "during daylight hours," about four hours after the stop sign had been knocked down in another collision. Huff drove her car through the intersection without stopping and collided with a car driven by plaintiff Markham. Huff claimed she "did not see the intersection" or "the limit line painted on the pavement for westbound traffic" due to "the `nature of the roadway and the apparent obstructions." She did not specifically identify any obstructions or explain what she believed was problematic about the roadway.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pages 973-974, 978-979.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pages 973-974.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at page 974.
The trial court denied the citys motion for summary judgment, concluding "section 830.4 did not immunize [the city]," and finding "a triable issue of fact as to whether the failure to replace the stop sign gave rise to a dangerous condition." The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and issue a new order granting the summary judgment motion. The appellate court concluded the section 830.4 immunity applied because plaintiffs did "not present[] evidence of any characteristic, apart from the absence of a stop sign, which would give rise to a triable issue regarding the existence of a dangerous condition at the intersection" (i.e., a "deceptive location" of a stop sign as opposed to its mere absence). The court explained: "Nothing in the record indicates that defendant city had a duty to place a stop sign on Eloise at Third, or that, having done so, it was obligated to keep the sign in place indefinitely. Furthermore, as with the inoperative traffic signals in Chowdhury, it makes no difference whether the stop signs are removed ` . . . by design or accident. [Citation.] Given this reasoning, any significance that may have attached to plaintiff David Markhams familiarity with the intersection and asserted reliance on a stop sign controlling traffic entering the intersection from Eloise Street is eliminated."
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pages 974-975.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pages 976, 977.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at page 979.
The City argues Chowdhury and City of South Lake Tahoe are apposite and support its position in this case. Castro disagrees, citing Matthews v. State of California as the case she believes is most relevant to this dispute. There, the traffic lights at the intersection at issue were malfunctioning at the time of the car crash. The "signal controlling east-west traffic . . . was stuck on green (go)" and the "signal controlling north-south traffic . . . was stuck on red (stop)." The plaintiffs car approached the intersection from the west at about 3:15 p.m., and entered the intersection on a green light. A car traveling north entered the intersection on a red light and hit the plaintiffs car.
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d 116.
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at page 119.
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at page 118.
The trial court granted the states motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the intersection constituted a dangerous condition within the meaning of section 830, subdivision (a), and the other drivers negligence did not negate the existence of the dangerous condition. The court reasoned it is foreseeable a driver who realizes he is stopped at a light which is stuck on red "is likely to reduce or abandon caution and increase the risks he is willing to take in entering the intersection against the red light in the face of approaching traffic on the cross street." And, a driver who approaches a green light would exercise a "heightened" degree of care in looking out for cross traffic if she knew the lights were stuck. "Thus, the fact that the light is stuck on red could reasonably be found to result in a greater risk to [the] motorist [approaching the light stuck on green] and to create a dangerous condition at the intersection to motorists generally."
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at page 122.
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at page 122.
Matthews v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at page 122.
Before we discuss our conclusions in this matter, we will address Castros mistaken interpretation of our prior opinion. Castro seems to believe plaintiffs stated a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property in their original complaint, and did not need to amend to allege additional facts in order to state a valid cause of action. Castro interprets our prior opinion to mean Chowdhury and City of South Lake Tahoe are inapplicable to the facts of this case and the City may not rely on them in support of its demurrer. What we actually concluded is plaintiffs might be able to allege a dangerous condition of public property if given an opportunity to amend their complaint. While we were not willing to hold an intersection with inoperable traffic lights can never constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law, we were not sure whether plaintiffs could allege sufficient facts to render Chowdhury inapplicable.
Lopez v. Hutchins, supra, B153148, page 10.
In support of their claim of a dangerous condition, plaintiffs have alleged the absence of operable tri-light traffic signals at the subject intersection, and nothing more. Under section 830.4, the City is immune from liability for a failure to provide these signals (or stop signs) at the intersection. Castro has cited no authority or facts — and we are aware of none — indicating the City had a duty to install tri-light signals at this particular intersection or to keep them turned on indefinitely. As set forth above, the manner in which the signals were extinguished has no bearing on the applicability of the section 830.4 immunity.
See City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at page 979.
Plaintiffs have not alleged the Citys failure to provide the signals or signs described in section 830.4 and some other condition of the intersection combined to create a dangerous condition of public property. For example, plaintiffs have not alleged there was some obstruction which prevented Hutchins from realizing she was approaching an intersection. Nor have plaintiffs alleged signs, markings or other devices not described in section 830.4 were necessary to warn motorists of a concealed trap within the meaning of section 830.8. This is not a case like Matthews in which the traffic lights were stuck, flashing improperly, or otherwise confusing to drivers. Once the tri-light signals went out, this intersection became no different from any other uncontrolled intersection where motorists are required to stop before proceeding through the intersection. Even if plaintiffs had alleged Hutchins had driven through this particular intersection on numerous occasions and expected there to be a light, this would not have helped plaintiffs cause. At any time, the City purposely could have removed or turned off the tri-light signals without negating its immunity under section 830.4.
See, e.g., De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 739, 745 (Court of Appeal reversed decision granting a motion for directed verdict in favor of the city, finding "there was considerable evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found the existence of a dangerous condition" at an intersection where "a walnut tree and shrubbery on the west side of [the street] impaired the visibility of the stop sign to such an extent that it was barely visible during the day and could not be seen by a southbound motorist at night; . . . [and] there was evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the `Stop Ahead legend on the pavement was faded").
Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 1195; Vehicle Code section 21800.
City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at page 979.
Plaintiffs had an opportunity to amend their complaint to allege facts placing this case outside the scope of the section 830.4 immunity. They failed to do so. It is clear plaintiffs cannot allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action against the City for dangerous condition of public property. Therefore, any further opportunity to amend the complaint would be futile.
Our conclusion plaintiffs have not alleged a dangerous condition resolves this matter in favor of the City. "Government tort liability in California is governed completely by statute." Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against the City — i.e., a negligence claim — without alleging a dangerous condition of public property. Moreover, we need not address the Citys liability for the actions of its independent contractors, as Castro asks us to do. "`[A] public entity cannot be held liable for an independent contractors act if the entity would have been immune had the act been that of a public employee." As set forth above, the section 830.4 immunity applies in this case. Similarly, we need not review the foreseeability of Hutchins negligence. Absent the existence of a dangerous condition, this issue too is immaterial.
Swaner v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 789, 797, citing section 815.
Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249, overruled on another ground in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 696, 702, footnote 4.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly sustained the Citys demurrer without leave to amend.
In accordance with our decision affirming the trial courts order, we reject Castros claim for sanctions against the City and need not address her request for removal of the trial judge.
DISPOSITION
The order sustaining the Citys demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, and dismissing the first amended complaint as to the City, is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P.J. & MUNOZ (AURELIO), J.