Opinion
HHDCV165042054S
12-15-2016
Daniel Castro v. Adm. Remedies Coordinator, Bennett
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Robert B. Shapiro, JUDGE
This action, in which the plaintiff/prison inmate alleges that his grievance was improperly denied, is before the court on the defendant's motion to dismiss (#102). The plaintiff filed papers in opposition to the motion. Oral argument was not requested. The matter appeared on the Short Calendar for October 31, 2016, to be adjudicated on the papers.
I
Background
In his complaint, dated April 11, 2016, which is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff alleges that, on an unknown date, the defendant devised a scheme to deny his grievance, by manipulating information to defend a member of the Department of Corrections. He alleges that " they used discrimination against me because I'm Latin." See Complaint, Counts 8 and 9.
The plaintiff claims various violations of his constitutional rights and seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief against retaliation.
Additional references to the factual allegations are set forth below.
II
Standard of Review
" Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 245, 558 A.2d 986 (1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992). The Supreme Court has termed this " fundamental principle" the " 'jurisdiction first' rule. Once the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers Companies, Inc. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 816, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).
" [T]rial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case . . . [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed. When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader . . . [W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, 293 Conn. 342, 347-48, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
Here, concerning the issues which are dispositive, as explained below, there are no disputed facts. No evidentiary hearing was requested or required.
III
Discussion
A
Standing
The defendant challenges the plaintiff's standing to bring this suit. " The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-31(a). [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged . . . [A] determination regarding the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law . . .
" Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allegations of injury [that he or she has suffered or is likely to suffer]. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests . . .
" Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213-15, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).
As stated above, to meet the first requirement of classical aggrievement, all that need be shown is a specific, personal, and legal interest in the subject matter of the challenged action. " For purposes of standing the plaintiff . . . need only allege a colorable claim of injury as standing exists to attempt to vindicate 'arguably' protected interests." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., supra, 294 Conn. 216-17. In addressing standing, the court need not adjudicate whether the plaintiff's interests are " definitively " protected. (Emphasis in original.) Id., 217.
In the context of a § 1983 action concerning conditions of confinement, the Appellate Court stated, " [a]s the United States Supreme Court has explained, '[t]he power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments . . . is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). As a result, '[t]he exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can show [an injury] resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 473. The standing requirement further evinces a proper regard for the judicial branch's relationship with coequal branches of government under our constitutional structure. Thus, '[i]t is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.' Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). An allegation of injury is both fundamental and essential to a demonstration of standing." (Footnote omitted.) Johnson v. Rell, 119 Conn.App. 730, 736-37, 990 A.2d 354 (2010).
" The plaintiff has brought a[n] . . . action pursuant to § 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ('[e]very person who, under color of [law] . . . custom, or usage, of any [s]tate . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [c]onstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law'); . . . ('[t]he purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails')." (Citation omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 126, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, " Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."
Since he has alleged a claim of injury, the plaintiff has standing as to his claims concerning the grievance denial, except, as discussed below, for his procedural due process claim. For example, prison inmates retain protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement, and may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Townsend v. Sterling, 157 Conn.App. 708, 709, 116 A.3d 873 (2015).
" Procedural due process ensures that the government utilizes fair procedures. To state a claim for violation of procedural due process, the Plaintiff must show that he had a protected liberty interest and, if he had such an interest, that he was deprived of that interest without being afforded due process . . . [The plaintiff] has a protected liberty interest only if the state created a liberty interest in a statute or regulation and the deprivation of that interest caused him to suffer an atypical and significant hardship . . . State-created inmate administrative remedy procedures do not create a protected liberty interest. Thus, Fourteenth Amendment due process protections are not implicated regardless of the actions taken by the defendant . . . in connection with the Plaintiff's administrative filings . . . [I]nmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in having prison officials comply with institutional grievance procedures." (Citations omitted.) Shakur v. Furey, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:08 CV 1187 (VLB), (D.Conn. April 8, 2010).
B
Sovereign Immunity
To the extent that the plaintiff seeks monetary damages for alleged violations of the Constitution, statutes, and laws of the State of Connecticut, defendant Bennett is immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. " Sovereign immunity relates to a court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case . . . The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law." (Citations omitted.) C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 257-58, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007).
" Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
" The determination of whether the plaintiff's complaint alleged claims against the defendants in their individual capacities is governed by the test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975) . . . [T]he fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent . . . The vital test is to be found in the essential nature and effect of the proceeding . . . [The Supreme Court] set forth four criteria to determine whether an action is in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). " If all four criteria are satisfied, the action is deemed to be against the state and, therefore, is barred." Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 216, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 929, 12 A.3d 569 (2011).
Here, the first criterion is met since defendant Bennett is a state official. See id. The second criterion is met since the plaintiff alleges that the actions of the defendant related to duties performed as a Department of Corrections state employee. See id.
Concerning the third criterion, the state is the real party in interest since damages are " sought for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant for performing or not performing acts that are part of [her] official duties." Id., 216-17.
As to the fourth criterion, a judgment against the defendant would control how state employees respond to situations such as that at issue, concerning a prison inmate's grievance. See id., 216; Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 621, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002) (" fourth criterion is met because any judgment against the defendant would operate to control the activities of the state, specifically the role of the attorney general's office in informing the public"). Here, there are no allegations that the defendant was " acting to justify prior misconduct, " Id., 622, bringing the conduct " significantly outside the normal scope of [her] authority." Id.
None of the recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity is applicable to the damages claims. See, Paragon Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 130 Conn.App. 211, 221-22, 23 A.3d 732 (2011).
Since all four criteria of the Spring v. Constantino, supra, test are met, the plaintiff's state law claims for damages are deemed to be against the state and, therefore, are barred by sovereign immunity. " [T]he immunity provided by [General Statutes] § 4-165 does not apply if the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies." Hultman v. Blumenthal, supra, 67 Conn.App. 620.
C
Qualified Immunity
" [C]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced . . . The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133-34, 913 A.2d 415, 421 (2007).
" Under federal law, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil damages liability for their discretionary actions as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated . . . Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability and, therefore, protects officials from the burdens of litigation for the choices that they make in the course of their duties . . . Whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity presents a question of law . . .
'Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct . . . We recently reaffirmed that lower courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first . . . If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 301-02, 124 A.3d 977 (2015).
The plaintiff's complaint lacks alleged facts. The subject of the grievance is not pleaded. The allegation of discrimination, quoted above, is set forth only in conclusory terms.
" The [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to the United States [c]onstitution is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike . . . A violation of equal protection by selective [treatment] arises if: (1) the person, compared with other similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) . . . such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 218, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).
The plaintiff alleges that an unspecified grievance was denied and contends that he was discriminated against. Speculation and conjecture are insufficient to support an equal protection claim. See, Menon v. Frinton, 170 F.Supp.2d 190, 197 (D.Conn. 2001).
" To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim under Section. 1983, a prisoner must show that " (1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2009). " A plaintiff can establish a causal connection that suggests retaliation by showing that protected activity was close in time to the adverse action." Id., 129.
Here, since only conclusory assertions are set forth, the plaintiff has insufficiently alleged facts to support a First Amendment claim.
" It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment . . . To state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts demonstrating failure of prison officials to provide for inmates' basic human needs-- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety . . . A prisoner may assert a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of future harm despite the absence of any symptoms stemming from the subject conditions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Conway, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:06CV1329 (SRU), (D.Conn. Sept. 23, 2008), aff'd, 381 Fed.Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1297, 131 S.Ct. 1701, 179 L.Ed.2d 634 (2011).
" An inmate may prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim if he can establish objective and subjective elements . . . The objective element is satisfied where the inmate shows that the deprivation he alleges is sufficiently serious, i.e., that his confinement under the alleged conditions violates contemporary standards of decency . . . The subjective element requires the inmate to show that correctional officials were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm . . . Defendants must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw that inference." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the complaint, the plaintiff has not alleged facts which support an action for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
The plaintiff's complaint, page 2, mentions that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of his right of freedom of association. No facts are alleged concerning this assertion.
Since the plaintiff's complaint does not sufficiently allege facts showing that the defendant violated a constitutional right, qualified immunity shields the defendant from the plaintiff's complaint for money damages. See, Braham v. Newbould, supra, 160 Conn.App. 301-02.
" [A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569 n.5, 877 A.2d 761 (2005).
Here, the plaintiff's claims are based on the denial of an unspecified grievance. " It is well-established that " [i]nmate grievance programs created by state law are not required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those procedures does not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim . . . In addition, prisoners do not have a due process right to a thorough investigation of grievances." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deangelis v. Santiago, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:16CV674 (MPS), (D.Conn. August 23, 2016) (dismissing claims concerning alleged attempts to prevent inmate from filing grievances as not rising to the level of a constitutional violation).
D
Injunctive Relief
The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring the defendant to refrain from retaliation as a direct result of his action for monetary damages.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has " instructed district courts to approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official--even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation--can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act . . . Thus, we have required that such claims be supported by specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015).
Here, as stated above, the plaintiff's allegations concerning retaliation are conclusory in nature. Accordingly, the claim for injunctive relief is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. It is so ordered.