Opinion
No. 00-1063-JTM.
March 16, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is a claim for overtime compensation by plaintiffs Larry Furr and Paul Castillo under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201. The defendant Key Energy Services defends the claim, and has submitted a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Furr and Castillo are employees acting in a "bona fide executive capacity" under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). A bona fide executive is an employee whose primary duty is the management of a subdivision of the defendant's business and who supervises the work of two or more other employees. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f).
The motion for summary judgment was directed at the claims of both plaintiffs. The response, however, attempts to preserve only the claims of Furr. It does not attempt to argue that Castillo was not a bona fide executive.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).
In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Key Energy provides oil rig crews to work on its customers' oil wells. Furr worked for Key Energy in Liberal, Kansas from July 15, 1997, to January 12, 1999, as a "rig supervisor" or "tool pusher." These terms, used by Furr in his deposition, refer to the same occupation and have the same duties. His salary was between $3600 to $3700 per month during his employment, and was never less than $250 per week.
Plaintiff Castillo worked as the area manager in Liberal. Furr, as a rig supervisor, reported to the area manager. Furr did not have responsibility for deciding who would work on a particular rig. The area manager decided that.
Plaintiff Castillo testified that the rig supervisor's responsibilities were to
get with [the customer] what he needs to be done on a well and how they was going to approach it by doing it. And then, it was his job to supervise the operation. To make sure the crew was there on time, that the rig was in condition to do the job, and the crew was in condition to do the job. Make sure everything went okay. The job was done correctly and safely.
(Castillo dep. at 15).
The rig supervisor was the most senior Key Energy employee present at the oil rig sites. As a rig supervisor, Furr was responsible for three rigs at a time. There were three men assigned to each rig: an operator, a derrick hand, and a floor hand. Furr was directly responsible for the performance of the crews he supervised.
As a rig supervisor, Furr was responsible to make rounds each day to ascertain if all workers on each crew were showing up, whether the crews were on time, if they were following proper procedure and whether they needed anything. He helped get his crews into the field, and made sure the hands were available to go on the rigs, and that the crews got to the proper location.
As a rig supervisor, Furr watched the rig crew to make sure that work was done correctly. If he observed a worker not performing a job correctly, Furr would stop him, and demonstrate the correct procedure. (Furr dep. at 9, 25). Furr stated that his job was to "basically check the rig crews and see if they were doing the job right." (Id. at 24).
Castillo has testified that rig supervisors "had the authority to just shut the operations down" if he observed someone working in an unsafe manner. In his response, Furr "takes issue" with Castillo's statement (Resp. at 3), but provides no evidence to support the denial, other than attaching a copy of Furr's job description. However, the job description does not support the attempted denial. The job description, beyond generally stating the obligation to assist and supervise the crew, states that rig supervisors are to "insure safe procedures are being followed." (Plf. Exh. 1, at 1). As noted earlier, Furr himself testified in his deposition that he could and did stop workers who were not working correctly.
Rig supervisors were also responsible for direct client contact. The rig supervisors had substantial responsibility in answering to customers on a daily basis, trying to resolve problems, and keeping customers happy. This included keeping the customer's on-site field representative or foreman satisfied. Furr testified that it was his responsibility to meet with each field foreman to make sure the customer was satisfied. Furr testified that, although the field representative had the ultimate authority on the site "within reason," he could give his opinion on how problems should be handled. (Furr dep. at 26). Furr also had the authority to make suggestions to the field foreman's supervisor.
The rig supervisor was responsible for drafting daily reports outlining all work performed by his crews. The customer would use the reports to determine what work should be done the next day.
Furr stated that the "vast majority" of his workday involved meeting with clients in the morning, getting his rigs started, checking each rig throughout the day, dealing with problems as they came up, making sure his rigs were following the field foreman's instructions or relaying changes of instructions to his crews, and making his daily reports. Furr determined his own daily schedule, depending upon the needs of the jobs at hand. His supervisor did not set particular hours for him or give him a list of the order in which rig crews were to be visited on any day. The only schedule imposed upon him was to be at the field meeting at 7:00 a.m. each day. He would then determine what rigs might have problems or need additional supervision that day, and would plan his own schedule.
Furr had discretion to take lunch breaks when he wanted; his daily responsibilities determined whether he would take a lunch break at all or how long it would be. He also had discretion as to whether he would return to his home to eat his evening meal prior to faxing in all the reports or whether he would stay at the office and wait for the rig crews to get the information for the reports to him.
Furr's area manager would ask him for input regarding employees from time to time. He was asked to evaluate new employees or employees who were potentially in line for getting a raise. He also kept an eye out for hands who were performing particularly well or particularly poorly. If one of his rig operators had a crew member who was just not performing the job correctly, Furr had to become involved. He would call the area manager, who would then either decide whether to discipline the man or pass the decision further up within the company.
Castillo testified that when he became area manager, he moved Furr into "head supervisor" position, which was the "same thing as a supervisor, but it would be higher than the rest of the supervisors." (Castillo dep. at 13). This meant Furr was in charge of the other supervisors whenever Castillo was absent.
Furr knew he was paid a salary rather than an hourly wage. His salary did not fluctuate each month according to the number of hours he worked. Furr has worked as a rig supervisor for other companies, and was always paid on salary.
Ultimately, although the response essentially rewords some of the defendant's statements of uncontroverted facts, there are no real controversies. Furr concedes he supervised the work of the rig crew, and had the authority to stop the work if he felt it was not being done correctly. It thus appears that Furr's position was primarily the management of other workers. He trained and directed workers, maintained records on worker performance, evaluated employees, recommended promotions or discipline. He determined how to allocate material and workers. The uncontroverted facts would therefore bring the case within the executive exemption recognized under 29 C.F.R. § 541.1.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED, this day of March 2001, that the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 28) is therefore granted.