Opinion
No. 05-11-00202-CR
05-18-2012
JIMMY AARON CASTILLO, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appelle
AFFIRM and Opinion Filed May 18, 2012
On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 059659
OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Fillmore, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Fillmore
A jury convicted Jimmy Aaron Castillo of murder and assessed punishment of life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In three points of error, Castillo argues the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and the trial court erred by denying a motion for mistrial during the punishment phase of the trial and by admitting evidence of extraneous offenses during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Background
Kyla Mestanza, Castillo's girlfriend, turned twenty-one on April 18, 2010. On the evening of April 17th, Castillo and Mestanza began celebrating by drinking Everclear at their apartment. They planned to continue celebrating by going to a bar with Misti Garner, Ricky George, and Rebecca Fisher and ordering Mestanza an alcoholic drink at midnight. At approximately 9:30 p.m., Castillo called his friend, Jeanet Pineda, and told her he was upset because he was going to have to talk to Mestanza about Alyssa Barnett, a former girlfriend, being pregnant with his child. Castillo said he wanted to "go crack some skulls."
At approximately 11:30 p.m., Castillo, Mestanza, and their friends went to Appleby's. Castillo continued to drink alcohol at Appleby's and got into a confrontation with a woman at an adjacent table. Both Castillo and the woman were screaming and cursing at each other. Castillo used racial slurs toward the woman and, according to the bartender, threatened to hit the woman in the face. The manager asked Castillo and his party to leave the bar. Barnett walked to the parking lot with Castillo and Mestanza and heard Castillo tell Mestanza that he was in the mood to box. Mestanza did not recall Castillo making this comment.
Mestanza testified that Castillo was intoxicated when they left Appleby's, but was "ok to drive." The two drove to the Towne Pub to meet Misty Hampton, a friend of Mestanza's. At the Towne Pub, Castillo parked the car in the exit from the parking lot and told Mestanza that Barnett was pregnant with his child. Mestanza became upset and called Hampton to let her know they were not coming into the bar. Garner testified that Mestanza also called her.
After spending the evening drinking beer at the Towne Pub, Robert Kane left the bar between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. According to Hampton, as she left the Towne Pub at approximately the same time, she heard two angry male voices and an angry female voice. She turned and saw Mestanza's truck parked in the exit from the parking lot. Castillo was standing outside the driver's side of the truck, and Mestanza was in the passenger seat. Hampton testified there "was cussing going on," and Mestanza was yelling at Castillo to get into the truck. There was another truck nearby with a man's arm sticking out of the window. Hampton called Mestanza to confirm everything was all right. Mestanza was swearing and using racial slurs, but indicated she was "good." Hampton then saw Castillo urinate in the general direction of the other truck. Hampton waited a few minutes, then "squeezed by" Mestanza's truck and drove home.
According to Mestanza, while she and Castillo were discussing Barnett's pregnancy, a man walked up, knocked on her window, and then walked away. A few minutes later, Castillo got out of the truck to urinate. Mestanza testified that she was yelling at Castillo to get into the truck because she wanted to leave, but neither Castillo nor the other man was yelling. Mestanza heard Castillo say, "if you are a man, drop whatever you have." She looked out the back window and saw the man with a weapon in his hand. The man put whatever he had in his hand into the back of his pickup truck and then knocked Castillo to the ground. Castillo managed to turn the man over and hit him three or four times. Mestanza also saw Castillo kick the man. Mestanza testified the man was on the ground, not fighting back, and did not go back to his truck during the fight.
Garner testified that Mestanza called her again and was hysterical. Mestanza was repeatedly screaming for Castillo to get into the truck. Mestanza then said Castillo was beating a man. Garner told Mestanza that she needed to leave, but Mestanza refused to do so without Castillo. Garner testified Mestanza said, "I think this guy is dead." It then sounded as if Mestanza dropped the telephone. The next thing Garner heard was Castillo saying, "Do you have anything else to say [expletive]." It sounded as if Mestanza was helping Castillo climb into the truck, and Castillo said, "I think my hand is broke." The call then terminated. Mestanza did not recall telling Garner that Castillo was beating a man or that she thought the man was dead.
The bar's video system showed that Pam Collier left the Towne Pub approximately three minutes after Kane. As Collier was driving out of the parking lot, she saw a man lying on the ground. A second man was bending over the man on the ground and appeared to have something in his hand. Collier honked her truck's horn and yelled at the second man to get back. The second man then put his hand behind his back as if he was hiding something. The man got into a truck with a woman in it and drove away. Collier wrote down the truck's license plate number and called 911. The man on the ground was later identified as Kane. Although Collier knew Kane, she did not recognize him due to the injuries to his face.
Kane was alive when the police arrived at the Towne Pub. Kane's truck was in the parking lot with the door open and the engine running. On the ground beside Kane's body was a metal rasp with "Kane" marked on it. DNA testing indicated that both Kane's and Castillo's blood was on the rasp. There was no crowbar or other tool in the back of Kane's truck.
Based on the license plate number provided by Collier, the police contacted Mestanza. Lieutenant Mike Eppler of the Denison police department then questioned Castillo. Castillo admitted he had been in a fight at the Towne Pub, but expressed disbelief that his opponent was dead. Castillo claimed the problem started because Kane was "running his mouth." According to Castillo, Kane initially had a crowbar. Castillo told Kane to put the crowbar up and if "you want to box, let's box." Kane then put the crowbar into the back of his pickup. After Kane swung at him, Castillo punched Kane approximately ten times. Castillo also admitting hitting Kane with an elbow and kicking Kane, but claimed he was just defending himself. The jury heard evidence that Castillo had previously been convicted of two offenses of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one offense of assault.
Kane died in the ambulance. Dr. Chester Gwin performed the autopsy on Kane. Kane's neck and face were swollen and bruised, his lips were split, and his teeth and nose were broken. These injuries were consistent with being hit with a fist or any blunt object. The hyoid bone and the thyroid cartilage in Kane's neck had been fractured, and Kane's eyes showed petechiae, or small hermorrhages. In Gwin's opinion, these injuries were from some type of compressive force being placed on the neck, either by choking or holding a foot or an object on the neck. The force would have to be applied for at least ten or twelve seconds to cause these injuries. Kane also had subdural hemorrhages in his head. These injuries were consistent with Kane being hit by a blunt object and by having his head beat on the ground. Some of Kane's injuries had a pattern of symmetric abrasions approximately 0.3 centimeters apart. These injuries were consistent with the pattern on the rasp found near Kane's body. Gwin determined the cause of Kane's death was blunt head and neck trauma and possible asphyxia by neck compression. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second point of error, Castillo complains the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because it failed to establish that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused Kane's death. We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1763 (2012). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860. This standard recognizes "the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860. The jury, as the fact finder, is entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We defer to the jury's determinations of credibility, and may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (in conducting legal sufficiency analysis, appellate court "may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury").
In evaluating a sufficiency claim, we consider all evidence presented to the jury, regardless of whether it was properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In the indictment, Castillo was charged with murder by (1) intentionally or knowingly causing Kane's death, (2) intending to cause serious bodily injury and committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Kane's death, or (3) committing or attempting to commit the felony of aggravated assault and, in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Kane's death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1)-(3) (West 2011). A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Id. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2011). A person commits aggravated assault if, during the course of the assault, the person causes serious bodily injury to another or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. See id.§ 22.02(a) (West 2011). "Serious bodily injury" includes bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes death. Id. § 1.07(a)(46) (West Supp. 2011).
Castillo argues the evidence is insufficient to establish he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in causing Kane's death. A person's culpable mental state is generally shown by circumstantial evidence. Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Lincoln v. State, 307 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). Circumstantial evidence of an accused's mental state is not treated differently than circumstantial evidence of other elements of the crime and is reviewed under the same standard as direct evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "Mental states are almost always inferred from acts and words." Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 10. If an inference as to a requisite mental state is reasonable, we will not "overturn such an inference, drawn on the whole of the circumstances, because one witness testified to the possibility that the inference could be false even though soundly supported by the circumstances." Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
As charged in this case, a person acts (1) intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result, (2) knowingly with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result, and (3) recklessly with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a)-(c) (West 2011).
The jury heard evidence that Castillo was looking to "crack some skulls" or "box," had been involved in an altercation at Appleby's during which he threatened to hit a woman, and had engaged in violent behavior on previous occasions. At the Towne Pub, Castillo was both intoxicated and upset about telling Mestanza that Barnett was pregnant. Castillo told Eppler that the problem started because Kane was "running his mouth." Although Castillo argues the evidence was undisputed that Kane attacked him first, it also shows Kane did not have a weapon when he attacked Castillo. Castillo admitted to hitting Kane with his fist ten times and with his elbow and kicking Kane two or three times. However, some of Kane's injuries were consistent with being hit by the rasp that was found close to his body. Both Kane's and Castillo's blood was found on the rasp, and Collier saw something in Castillo's hand. The jury, therefore, could reasonably infer that Castillo retrieved the rasp from Kane's truck and hit Kane with it. Mestanza told Garner that Castillo was beating a man and that she thought the man was dead. Kane was beat beyond recognition and his injuries were consistent with very hard hits or kicks and with having his head slammed into the ground.
The jury heard all the testimony. It was the role of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, and we must defer to that determination. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude a rational jury could have found Castillo guilty of all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860. We resolve Castillo's second point of error against him. Motion for Mistrial
In his first point of error, Castillo argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial during the punishment phase of the trial. After both sides closed, but before the charge was read to the jury, Castillo's counsel called Gary Paddock, the trial court's bailiff, to testify outside the presence of the jury about possible juror contamination. Paddock testified that one of the jurors had told him that "somebody in the hall said you ought to be shot." The jurors did not know who made the statement.
The trial court denied Castillo's request to question the jurors individually about the incident and his motion for a mistrial. Prior to reading the charge, the trial court instructed the jury:
Also let me remind you that in your deliberations the only thing you can consider is the evidence that has been brought before you from the courtroom.
If you overheard anything out in the hallway or anywhere else or had somebody say something to you outside in the hallway or something like that, you are to completely disregard that and limit your deliberation solely to the evidence that has been brought you in the whole trial of this case from the courtroom.
We review a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 3030 (2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 292. "Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is incurable, will a mistrial be required." Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884-85 (mistrial is extreme remedy and should be granted "'only when residual prejudice remains' after less drastic alternatives are explored.")
An outburst from a bystander "which interferes with the normal proceedings of a trial will not result in reversible error unless the defendant shows that a reasonable probability [exists] that the conduct interfered with the jury's verdict." Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 292 (quoting Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); Landry v. State, 706 S.W.2d 105, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). A trial court's instructions to disregard such an outburst are "generally considered sufficient to cure the impropriety because it is presumed that the jury will follow those instructions." Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 292; see also Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Here, there was no evidence before the trial court at the time Castillo requested a mistrial to demonstrate the comment in the hallway interfered with the jury's verdict. Further, prior to reading the charge, the trial court instructed the jurors to base their decision only on the evidence from the trial and to disregard any comments they might have heard in the hallway, and we must presume that the jurors followed these instructions. Because we conclude that nothing in the record suggests that the comment was of such a nature that the jury could not follow the trial court's instruction not to consider it, we resolve Castillo's first point of error against him. Admission of Evidence of Extraneous Offenses
Castillo relies heavily on testimony given by the jurors at the hearing on his motion for new trial to argue the comment was attributed to his family and had an emotional impact on the jurors. This evidence, however, was not before the trial court at the time it denied Castillo's motion for mistrial, and Castillo has not complained about either the trial court's denial of Castillo's request to question the jurors prior to the reading of the charge or the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. Further, the jurors all testified unequivocally at the hearing on the motion for the new trial that the statement was not mentioned during the deliberations on punishment and did not bear on the outcome of the deliberations.
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In his third point of error, Castillo asserts the trial court erred by admitting evidence of extraneous offenses during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. During its case-in-chief, the State offered evidence of Castillo's two prior convictions for aggravated assault and one prior conviction for assault. Castillo objected the evidence was inadmissible under rules of evidence 404(b) and 403. The State argued the evidence was admissible to rebut Castillo's claim of self-defense. The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible.
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses for an abuse of discretion. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We will not reverse a decision that is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 343-44. A trial court's decision to admit evidence of an extraneous offense is generally within this zone if the evidence shows (1) the extraneous offense is relevant to a material, non-propensity issue, and (2) the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Id. at 344.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible "to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). But it may "be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id. Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, rather than exclusion, and excludes "only that evidence that is offered (or will be used) solely for the purpose of proving bad character and hence conduct in conformity with that bad character." De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343.
Extraneous offense evidence is admissible to rebut a defensive issue that negates one of the elements of the offense. Id. A party may introduce evidence of an extraneous offense if the evidence "logically serves to make more or less probable an elemental fact, an evidentiary fact that inferentially leads to an elemental fact, or defensive evidence that undermines an elemental fact." Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). A defense opening statement may open the door to the admission of extraneous offense evidence to rebut defensive theories presented in that opening statement. Id. at 344-45; Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Here, Castillo's counsel argued during his opening statement that Castillo acted in self- defense during the confrontation with Kane. Further, Castillo designated, under the rule of optional completeness, portions of his interview with Eppler relating to Kane having a weapon and Castillo acting in self-defense. Castillo also questioned Eppler about whether Castillo could have been acting in self-defense. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that, beginning with the opening statement, Castillo attempted to portray Kane as the aggressor and Castillo as merely defending himself and lacking criminal intent. Once Castillo claimed he acted in self-defense, the State was allowed to rebut the defense with evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts where Castillo was the aggressor. See Halliburton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Render v. State, 347 S.W.3d 905, 921 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet. ref'd)
The evidence offered by the State showed Castillo was involved in two unprovoked violent altercations. A third incident showed Castillo continued to beat a victim who was lying helpless on the ground. Castillo's history of extremely violent behavior rebuts his defensive theory that he acted in self-defense during the confrontation with Kane. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the evidence was admissible under rule 404(b). See Bass, 270 S.W.3d at 563; Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Castillo contends that, even if the evidence was relevant, it should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. "Unfair prejudice" does not arise from the mere fact that the evidence injures a party's case, because virtually all evidence that a party offers will be prejudicial to the opponent's case. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Evidence is "unfairly prejudicial" only when it tends to have some adverse effect on a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justifies its admission. Id. In conducting an analysis under rule 403, the trial court:
must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent's need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In practice, the factors in this balancing test frequently blend together. Id.
Applying these factors, we first note that the inherent probative force of the extraneous offense evidence was significant because it tended to rebut Castillo's self-defense theory and was highly probative of Castillo's intent, a material issue at trial. See Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 882 (stating that extraneous offense evidence was probative to rebut the central issue at trial as raised by the defense). Because the evidence had substantial probative value, there was little tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis or to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues. It took the State little time to present the evidence to the jury, and Castillo identifies no similar evidence the State could have used to rebut his defensive theory. Considering all the relevant factors, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence over Castillo's rule 403 objection.
Because we have concluded the evidence was properly admitted to rebut Castillo's self-defense theory, and the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, we conclude that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the extraneous offense evidence. We resolve Castillo's third point of error against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110202F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JIMMY AARON CASTILLO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-11-00202-CR
Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court of Grayson County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 059659).
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Morris and Myers participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered May 18, 2012.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE