The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a conspicuous place on the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and the owner of the vehicle doing the striking. FN35. Martin, supra at 120(3), 692 S.E.2d 741. Compare Castillo v. State, 263 Ga.App. 772, 774(2), 589 S.E.2d 325 (2003) (no reversible error to instruct jury on trafficking in 28 grams or more of cocaine when indictment charged trafficking in a greater amount because an accused โcan commit the crime of trafficking in only one way, by being involved with more than 28 grams of cocaineโ)(punctuation omitted). FN36. Collier, supra.
OCGA ยง 40-6-271 (a) provides: "The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a conspicuous place on the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and the owner of the vehicle doing the striking."Martin, supra at 120 (3); Compare Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 774 (2) ( 589 SE2d 325) (2003) (no reversible error to instruct jury on trafficking in 28 grams or more of cocaine when indictment charged trafficking in a greater amount because an accused "can commit the crime of trafficking in only one way, by being involved with more than 28 grams of cocaine"). Furthermore, because no reversible error occurred with respect to the jury instruction on failure to stop upon striking an unattended vehicle, Fairwell cannot succeed on her related claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to that instruction.
The evidence was sufficient to support Thomas' conviction for trafficking in heroin. Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) ( 589 SE2d 325) (2003). 2.
(Footnote omitted.) Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) ( 589 SE2d 325) (2003). Nonetheless, Martinez was convicted and sentenced under OCGA ยง 16-13-31 (a) (1) (C) for knowingly possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine or any mixture of cocaine with a purity often percent or more. The quantity of cocaine that was weighed and tested by the laboratory expert amounted to 982.
Ruffin, C. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. See Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 775 (4) ( 589 SE2d 325) (2003) (no ineffective assistance in failing to object to trial court's statements in course of colloquy over whether evidence should be admitted because those statements did not violate OCGA ยง 17-8-57); Adams v. State, 264 Ga. 71, 76 (7) ( 440 SE2d 639) (1994).Castillo, supra.
A trial court's conclusion that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous.Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 775 (4) ( 589 SE2d 325) (2003). Trial counsel announced that he could introduce exculpatory documentary evidence about when Gibbs acquired gold teeth but failed to offer such evidence after the state announced that it would object based on counsel's noncompliance with his reciprocal discovery obligations.
(Footnotes omitted.) Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 775(4) ( 589 S.E.2d 325) (2003). Rogers contends that he offered his defense counsel two areas of exculpatory evidence which required that he testify in his defense, but that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying.
While petitioner argues that changing the amount of cocaine in the indictment is substantive and therefore only the grand jury may amend it, Georgia law explicitly rejects that contention. See Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 773 (2003)(stating that any quantity of cocaine above the statutory amount of 28 grams "affects sentencing, not the manner in which the crime is committed"); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. App. 337, 338 (2002)("[T]o be guilty of trafficking in cocaine, one need only possess 28 grams or more of cocaine. . . . Larger amounts by specified increments affect only the punishment and are therefore not material allegations to prove the crime of trafficking.")(internal citations omitted); Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 327 (1988) (holding there was not a fatal variance where the indictment charged the defendant with trafficking 400 grams of cocaine but the evidence showed only 319 grams, because the code section only requires 28 grams of cocaine and "[l]arger amounts by specified increment affect only the punishment.").