Nos. 05-09-01299-CR, 05-09-01300-CR
Opinion Filed July 21, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F07-14889-HI F07-14903-HI.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice MURPHY.
Roseann Castillo waived a jury trial and pleaded guilty to intoxication manslaughter and failure to stop and render aid. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021(c), 550.023(3) (Vernon 1999 Supp. 2009). Appellant also pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph contained in each indictment. After finding appellant guilty of both offenses, the trial court assessed punishment at eleven years' confinement in each case, to be served concurrently. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine her concerning her opinion of the veracity of another witness. We affirm. We issue this memorandum opinion because the law to be applied is well settled. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
Appellant contends the error occurred during the punishment hearing following her guilty plea. The trial court heard testimony from various witnesses related to what happened on the night of the accident. One witness, Al Barboza, testified that before the accident, he had been drinking with appellant at his place of employment. After they left, she followed him back to his apartment. He testified that when she arrived at his apartment, he noticed damage to her car and asked her what happened. Barboza recalled appellant told him that "someone came out of nowhere" and "hit her on the side of her vehicle." Barboza testified he told appellant to "get back to the scene," but appellant asked him to help her hide her vehicle. He said appellant "was concerned about losing her job and going to jail." Appellant testified she did not recall telling Barboza to help her hide her car. On cross-examination, however, she testified affirmatively that she "did not say that." The following exchange then occurred: Q. [Prosecutor]: Okay. Why would Al lie about just that one piece of testimony? What motivation would he have to lie about that after he said you were so sincere and you were real concerned about —
[Appellant's Counsel]: Judge, I'm going to object to speculating on what Al would have done or said. Calls for speculation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[Appellant's Counsel]: You overruled the objection, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Overruled the objection.
Q. [Prosecutor]: You may answer.
A. [Appellant]: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question.
Q. [Prosecutor]: You said Al is lying about you saying — about you trying to hide your car before going back to the scene. And then my question is what would — what reason would he have to lie about that when he comes to testify and said that you were sincere and remorseful about every other aspect of the accident? Why would he lie about that one piece of testimony?
A. [Appellant]: Probably to save himself from being involved.
DISCUSSION
In her sole point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask her, over objection, "to call her friend a liar." She argues that it is improper to require her to offer an opinion as to the veracity of testimony from another witness that contradicts her own testimony. She criticizes the State's question as a "cheap shot," intended to damage her credibility and character. She argues that by allowing the State's question, the trial court unfairly "forced" her to make a choice between "admitting a cover-up or calling her own friend a liar." Appellant maintains the trial court assessed a harsher sentence based on the testimony that she asked Barboza to help her hide her car, as well as her "alleged concern about not getting caught." The State responds that appellant has waived any error because her complaint at trial does not comport with her complaint on appeal. We agree with the State. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint on appeal, a party must have made a timely and specific request, objection, or motion to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The purpose of the specificity requirement in rule 33.1(a) is to (1) inform the court of the basis of the objection and give it an opportunity to rule on it; and (2) give opposing counsel the opportunity to respond to the complaint. Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Importantly, a party's "point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial." Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (point of error raised on appeal must correspond to objection made at trial). The record before us reveals that appellant objected when the prosecutor asked her why Barboza would lie about appellant asking him to help her hide her car. The basis of her objection, however, was that the question called for speculation; that is, she was being asked to speculate "on what [Barboza] would have done or said." At no time did appellant complain to the trial court that it was error to permit the State's question because it called for her to offer an opinion on the veracity of Barboza. Nor did she object on the basis that the State was attempting to damage her credibility and character by asking her "to call her friend a liar." After the trial court permitted the State's question, appellant made no further objection. Thus, the trial court was only called upon to rule on the basis that the question called for speculation and "never had the opportunity to rule upon" the specific rationale appellant now presents on appeal. Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Because the objection appellant made to the trial court does not correspond to her complaint on appeal, we conclude appellant did not properly preserve error. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment in both cases.