So we consider that argument abandoned. See, e.g., Castelvetere v. Messer, 611 F. App'x 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding appellant "abandoned th[e] issue" because he "fail[ed] to cite a single authority [to] support" his "assert[ion]" that the government's conduct violated substantive due process and only alleged that the conduct shocks the conscience (citing Williams, 544 F.3d at 690)). C.
Thus, we consider that argument abandoned. See Castelvetere v. Messer, 611 F. App'x 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding appellant "abandoned th[e] issue" because he "fail[ed] to cite a single authority [to] support" his "assert[ion]" that the government's conduct violated substantive due process and only alleged that the conduct shocks the conscience). We evaluate the merits of Prado's procedural due process arguments on the other five events.
These claims should not be tried by a federal tribunal that no longer has original jurisdiction over any of the remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction ....”); Castelvetere v. Messer, 611 Fed.Appx. 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen all federal claims are dismissed . . . the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims ....”); United States v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[Federal appeals courts] have indicated a strong preference for the dismissal of pendent or ancillary claims whenever the district court disposes of the federal claim or claims prior to trial.”).
Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254- 55 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Castelvetere v. Messer, 611 Fed.Appx. 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2015) (same). The Court recommends applying that rule of thumb here.
Parra, 2017 WL 2889559. As a result, he could not "show causation for purposes of [a] § 1983 claim," Castelvetere v. Messer, 611 F. App'x 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006)), for what he describes as Defendants' "quest for persecution." (Doc. No. 61-1 at 11).
A First Amendment retaliation claim “does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.” Castelvetere v. Messer, No. 1:12-cv-02453, 2014 WL 977709, n. 7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2014), aff'd, 611 Fed.Appx. 250 (6th Cir. 2015) (the injury underlying the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim was his indictment, which occurred more than two years before he filed the complaint).