" Id. "[I]n determining whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion, we must consider whether the evidence in the record provided a sufficient foundation to allow the trial judge to [determine that] the complaint [was made] without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense."Castelow v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 305, 311, 512 S.E.2d 137, 139 (1999) (emphasis removed). To support his argument that the record in the instant case is insufficient to provide an adequate foundation for the trial court to admit the child's report to her stepmother, appellant relies on our holding in Castelow.
eleven-year-old victim's twenty-one-month delay in reporting her grandfather's inappropriate sexual conduct was adequately explained where the child testified "that she did not tell anyone about the incident because her grandfather told her not to tell," she "didn't think anybody was going to believe her," and "she felt scared and threatened" by the defendant); Terry, 24 Va.App. at 636, 484 S.E.2d at 618 (holding that twelve-year-old victim adequately explained ten-month delay where the victim "was afraid her mother would not believe her because the defendant was her mother's good friend" and she was afraid that, if she told her father, "he would hurt the defendant and end up in jail"); cf. Lindsey, 22 Va.App. at 16-17, 467 S.E.2d at 827 (holding that a letter written by a thirteen-year-old victim two years after her alleged rape was admissible, reasoning that the "issue of the two-year delay was one of credibility," not admissibility). In this respect, the present case differs from Castelow v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 305, 512 S.E.2d 137 (1999), where we held that the victim's statement did not qualify as a "recent complaint" because the victim presented no evidence to explain the sixteen-month delay between the incident and the subsequent complaint. In Castelow, we reasoned that the victim therefore failed to provide an adequate foundation to guide the trial court's exercise of discretion.
The court overruled Almond's objection, stating only that it was "familiar with the cases" the Commonwealth cited. Almond briefly argued that "the Castelow case . . . can be read either way" in response to the Commonwealth's citation of Castelow v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 305, 512 S.E.2d 137 (1999), regarding the issue of a victim's delay in making a complaint. Almond, however, made no further objections regarding the recent complaint rule.
See Rule 3A:12(b) (requiring only notice to adverse parties, not notice within a number of days before the subpoena is issued). See, e.g., Castelow v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 305, 314-15, 512 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1999) (discussing a motion to quash by the Commonwealth). Appellant also argues the trial court denied his right to call for evidence in his favor and to prepare his defense when it denied him access to Dr. Rountree's records.