Opinion
No. CV 05 4007828
October 18, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
On April 19, 2005, the plaintiff, Linda Castelot-Cascone, filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Bridgeport Hospital (Bridgeport), Michael Liebowitz, Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation (Yale), Risk Management Planning Group and Yolanda Gray. Bridgeport, Liebowitz and Yale brought motion to strike #101 which is currently before the court. Risk Management Planning Group and Gray brought their own motion to strike which, on August 2, 2005, Judge Hiller granted with regard to counts one and three. The civil action arises out of a workers' compensation claim.
In count one the plaintiff alleges that the defendants breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to pay workers' compensation benefits including the failure to timely pay for the plaintiff's medical treatment.
In count two the plaintiff alleges that upon her return to work the defendants reassigned her to other duties in the hospital, thereby discriminating against her in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 31-290a.
General Statutes § 31-290a provides in relevant part: "(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."
In count three the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' failure to pay benefits and their failure to timely pay for medical treatment violated General Statutes §§ 38a-815, 38a-816, the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), resulting in a violation of General Statutes § 42-110a, et seq., the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).
On May 9, 2005, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts one, two and three, accompanied by a memorandum in support. On June 17, 2005, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion to strike. Both parties filed subsequent memoranda.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Comn. 375, 378 (1997).
"[I]n determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292 (2004). Additionally, "the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
"A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498. However, "[w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . [and] . . . [w]here the legal grounds for . . . a motion [to strike] are dependent upon underlying facts not alleged in the plaintiff's pleadings, the defendant must await the evidence which may be adduced at trial, and the motion should be denied." Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., supra, 268 Conn. 292-93.
AS TO COUNT ONE
The defendants move to strike count one because Connecticut does not recognize a claim for bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim. The defendants rely on DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487 (2005). The plaintiff argues that her cause of action should survive because Connecticut courts have not barred causes of action for bad faith processing of workers' compensation claims where the defendant's conduct is so egregious as to remove the claim from the scope of the compensation act.
The plaintiff concedes that DeOliveira applies to claims against employers in addition to claims against the employer's insurer. See Yuille v. Bridgeport Hospital, 89 Conn.App. 705 (2005).
The court finds that the defendants' motion to strike count one should be granted because DeOliveira applies and the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to remove her claim from the scope of the workers' compensation act. Count one alleges that despite the lack of any reasonable basis, the defendant willfully, intentionally and repeatedly failed to timely pay and/or promptly pay for the plaintiff's medical treatment and failed to provide benefits when the defendant knew or should have known the plaintiff was entitled to them. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to provide benefits at a time when it had sufficient information to justify its action, failed to promptly pay benefits, and failed to attempt in good faith a prompt, fair and equitable settlement. In sum, the plaintiff alleges the defendants breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing in their handling of her workers' compensation claim.
In DeOliveira, the Connecticut Supreme Court held, "[a] cause of action against an insurer for bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim . . . is barred by General Statutes § 31-284(a), the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), and, therefore, the plaintiff's remedies are limited to those afforded under the act." DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 490. The court noted that the legislature has already given the power to compensation commissioners to impose various penalties on employers for untimely payment of benefits and unduly delaying claims. Id., 496-97. The court "construe[d] the exclusionary provision's prohibition on damages actions for injuries arising out of and in the course of . . . employment to include injuries arising out of and in the course of the workers' compensation claims process." CT Page 13757 Id., 504.
The court did recognize "[t]hat there could be an instance in which an insurer's conduct related to the processing of a claim, separate and apart from nonpayment, might be so egregious that the insurer no longer could be deemed to be acting as an agent of the employer and, thus, a claim arising from such conduct would not fall within the scope of the act." (Emphasis in original.) DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 507. The plaintiff's complaint, however, fails to assert any such facts. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike count one is granted.
AS TO COUNT TWO (LIEBOWITZ AND YALE-NEW HAVEN HEALTH SERVICES)
The defendants move to strike count two as to Liebowitz and Yale because a § 31-290a claim can only be brought against an employer. Neither Liebowitz nor Yale are the plaintiff's employer. The plaintiff argues that Connecticut courts look to federal law to determine whether a suit against Liebowitz and Yale should be allowed. The plaintiff cites federal case law for the proposition that a cause of action properly lies against these two defendants in their capacity as employees, agents, and/or servants of Bridgeport and that she has alleged enough facts to support such a claim.
Both parties fail to cite General Statues § 31-275(10) which defines "employer" for purposes of the compensation act. The court finds that because the plaintiff has not alleged any facts that Liebowitz or Yale are employers as defined in the statute, the motion with regard to these two parties should be and is hereby granted.
"The entire statutory scheme of the [compensation act] is directed toward those who are in the employer-employee relationship as those terms are defined in the act and discussed in our cases. That relationship is threshold to the rights and benefits under the act . . ." Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 680 (2000).
Section 31-290a provides in relevant part: "(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall . . . in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 31-275(10) provides in relevant part: "Employer means any person, corporation . . . or the legal representative of any such employer . . ." Section 31-275(9)(A) defines employee, in part, as any person who "(i) [has] entered into or works under any contract of service . . . with an employer . . ."
As such, at a minimum, in order to state a claim pursuant to § 31-290a, the plaintiff would need to allege (1) that the defendant was an employer as defined, (2) that the employer was subject to the provisions of the compensation act, and (3) that she was an employee as defined in § 31-275(9). Furthermore, because a "[m]otion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged"; Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498; a mere conclusory statement that a defendant is the plaintiff's employer, without more, is insufficient.
In this case the plaintiff has not alleged that Liebowitz or Yale were her employers as defined or legal representatives of her employer. She has not alleged that they were subject to the provisions of the compensation act, and she has not alleged that she was their employee. Instead, the plaintiff only alleges an employer-employee relationship with Bridgeport. She alleges that she was employed as a nurse by Bridgeport, that Bridgeport is a corporation, and that Bridgeport was subject to the provisions of the compensation act. Because the plaintiff fails to plead an employer-employee relationship with Liebowitz and Yale, her complaint fails to state a § 31-290a claim.
Additionally, even though "[w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . ."; Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., supra, 268 Conn. 292; none of plaintiff's allegations necessarily imply that Liebowitz or Yale were her employers. The only two allegations remotely supporting such an implication are the allegations that Liebowitz and Yale are Bridgeport's agents, servants, and/or employees, and that the defendants were obligated to conform their conduct to the provisions of the compensation act. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, however, these are mere legal conclusions which do not imply that the plaintiff was an employee of Liebowitz or Yale, nor do they imply that Liebowitz or Yale are employers. Most importantly, the allegations do not imply that Liebowitz or Yale are subject to the provisions of the compensation act. The court finds that the plaintiff failed to assert the minimum needed to bring a § 31-290a claim and the defendants' motion to strike count two as to Liebowitz and Yale is granted.
AS TO COUNT TWO (BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL)
The defendants move to strike count two as to Bridgeport Hospital for the reason that the plaintiff has not asserted enough facts to support a claim of workers' compensation discrimination.
"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 31-290a, the plaintiff must show that she was exercising a right afforded her under the act and that the defendant discriminated against her for exercising that right." Mele v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 751, 769 (2004). "In other words, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between exercising her rights under the act and the alleged discrimination she suffered. Implicit in this requirement is a showing that the defendant knew or was otherwise aware that the plaintiff had exercised her rights under the act." Id., 776. "To establish [a] prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must first present sufficient evidence . . . [1] that she engaged in protected [activity] . . . [2] that the employer was aware of this activity, [3] that the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff, and [4] that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action, i.e., that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action . . ." Id.
The court denies the defendants' motion to strike count two with regard to Bridgeport Hospital because the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 400 (2005).
In count two, the plaintiff alleges that after sustaining her work-related injury she received medical attention and gave notice to Bridgeport Hospital and to the workers' compensation commission as required by the compensation act. She further alleges that she complied with all of Bridgeport's reasonable requests and that she underwent two surgeries both approved by Bridgeport. These allegations support the contention that the plaintiff exercised her rights under the compensation act, engaged in protected activity and that Bridgeport was aware of such activity.
The plaintiff also alleges that upon her return to work, Bridgeport refused to return her to her original position and instead, reassigned her to another department where she had little experience and familiarity. The plaintiff alleges that Bridgeport later reassigned her original position without offering the position to her and that she informed Bridgeport that she had been cleared for light work and wished to be assigned to work within her capacity. The plaintiff further alleges that as a result of her reassignment she sustained and continues to sustain financial damages and losses and that her reassignment was retaliatory. Construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, these facts support a causal connection between Bridgeport's adverse actions and the plaintiff's exercising her rights.
Because the facts alleged could support a cause of action against Bridgeport Hospital for violation of § 31-290a, the defendants' motion to strike count two with regard to Bridgeport Hospital is denied.
AS TO COUNT THREE
The defendants move to strike count three of the complaint setting forth multiple arguments. The defendants first argue that because CUTPA is inapplicable to an employer-employee relationship, the plaintiff cannot assert a claim against it. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of an insurance contract and therefore the plaintiff cannot assert a claim pursuant to CUIPA. Finally, the defendants argue that DeOliveira foreclosed any possibility of the plaintiff brining a CUIPA/CUTPA action founded upon a claim for bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim.
The plaintiff argues that her CUIPA/CUTPA claim is separate and distinct from her bad faith processing claim and that she has alleged sufficient facts. The plaintiff further argues that although CUTPA does not apply to employer/employee relationships, her complaint should survive because CUTPA claims against employers by employees are not barred and can be brought when the employer's activities lie outside the employer/employee relationship.
The dispositive issue before the court is whether Connecticut recognizes a CUIPA/CUTPA cause of action based upon allegations that the defendant failed to process a plaintiff's workers' compensation claim in good faith.
In DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 487, the plaintiff alleged seven causes of action, including "negligent, reckless and intentional conduct, implied breach of the covenant of good faith, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act . . ." Id., 493. The Connecticut Supreme Court has already thus ruled that the allegations of count three can only be pursued within the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation act. The court stated "injuries arising out of and in the course of the workers' compensation claims process fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions because this process is tethered to a compensable injury. Indeed, every employee who suffers a workplace injury must go through the claims process in order to recover compensation." Id., 503-04.
The third count CUIPA/CUTPA claim arises out of the plaintiff's workers' compensation claims and for that reason the court finds, as per the holding in DeOliveira, that the plaintiff's CUIPA/CUTPA claim is barred. Thus the defendants' motion to strike count three is hereby granted.