Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG06-283347
Kline, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Eve Del Castello appeals in propria persona from the decision of the Alameda County Superior Court granting her petition for a writ of mandate in part and denying it in part, but refusing to declare Vehicle Code section 40215 unconstitutional insofar as it requires a person contesting a parking ticket to pay the fine before seeking a refund at a hearing on the merits. The court found that “the procedures used to schedule an administrative hearing on [appellant’s] parking citation provided constitutionally inadequate notice of the availability of a process to avoid the payment of the fine prior to the hearing by providing satisfactory proof on an inability to pay.” Therefore, the court ordered respondent Alameda County Transit Parking Enforcement Center (the Center) “to permit [appellant] to request an administrative hearing on her parking citation without advance payment of the parking penalty, if, pursuant to Vehicle Code [section] 40215, [appellant] provides satisfactory proof of her inability to pay the amount due in advance of the hearing.” In denying appellant’s ex-parte application to revise its order to find the prepayment requirement and the entire statute unconstitutional, the court found: “Implicit in the Court’s ruling is the determination that Vehicle Code [section 40215] is constitutional. (See Tyler v. County of Alameda (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 777 [(Tyler)].)”
All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code, unless otherwise indicated.
This timely appeal followed, in which appellant challenges the constitutional validity of the statute.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGRUOUND
Appellant was issued a parking ticket on June 21, 2006. Because appellant drove off before the sheriff’s technician completed the citation, the citation was mailed to her. Appellant requested an administrative review of the citation and the citation was upheld following that review. Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate on August 10, 2006. Following a hearing held March 8, 2007, the superior court granted the petition without qualification. On March 14, 2007, the court filed an amended order, clarifying that it had only ruled that the Center’s notice was unconstitutional because it failed to notify appellant that she could apply for a waiver of the prepayment if she qualified under section 40215. On April 27, 2007, the court denied appellant’s ex-parte application seeking to have the court once again revise its order. That order stated: “Implicit in the Court’s ruling is the determination that Vehicle Code [section] 40125 [sic] is constitutional. (See [Tyler, supra, ] 34 Cal.App.4th 777.)”
The court and the parties at various points, in what was obviously a clerical error, erroneously identified the applicable statute as 40125, rather than 40215. All parties knew the challenge was to section 40215. The court cited to the correct statute in its amended order of March 14, 2007, and its April 27th order cited the Tyler case, which only concerned the predecessor statute of section 40215. This error was harmless.
I.
At the outset, we note appellant’s unequivocal statements in her opening and closing briefs that she succeeded in having the ticket dismissed in small claims court in Berkeley. Respondent argues that the matter is therefore moot and appellant does not directly challenge that assertion, arguing only that the matter concerns “due process” for herself and “everyone in this state.” We conclude the matter is moot.
“A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.) ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316, citing Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.)” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.)
II.
Were we to determine the matter were not moot, we would nevertheless conclude the superior court did not err in refusing to strike down the statutory scheme as a violation of due process. Tyler, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 777, held the same prepayment procedure of the statutory predecessor to section 40215 to be constitutional. In Tyler, Division One of this court held “that the statutory scheme for contesting parking tickets does not violate due process requirements. There is no likelihood that the contestant will suffer a serious or permanent loss of money, and the initial administrative review procedure is sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of an erroneous determination by the ticketing officer. We therefore conclude that an evidentiary hearing need not be held before the contestant deposits the parking penalty.” (Id. at p. 787.) In reaching this conclusion, the Tyler court noted that “the statute expressly contemplates indigent contestants and requires the processing agency to establish a procedure for contesting parking tickets by persons who are financially unable to deposit the full amount of the parking penalty. ([Former] § 40200.7.)” (Tyler, at p. 783, fn. 3.) That provision is retained in section 40215, subdivision (b), and was the basis for the superior court’s granting of the writ in part. Tyler was followed by the Sixth Appellate District in Love v. City of Monterey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 562, 564 (Love).)
The statutory scheme for challenging parking tickets at the time of Tyler, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 777, involved sections 40200.7 and 40215. In 1995, the Legislature repealed section 40200.7 and included its provisions within section 40215. The statutory scheme remains substantively unchanged. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 67B West’s Ann. Veh. Code (2000 ed.) foll. § 40215, p. 281.)
The Tyler court did hold that a $25 “processing fee” payable in advance of the administrative hearing was without statutory authority. (Tyler, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) No such fee is involved in this case.
As described in Kahn and Links, Cal. Civil Practice: Civil Rights Litigation (2007 Thompson/West) section 7:16, at page 22: “[Tyler, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 777 and Love, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 562] upheld parking ticket procedures that required persons wishing to contest parking tickets to pay their fines first and then seek a refund following a hearing on the merits. The courts found that the procedures deprived the ticketed persons of property, but applied the balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge [(1976)] 424 U.S. 319 . . . in approving the post-deprivation procedures. The courts observed that there was a legitimate governmental need to collect fines promptly and to deter dilatory and frivolous challenges to citations. These interests counterbalanced the private interest in retaining a parking penalty assessment until after adversary administrative review. The hearing, decision, and refund procedure were all designed to function quickly, so even if the deprivation was adjudged to be wrongful, it could be remedied promptly. All in all, the courts found the procedures to comport with procedural due process.” Tyler, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 777, and Love, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 562, are dispositive of the question. The trial court did not err.
We note that appellant cites to various provisions of the California Constitution regarding self-incrimination and bail. However, these provisions are inapplicable here. “No longer are parking violations treated as infractions within the criminal justice system; instead, they are treated as civil offenses subject to civil penalties and administrative enforcement.” (Tyler, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
We concur: Haerle, J., Lambden, J.