Thus, says the board, because at the time of his firing his position had been reallocated to the unclassified service, he was no longer a "classified" employee and could be fired at will and without cause. We believe Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Casteel v. Vaade, 167 Wis.2d 1, 21 n. 18, 481 N.W.2d 476, 484 (1992), requires rejection of the argument. Donald Castelaz was appointed to a civil service position in the federally funded Milwaukee Model Cities Agency.

With regard to the defendants' assertion that Kramer failed to comply with the notice of claim statute, sec. 895.45, Stats. 1977, the court of appeals ruled that compliance is not required on a sec. 1983 action, citing Perrote v. Percy, 452 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Wis. 1978). With regard to the defendants' assertion that Kramer failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the court similarly noted that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not mandatory in a sec. 1983 action, citing Castelaz v. Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 534-35, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980). On the due process question, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the University deprived Kramer of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.

We believe Utah Construction Mining and Kremer clearly foreshadowed Elliott's later, explicit application of administrative res judicata to sec. 1983 claims. Lindas's final argument is that it would be inequitable to give preclusive effect to the commission's hearings because during the time period at issue, Wisconsin law, per Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980), and Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis.2d 404, 383 N.W.2d 54 (1986), required claimants to exhaust their state administrative remedies prior to initiating a sec. 1983 action in state court. She argues that this exhaustion requirement, coupled with preclusion, impermissibly bars her access to state court.

The basis for this contention is that the complaint, on its face, demonstrates that Kramer had previously commenced administrative action at the time he filed these claims. UWM cites Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980), for the proposition that when there is provided an adequate administrative remedy, including court review of the administrative decision, exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before a sec. 1983 claim may be filed. We disagree.

Under Wisconsin law, civil service laws are not an absolute job guarantee. Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 521, 289 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Casteel v. Vaade, 167 Wis.2d 1, 21 n. 18, 481 N.W.2d 476, 484 n. 18 (1992). Moreover, civil service laws are not intended to prevent good-faith reorganization.

Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1986). See, also Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 521 (1980) (civil service laws do not prevent a city or state from terminating an employee "if there are no funds available or if the position is abolished in good faith or otherwise becomes unnecessary"); Dane County v. McCartney, 166 Wis.2d 956, 963-64 (Ct. App. 1992) (elimination of a position pursuant to a reorganization does not entitle employee to due process). Where this exception applies, it circumscribes the employee's substantive property right.

Thus, "where there is a specific procedure for review of administrative action and for court review of the administrative decision, the remedy before the administrative agency must be pursued prior to resort to judicial remedies." Castelaz v. Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 532, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980) (emphasis added); Accord Nodell Investment Corp. v. Glendale, 78 Wis.2d 416, 422-24, 254 N.W.2d 310 (1977). According to Ferch v. Schroedel, 241 Wis. 457, 461, 6 N.W.2d 176 (1942), where the plaintiff fails to follow the required statutory procedure, the court has no jurisdiction to hear a request for an injunction.

The Vorwald court stated that "[a]bsent civil service regulations or laws * * * a municipal employee is an employee at will and has no property interest in employment. Castelaz v. Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 520, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980); Adamczyk v. Caledonia, 52 Wis.2d 270, 273-274, 190 N.W.2d 137 (1971); accord Amendola v. Schliewe, 732 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1984); compare Hough v. Dane County, 157 Wis.2d 32, 40-42, 458 N.W.2d 543 (Ct.App. 1990)." Accordingly, Wisconsin courts have also held that "[t]he rights of an employee terminable only for cause are considered property rights.

Under Wisconsin law, a public employee has no tenure in his employment absent civil service regulations or laws, or the protections of a contract or collective bargaining agreement authorized by statute. Castelaz v. Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 520, 289 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1980); Adamczyk v. Caledonia, 52 Wis.2d 270, 273-75, 190 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1971). Amendola was admittedly not covered by a contract, collective bargaining agreement or any Kenosha County civil service system.

(Citation omitted.)Id.; see also Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 513, 521 (1980) (stating that civil service laws do not prevent a municipality from terminating an employee "if the position is abolished in good faith"), overruled on other grounds by Casteel v. Vaade, 167 Wis. 2d 1 (1992);Dane County v. McCartney, 166 Wis. 2d 956, 963-64 (Ct.App. 1992) (stating that a governmental employee is not entitled to due process if his position is eliminated pursuant to a reorganization). Thus, a for-cause employee who loses his position because a legislative body abolishes it in good faith does not have a property interest in continuing to serve in the position.