r medical group rather than of Dr. Hartman individually ( see generally Cardenales v Queens-Long Is. Med. Group, EC, 18 AD3d 689, 690; Lawyer v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 246 AD2d 800, 802). Indeed, the plaintiffs established, inter alia, that the plaintiff underwent pre-admission testing by Cardiovascular personnel at Cardiovascular's premises, that the plaintiff was treated by various member physicians of the Cardiovascular group practice, and that the billing for the medical services rendered was in the name of Cardiovascular rather than the individual physicians. Under these circumstances, whether the plaintiff was a patient of the Cardiovascular group, and therefore whether the continuous treatment of the plaintiff by Dr. Hartman may be imputed to the Cardiovascular group and its member physician Dr. Scott so as to render the action against them timely, must be resolved at trial ( see Traphagen v Packer Hosp., 270 AD2d 777, 778-779; Urgovitch v Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 245 AD2d 53, 54; Castano v Lindenhurst Eye Physicians Surgeons, 220 AD2d 477, 478; Polokoff v Palmer, 190 AD2d 897, 899; Ryan v Kountz, 114 AD2d 358; Watkins v Fromm, 108 AD2d 233, 239-240).

The Supreme Court erred in granting Shepko's motion. The continuous treatment doctrine may be applied to a physician who has left a medical group, by imputing to him or her the continued treatment provided by subsequently-treating physicians in that group ( see, Castano v Lindenhurst Eye Physicians Surgeons, 220 A.D.2d 477; McKinney v Bay Ridge Med. Group, 126 A.D.2d 711; Watkins v Fromm, 108 A.D.2d 233). There is an issue of fact as to whether or not the services Shepko rendered to the decedent fell within the scope of that doctrine ( see, McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399; Mandel v. Herrmann, 271 A.D.2d 661; Canter v. East Nassau Med. Group, 270 A.D.2d 381; Pace v Caron, 232 A.D.2d 617). However, contrary to the appellant's contention, Badia's motion was properly granted, and the complaint was properly dismissed insofar as asserted against him since the continuous treatment doctrine was inapplicable to him as a matter of law.

We also note that similar determinations have obtained in the area of medical malpractice. Subsequent treatment by remaining members of a medical group has been imputed to physicians departed from the group for Statute of Limitations purposes, "provided it is established that the patient was treated as a group patient and the subsequent treatment was for the original condition and/or complications resulting from the original condition" ( Watkins v. Fromm, 108 A.D.2d 233, 234; see, McKinney v. Bay Ridge Med. Group, 126 A.D.2d 711, 712; Castano v. Lindenhurst Eye Physicians Surgeons, 220 A.D.2d 477). Moreover, where an agency relationship is shown to exist between two caregivers, continuing treatment by one will be imputed to the other for purposes of tolling the Statute of Limitations under the continuous treatment rule ( see, McDermott v Torre, supra, at 407-408; Watkins v. Fromm, supra, at 241).

[Plaintiff] did not make that decision and was not privy to their internal arrangement" ( Watkins v. Fromm, 108 A.D.2d 233 at 243, 488 N.Y.S.2d 768 ). By providing medical care and treatment within a group practice, the physicians created "what amounted to a joint interest in [plaintiff] with respect to the medical treatment for which he came to the group" ( Watkins v. Fromm , 108 A.D.2d at 243, 488 N.Y.S.2d 768. SeeCastano v. Lindenhurst Eye Physicians and Surgeons, 220 A.D.2d 477, 477, 632 N.Y.S.2d 167 [2d Dept. 1995] ). Plaintiff has established through his testimony and that of defendants that the group had undertaken to monitor his condition for the recurrence of cancer.