Opinion
SA-24-CV-00509-XR
07-23-2024
RUDY CASTANEDA, Plaintiff, v. PLANET FITNESS, INC., AREA DIRECTOR JOHN HENSLEY, UNIT MANAGER URIEL LNU, CLERK JOHN DOE, Defendants.
Honorable Xavier Rodriguez United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation concerns the above-styled cause of action. This case was referred to the undersigned for a ruling on Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a review of the pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On June 11, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP, but the Court withheld service of Plaintiff's Complaint pending review of a More Definite Statement regarding the claims Plaintiff is attempting to bring through this suit. Plaintiff has filed the ordered More Definite Statement, and the Court has undertaken a review of Plaintiff's pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's case be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e).
I. Background and Analysis
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this Court may screen any civil complaint filed by a party proceeding in forma pauperis to determine whether the claims presented are (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.” Biliski v. Harborth, 55 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1995). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on “an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact when the allegations are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional or when they “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). This court is “vested with especially broad discretion” in making the determination of whether an IFP proceeding is frivolous or fails to state a claim. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff's proposed Complaint sues Planet Fitness, Inc., and its Houston, Texas, based Area Director, as well as local San Antonio clerks and managers for terminating his athletic club membership. Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled because of his diagnosis of diabetic peripheral neuropathy, which requires him to wear sandals with socks when using exercise equipment, rather than closed-toe sneakers as required per Planet Fitness policy. Plaintiff claims that he suffered discrimination because a Planet Fitness clerk refused to permit him to exercise when Plaintiff visited his local Planet Fitness wearing socks and sandals instead of athletic shoes. Plaintiff attaches Planet Fitness's safety-based “Club Policies” to his proposed Complaint, which states that “sneakers must be worn at all times.” (Ex. E, Club Policies [#4-1], at 28.) Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he argued with the Clerk and after arguing “motioned his water bottle toward the Clerk and made an empty threat with his bottle . . . as an intimidation” but did not intend to hit the Clerk. (Compl. [#4], at 5-6.) Plaintiff further alleges that several days later, on July 6, 2022, Plaintiff received several calls from the Area Director of Planet Witness and was told he could no longer workout at Planet Fitness and that his membership was being terminated. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff's proposed Complaint asserts causes of action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and the Due Process Clause of the United States and Texas Constitution. Plaintiff has not pleaded plausible claims under any of these legal theories.
First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff does not allege that Planet Fitness was his employer or that he was discriminated against as an employee. Plaintiff therefore cannot state a plausible claim under Title VII.
Plaintiff's claims under the federal and Texas Constitutions are also implausible as pleaded. Plaintiff alleges his due process rights were violated because he was denied use of the Planet Fitness gym despite having a paid membership. The United States Constitution protects citizens from State actions depriving them of their constitutional rights and does not protect against merely private conduct. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The Texas Constitution also requires state action before a litigant can maintain a claim under the Due Process Clause. Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. 1997). Plaintiff alleges that he was harmed by private actors, not State actors, and therefore his allegations fall outside the ambit of the federal and Texas Due Process Clauses.
Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). Section 1985 creates a private right of action for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994). In the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff must also show that the conspiracy was motivated by a race-based animus. Bryan v. City of Madison, Miss., 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff's proposed Complaint does not contain any specific allegations regarding the nature of the alleged conspiracy sufficient to state a claim under Section 1985(3). The undersigned specifically ordered Plaintiff to provide more information about the alleged conspiracy in his More Definite Statement, including the identity of the alleged conspirators and why he believed the conspiracy involved race-based discrimination. Plaintiff's More Definite Statement alleges that there was a racial interaction with Plaintiff because Planet Fitness allowed “Anglo” men and women to use the gym but does not explain the alleged conspiracy with any more specificity. (More Definite Statement [#5], at 6.) These vague allegations do not articulate a plausible cause of action under Section 1985(3) or describe a race-based conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws.
Finally, Plaintiff's proposed Complaint does not plead a right to relief under Title III of the ADA. Title III of the ADA prescribes that: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To assert a viable claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must plead three elements: (1) he has a disability; (2) the place that the defendant owns, leases, or operates is a place of public accommodation; and (3) he was denied full and equal enjoyment because of his disability. Id. Even assuming Plaintiff has alleged all the requisite facts to state such a claim, his proposed Complaint only seeks damages. Title III of the ADA only entitles a plaintiff to injunctive relief, not damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (incorporating into Title III of the ADA the remedial scheme of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, which permits only actions for injunctive relief). The undersigned ordered Plaintiff to address his proposed relief in the More Definite Statement and to “state with specificity” any other relief besides damages he is seeking through this suit. Plaintiff's More Definite Statement again states that he is seeking “monetary damages” but also asserts that he is “seeking injunctive relief so that others do not come across equal distress.” (More Definite Statement [#5], at 4-5.) Plaintiff's general reference to injunctive relief is insufficient to save his ADA claim from dismissal. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff's claims be dismissed.
Moreover, by Plaintiff's own allegations his Planet Fitness membership was terminated not for simply for presenting to the gym with improper footwear but rather for physically threatening a Planet Fitness clerk. Plaintiff is a frequent filer of lawsuits in this District. Plaintiff's suits have repeatedly been dismissed for failure to state a non-frivolous claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1915(e) or for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Castaneda v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 5:21-cv-00632-JKP-RBF; Castaneda v. State of Nevada, 5:22-cv-01353-FB-RBF; Castanda v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 5:23-cv-00807-JKP; Castaneda v. Southwest Key Programs, 5:23-cv-1218-JKP. U.S. District Judge Fred Biery previously warned Plaintiff that continuing to file baseless actions could result in sanctions, including his designation as a vexatious litigant. See Castaneda v. State of Nevada, 5:22-cv-01353-FB-RBF. U.S. District Judge Pulliam subsequently reiterated the admonishment, warning Plaintiff that if he continues to file non-meritorious lawsuits, the Court may impose sanctions. See 5:23-cv-00807-JKP; Castaneda v. Southwest Key Programs, 5:23-cv-1218-JKP. Again, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief on the facts presented in his Complaint and More Definite Statement. The District Court should take Plaintiff's litigation history into consideration in resolving this case and evaluating his future lawsuits. Plaintiff is warned that the undersigned will also consider his pattern of filing in evaluating any future lawsuits. Furthermore, filing future baseless suits could result in the imposition of sanctions, including a pre-suit injunction requiring Plaintiff to seek permission before filing a lawsuit in this Court.
II. Conclusion and Recommendation
Having considered Plaintiff's Complaint under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to Section 1915(e).
III. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party shall file the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).