Opinion
SA-24-CV-00718-JKP
07-23-2024
RUDY CASTANEDA, Plaintiff, v. RODOLFO RAMON FRAUSTO-RECIO, FALCON INSURANCE COMPANY, OFFICER DANIEL M. RAMIREZJR., SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT; SGT. JOHN DOE, SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Elizabeth S. ("Betsy") Chestney, United States Magistrate Judge
To the Honorable United States District Judge Jason K. Pulliam:
This Report and Recommendation concerns the above-styled cause of action. This case was referred to the undersigned for a ruling on Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a review of the pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned will grant Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis but recommend that Plaintiff's case be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e) and that Plaintiff be barred from filing future complaints in the Western District of Texas without obtaining prior approval from a district or magistrate judge.
I. Motion to Proceed IFP
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350, as well as an administrative fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP includes his income and asset information, which demonstrates that Plaintiff does not have sufficient monthly resources available to pay the filing fee, and the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP.
The administrative fee, which is currently $55, is waived for plaintiffs who are granted IFP status. See District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.
II. Frivolousness Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is empowered to screen any civil complaint filed by a party proceeding IFP to determine whether the claims presented are (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After reviewing Plaintiff's proposed Complaint, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims are either legally frivolous or fail to state a claim. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend dismissal under Section 1915(e).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) does not make frivolousness review mandatory before the docketing of a Complaint filed by a non-prisoner Plaintiff proceeding IFP. However, the San Antonio Division has a standing order requiring all Magistrate Judges to undertake such review in conjunction with disposing of a motion to proceed IFP.
Plaintiff's proposed Complaint names a private individual (Rodolfo Ramon Frausto-Recio), an insurance company (Falcon Insurance Company), the San Antonio Police Department, and two officers (Daniel M. Ramirez, Jr., and John Doe). Plaintiff alleges that he was bicycling on a sidewalk on the way to a convenience store when he was hit by a truck (presumably driven by Frausto-Recio). Plaintiff alleges that he sustained physical injuries to his left knee when he fell off the bike. Plaintiff complains that the police officer responding to the scene of the accident did not write a police report or follow the governing rules of the San Antonio Police Department in choosing not to charge Frausto-Recio with a violation of traffic laws. Plaintiff's Complaint references causes of action of negligence and violations of his due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff's Complaint fails to plead a viable cause of action under any of these statutes or common-law theories.
First, Plaintiff has not pleaded any plausible federal cause of action against the San Antonio Police Department or any of its police officers. Plaintiff repeatedly alleges he was discriminated against due to his disabilities; that the San Antonio Police Department conspired with Frausto-Recio to avoid prosecuting him for traffic violations; and that his procedural due process rights were violated. Yet, Plaintiff does not articulate how he was harmed by any of these acts. The only injury asserted by Plaintiff is an injury to his knee from the collision, which was caused by the alleged negligence of Frausto-Recio in the operation of his vehicle, not any act of the San Antonio Police Department or a police officer.
To state a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must first identify a protected life, liberty, or property interest and then show that a governmental action resulted in a deprivation of the interest. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010). The essential elements of procedural due process under the Constitution are notice and an opportunity to respond. Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff does not identify the legal interest at issue that might trigger a right to procedural due process. Insofar as Plaintiff is asserting that he had a life, liberty, or property interest in the prosecution of Frausto-Recio, this theory is legally flawed. The Fifth Circuit has long held that the failure to investigate or prosecute an offense does not give rise to § 1983 liability. Rolen v. City of Brownfield, Tex., 182 Fed. App'x 362, 364 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiff's claim under Title VII also fails as a matter of law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the context of employment. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff does not allege that he was discriminated against as an employee of any Defendant.
Nor has Plaintiff alleged a plausible claim of disability discrimination under the ADA. Title II of the ADA prohibits the providers of public services from discriminating against disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) the plaintiff is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has not articulated any facts relating to this cause of action.
If Plaintiff's federal claims all fail as a matter of law, he must sufficiently plead this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over his remaining claims of negligence against Frausto-Recio. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. This Court only has jurisdiction and authority to entertain cases that either (a) raise a federal question (involve claims arising under the United States Constitution or a federal law) or (b) fall under the Court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. For the Court to have jurisdiction over a state-law claim under the Court's diversity jurisdiction, the matter in controversy must exceed $75,000 and be between citizens of different states. Id. at § 1332(a).
Plaintiff, as the person bringing this case in federal court, bears the burden of establishing this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff also bears the burden to “distinctly and affirmatively” allege the citizenship of the parties. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 919 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citation and quotation omitted.) Plaintiff does not plead the citizenship of Frausto-Recio in his Complaint. Nor has he pleaded an approximate monetary amount of his alleged damages related to his physical injuries. Plaintiff has not established diversity jurisdcition over his negligence claims. Finally, the Complaint does not assert any factual allegations against the insurance company Defendant-Falco Insurance Company.
Typically, when evaluating a pro se plaintiff's proposed complaint under Section 1915(e), the Court would give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to file a More Definite Statement containing additional factual allegations to attempt to cure any deficiencies identified in the Court's initial review before recommending dismissal. But Plaintiff's situation requires a different approach. Plaintiff has already had five cases dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous pursuant to Section 1915(e) in this Court (or recommended for dismissal by a Magistrate Judge). See Castaneda v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 5:21-cv-00632-JKP-RBF; Castaneda v. State of Nevada, 5:22-cv-01353-FB-RBF; Castanda v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 5:23-cv-00807-JKP; Castaneda v. Southwest Key Programs, 5:23-cv-1218-JKP; Castaneda v. Planet Fitness, Inc., 5:24-cv-00509-XR-ESC. U.S. District Judge Fred Biery previously warned Plaintiff that continuing to file baseless actions could result in sanctions, including his designation as a vexatious litigant. See Castaneda v. State of Nevada, 5:22-cv-01353-FB-RBF. U.S. District Judge Pulliam subsequently reiterated the admonishment, warning Plaintiff that if he continues to file non-meritorious lawsuits, the Court may impose sanctions. See Castaneda v. Southwest Key Programs, 5:23-cv-1218-JKP. The undersigned recently issued a similar warning. Castaneda v. Planet Fitness, Inc., 5:24-cv-00509-XR-ESC. In light of this litigation history, Plaintiff should not be permitted the opportunity to file a More Definite Statement and his proposed Complaint should be dismissed under Section 1915(e).
III. Designation as a Vexatious Litigant
A district court may bar a vexatious litigant from filing future complaints unless he seeks the prior approval of a district or magistrate judge. Potts v. Texas, 354 Fed. App'x 70, 71 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1994)). Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that an unrepresented party certifies (1) that all court pleadings and court filings are not “being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation” and that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Violations of this Rule subject a litigant to sanctions, including non-monetary ones, with the goal of “deter[ring] repetition of the conduct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(4). This Rule gives district courts wide discretion in determining what sanctions are appropriate. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 1988). Further, a court may order a party to show cause why conduct has not violated Rule 11 and impose these sanctions sua sponte. Fed R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).
Federal courts also have inherent power to sanction abusive litigation practices “to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice and . . . to command respect for [their] orders, judgments, procedures, and authority.” In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993). Within this inherent authority is the ability to issue a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious filings with the court. Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008). When determining whether the imposition of a pre-filing injunction would be appropriate, the court must weigh all relevant circumstances, including four main factors: (1) the party's history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party's filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions. Id. (internal quotations omitted). If issued, such injunctions “must be tailored to protect the courts and innocent parties, while preserving the legitimate rights of litigants.” Id. at 190.
Plaintiff has been warned repeatedly by various judges in the Western District of Texas's San Antonio Division that filing additional baseless lawsuits could result in the issuance of sanctions. These warnings provided the required notice to Plaintiff that the Court was considering this injunction as a potential sanction, as required by Rule 11(c)(3). All four factors regarding the issuance of a pre-suit injunction also support this sanction. Plaintiff has a history of filing baseless and legally frivolous lawuits without a good faith basis. He filed five cases in a two-year time period that have either been dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous under Section 1915(e) (or recommended for dismisal). His filings have burdened the Court, and lesser sanctions would not adequately deter the filing of additional suits. Accordingly, the Court should issue a pre-filing injunction.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's pro se Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs [#1] is GRANTED.
Having considered Plaintiff's Complaint under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to Section 1915(e). It is further recommended that a pre-suit injunction be issued against Plaintiff and that he be BARRED from filing future complaints in the Western District of Texas without obtaining prior approval from a district or magistrate judge.
V. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party shall file the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).