The pertinent portion of the statute with which we are concerned in the instant case provided in 1875 that any person "who shall commit robbery . . . and shall, in the perpetration thereof, use any personal abuse, force, or violence or be so armed as clearly to indicate violent intentions" shall be imprisoned. Rev. 1875, p. 499 7. The words "with any dangerous Armour or Weapon" were deleted although there had been no intervening action by the General Assembly. "It is presumed that changes in the language of a statute when it is incorporated into a revision are not intended to alter its meaning and effect, and this is particularly true of the Revision of 1875. Bassett v. City Bank Trust Co., 115 Conn. 393, 401, 161 A. 852; State v. Muolo, 118 Conn. 373, 384, 172 A. 875." Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 468, 72 A.2d 479. The revisers' preface to the Revision of 1875 says (p. xii): "We . . . have carefully gone over every section of our existing laws, striking out all unnecessary verbiage and repetitions, and condensing every expression which we thought susceptible of it." It follows that the deletion of these words by the revisers was not intended to alter the meaning and effect of the statute.

These changes, however, cannot be considered as manifesting an intent to alter the meaning and effect of the statute. Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 468, 72 A.2d 479, and cases cited. The legislative history of 53-21 also discloses that in 1921 the first part of the statute was added to an existing statute.

In seeking to ascertain the intent of legislation, "[i]t is presumed that changes in the language of a statute made when it is incorporated into a revision are not intended to alter its meaning and effect, and this is particularly true of the Revision of 1875." Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 468, 72 A.2d 479, and cases cited. It is therefore to be assumed that the revisers in 1875 considered that the word "injure" conveyed the meaning of "injure or deface."

The so-called minority rule, too, was held to be the rule in Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411. Subsequently a statute was passed, and under that statute it was held in Welch's Appeal from Probate, 43 Conn. 342, that the husband should contribute a fair proportion toward the support of the children. See also Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 72 A.2d 479. The so-called minority rule also seems to be substantially in effect in Kentucky. See Christie v. Christie, 223 Ky. 539, 4 S.W.2d 375, wherein it was held that the wife may apply to the court in the divorce proceeding and have the decree modified so as to compel the husband to contribute to the support of the minor children, and if she is able to serve notice upon the former husband she cannot recover a judgment for past support.

This obligation is not terminated per se by the divorce of the parents of the child; Welch's Appeal, 43 Conn. 342, 350; although, by virtue of 7340 of the General Statutes, after divorce the obligation is upon both parents to maintain the children of their marriage according to their respective abilities and the court may inquire into the pecuniary ability of each and make such decree against either or both for such maintenance as it considers just. Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 465, 72 A.2d 479. Correlative to the duty of the father to support is the right to the custody and companionship of the child.

See Miller v. Phoenix State Bank Trust Co., 138 Conn. 12, 16. "There is a presumption that a general revision of the statutes does not change the law . . . ." Ibid.; see State v. DeGennaro, 147 Conn. 296, 303; Wilson v. Miller, 144 Conn. 212, 216; Norwalk v. Daniele, 143 Conn. 85, 87; Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 468. This statute had received no further legislative action except through the approval of subsequent revisions and codifications.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff as the moving party has the burden of proof on the issue of earning capacity, see Castagnola v. Fatool, 16 Conn. Sup. 119, aff'd. 136 Conn. 462 (1949); and on the present record she has failed to prove an earning capacity for the defendant sufficient to support her claim for $316 or more in weekly child support. The evidence also indicates that although in prior years the parties enjoyed a fairly comfortable standard of living, this standard of living appears to have been accomplished by the family living beyond its means as evidenced by their debt, the foreclosure on their home, and the defendant's bankruptcy.

Id., p. 350. In 1950, our Supreme Court reviewed the development of our law of child support and held in Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462 (1950) at pps. 467-468:

A minor child in need of support must be maintained by both parents according to their respective abilities. This continues to be the common law rule as applied to divorced parents, Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, and the more recent statutory amendments have not altered the common law rule, Guille v. Guille, 196 Conn. 260). In an appropriate situation, the non-custodial parent's assets may be secured as allowed by 46G-84(d), C.G.S. in order to provide child support.

"It is presumed that changes in the language of a statute made when it is incorporated into a revision are not intended to alter its meaning and effect. . . ." Castagnola v. Fatool, 136 Conn. 462, 468. "Unless it clearly appears otherwise, revisers are presumed to have expressed in their revision the intent of existing statutes, though they may have altered the form of their statement. . . . The language of the statute as revised or the legislative intent to change the former statute must be clear before it can be pronounced that the statute was changed in respect to its construction and operation." Wilson v. Miller, 144 Conn. 212, 216.