Opinion
C041972.
10-9-2003
TIMOTHY F. CASSIDY, as Successor Trustee etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PATRICK A. CASSIDY, Defendant and Appellant.
In four prior appeals we considered a variety of allegations by defendant Patrick A. Cassidy against his brother, plaintiff Timothy F. Cassidy, successor trustee of the Harry W. Cassidy Living Trust.[] The skirmishes began following the death of Harry Cassidy, the patriarch of the Cassidy clan. Harry left a will and trust distributing his estate and naming Timothy as successor trustee. Patrick challenged the validity of the trust in a series of petitions. We affirmed the courts dismissals of the petitions.[] We also affirmed the trial courts determination that Patricks petitions constituted a violation of the no-contest clause of Harrys trust.[]
We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity and simplicity. No disrespect is intended.
Cassidy v. Cassidy (Mar. 11, 2003, C037903) (nonpub. opn.) and Cassidy v. Cassidy (Apr. 8, 2003, C039379) (nonpub. opn.).
Cassidy v. Cassidy (Mar. 13, 2003, C040825) (nonpub. opn.).
Timothy filed a motion to declare Patrick a vexatious litigant. The trial court entered a "Prefiling Order — Vexatious Litigant." On appeal, Patrick, proceeding in propria persona, contends Timothy failed to make a proper motion to have Patrick declared a vexatious litigant, the statement of decision failed to identify any frivolous pleading, insufficient evidence supports the order, and the court erred in failing to record the proceedings. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Harry, father of Patrick, Timothy, James, and Sharon Cassidy, executed a living trust and a related will. Harry died, leaving his four children. A living trust identified in the will named the four children as beneficiaries. The trust gave each child, including Patrick, a gift of $5,000. The trust stated it made no other provision for Patrick. Under the terms of the trust, Timothy succeeded Harry as trustee. The trust included a no-contest clause that revoked any share or interest of any beneficiary who contested or attacked the trust.
Patrick filed a series of three petitions challenging the validity of the trust and accusing Timothy of various nefarious misdeeds, including undue influence on their father, squandering the resources of the trust, failure to provide an accounting, and breach of the trust. The trial court granted Timothys motion to dismiss the three petitions, finding them not reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of the trustee or beneficiaries. We affirmed the judgment in Cassidy v. Cassidy, supra, C037903.
Subsequently, Patrick filed a fourth petition. The trial court dismissed causes of action to ascertain beneficiaries, remove the trustee, and compel redress of breach of trust under the doctrine of res judicata. The court granted the cause of action for an accounting and denied the cause of action for payment of the specific devise without prejudice pending the accounting. Patrick attempted to appeal from the minute orders. We dismissed the appeal in Cassidy v. Cassidy, supra, C039379.
Timothy, as trustee, filed a petition for order determining contestants lack of entitlement to distribution of trust gift. The court granted Timothys petition, finding Patricks first petition constituted a contest in violation of the trust. Patrick filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, Patrick appealed and we affirmed the trial courts revocation of the $5,000 gift under the trust in Cassidy v. Cassidy, supra, C040825.
Prior to the trial courts order denying the motion for reconsideration that was the subject of Cassidy v. Cassidy, supra, C040825, Timothy filed a "Notice of Motion for Prefiling Order Prohibiting Vexatious Litigant from Filing New Litigation in Propria Persona." Patrick opposed the motion.
Patrick filed a motion for change of venue to move the action from the probate court to the superior court in conjunction with a separate personal injury tort action Patrick brought against Timothy and his other siblings. The trial court denied the motion.
The court heard oral argument on Timothys vexatious litigant motion. The court concluded: "Mr. Cassidy [Patrick], I think you got a problem here, and Ill be honest with you, in terms of bringing the motions. [¶] . . . I think youre entitled to bring your petitions. And you dont have to like the Courts ruling. But the petitions tend to incorporate other matters previously ruled on, and they are derisive of the Courts rulings, which really colors the way the Court sees what you are doing. [¶] Its one thing to seek an adjudication, but its another thing to file lengthy briefs . . . referring to multiple documents that tend to overlap. [¶] And in light of the way you address Mr. Walker [Timothys counsel] on the envelope,[] and the Court in the pleadings, . . . this . . . appears to be an intentional tactic designed to burden them in trying to unwind what is precisely before the Court, and to make them face over and over the same issues previously heard and determined . . . . Quite literally [it] seems that — that youre just trying to harass Timothy with the pleadings. [¶] If you had filed — simply asked for an adjudication, that would be one thing. But the way theyve come in, it looks like youre just trying to drive up his legal costs."
An envelope was entered into evidence. The envelope, sent from Patrick to Timothys counsel, is addressed to "Kevin M. (Foghorn Leghorn) Seibert and Juan D. (Doofus) Walker."
The trial court entered a "Prefiling Order — Vexatious Litigant." The order states Patrick "is prohibited from filing any new litigation [against Timothy] in propria persona in the courts of California without approval of the presiding judge of the court in which the action is to be filed." The order does not require Patrick to furnish security under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1.[]
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
As requested, the court issued a detailed statement of decision. The court found Patrick a vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(3). In support, the court provided a detailed chronology of the various pieces of litigation filed by Patrick in his Ahab-like pursuit of Timothy. The court concluded Patrick filed numerous frivolous and unmeritorious papers.
Following entry of the order, Patrick filed a motion for reconsideration. The court denied the motion and cited Patrick for contempt of court. Patrick filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Section 391, subdivision (b) defines several categories of vexatious litigants, including one who, "[in] any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." (§ 391, subd. (b)(3).)
A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. On appeal, we uphold the ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219 (Bravo).) We presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment. (Ibid.)
The Legislature passed vexatious litigant statutes to curb misuse of the courts by litigants acting in propria persona who repeatedly relitigate the same issues. These persistent and obsessive litigants often file groundless actions against judges and other court officers who made decisions adverse to them. This abuse of the system wastes court time and resources and prejudices other parties waiting their turns before the courts. (Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 220-221.) Section 391.7 does not deny the vexatious litigant access to the courts but operates solely to preclude the initiation of meritless lawsuits and their attendant expenditures of time and money. These statutes are constitutional and do not deprive a litigant of due process of law. (Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222.)
II
Patrick contends Timothy never filed a proper motion to have him declared a vexatious litigant, a condition precedent to obtaining a valid prefiling order.[] Patrick faults Timothy for filing only a motion for a prefiling order, not a motion to have Patrick declared a vexatious litigant. According to Patrick, Timothys motion "simply concluded and assumed Patrick was a vexatious litigant, without ever presenting any evidence to support this self-serving conclusionary statement." We disagree.
Initially, Patrick challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter the prefiling order. However, in his reply brief, Patrick abandons this contention.
Timothys motion states it is made "on the ground that petitioner Patrick A. Cassidy is a vexatious litigant as defined under section 391(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure." The memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion is accompanied by a declaration by Juan D. Walker that painstakingly summarizes the myriad motions filed by Patrick and the trial courts ruling on each one. The Walker declaration also summarizes the various peremptory challenges by Patrick against Judge Sueyres of the trial court, including Patricks vitriolic accusations against the judge. Timothy filed a valid motion under section 391.7.
Patrick also argues that Timothy, as the plaintiff, lacked standing to invoke the vexatious litigant statute against Patrick, the defendant. Section 391, subdivisions (d) and (e) define "plaintiff" and "defendant" for the purposes of the vexatious litigation statute. Section 391, subdivision (d) states: "`Plaintiff means the person who commences, institutes or maintains a litigation or causes it to be commenced, instituted or maintained, including an attorney at law acting in propria persona." Patrick appears to read this definition as barring Timothy from bringing a motion to have Patrick declared a vexatious litigant.
However, section 391 does not support Patricks interpretation. Section 391, subdivision (b) states: "`Vexatious litigant means a person who does any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." (Italics added.) Nothing in section 391 requires that the person bringing the vexatious litigant motion be a defendant.
In addition, over the course of the litigation between the brothers, Patrick has been the plaintiff or moving party in many of the underlying disputes. Patrick filed four petitions challenging Timothys handling of the trust. We find no merit to Patricks argument that, as the plaintiff, Timothy could not file a motion to have Patrick declared a vexatious litigant.
III
Patrick also faults the trial courts statement of decision for failing to identify any particular pleading or motion as being frivolous or filed for an improper purpose. Again, Patrick is mistaken. Our review of the statement of decision reveals a fulsome list of Patricks litigation activities.
The court noted Patricks filing of the three petitions challenging Timothys administration of the trust, Patricks peremptory challenge to Judge Sueyres, Patricks objection to the decision denying the peremptory challenge, Patricks filing of a fourth petition after the court dismissed the previous three petitions, Patricks second peremptory challenge to Judge Sueyres, Patricks motion to show cause and for contempt against Timothy, Patricks third peremptory challenge to Judge Sueyres, and Patricks motion to vacate the trial courts order finding Patricks petitions constituted a contest.
The statement includes a brief analysis of the repetitive nature of the actions and includes snippets of some of Patricks more vociferous accusations against both the court and his brother. We find no evidence of the "Kangaroo Court proceedings" Patrick claims taint the record.
Patrick also contends the judgment entered by the trial court is "completely insane" and a "phantom judgment." The trial court, in its statement of decision, states: "Judgment is to be entered in accordance with this Statement of Decision." We find no lunacy or invisibility in the courts pronouncement.
In addition, Patrick contends the trial court ignored the automatic stay provisions of section 916, arguing jurisdiction of the proceedings involving his four petitions resides in this court. According to Patrick, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare him a vexatious litigant.
However, the perfecting of an appeal under section 916, subdivision (a) only stays the order appealed from or matters embraced therein or affected thereby. The trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the order. (Sherry H. v. Thomas B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1502-1503.) Here, Timothy sought to have Patrick declared a vexatious litigant, a matter unconnected with the underlying subject matter of the prior appeals.
IV
Patrick contends insufficient evidence supports the trial courts finding that he is a vexatious litigant under section 391. According to Patrick, the only evidence submitted in support of Timothys motion was Walkers declaration and the envelope that included "nicknames" of Timothys counsel.[]
See footnote 4 ante, at page 4.
We disagree. The trial court, in its statement of decision, cited numerous motions and pleadings filed by Patrick in San Joaquin Superior Court case No. 70255. Painstakingly, the court annotated the listing of each piece of litigation, concluding the litigation filed by Patrick was frivolous and unmeritorious. In addition, the court summarized the vituperative language employed by Patrick against both the court and opposing counsel. The trial court heard these motions and ruled on the various petitions. In doing so, the court observed the demeanor and conduct of Patrick toward both the court and opposing counsel. We find the court had before it evidence sufficient to determine Patrick was repeatedly filing unmeritorious motions solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (§ 391, subd. (b)(3).)
V
Finally, Patrick contends the trial courts failure to record the proceedings on July 12, 2002, amounts to a miscarriage of justice. In a recurring motif, Patrick alleges: "The conduct by Judge Sueyres in this case has been deplorable, and appears to be out of a corrupt motive to favor Timothy at every turn, and to use the law as a bludgeon against Patrick at every turn, regardless of the law and the facts."
On July 12, 2002, the trial court held oral argument on Patricks motion to vacate the prefiling order and motion to strike. Patricks motion to vacate requested a court reporter. The record contains only a minute order of the hearing; no reporters transcript appears in the record.
Patrick argues: "Judge Sueyres abused his discretion when he refused to provide a court reporter, and Patrick has been prejudiced because it makes it impossible for Patrick to provide an adequate record from which he can demonstrate that the court abused its discretion."
The Superior Court of San Joaquin County, Local Rules, rule 1-103 states: "An official court reporter shall report the following court proceedings (including trial) whether contested or uncontested: [¶] a. Civil Jury trials; [¶] b. Juvenile proceedings; [¶] c. Any court proceedings ordered by the court; and [¶] d. Any other court proceeding for which a party requests a court reporter . . . ." (Italics added.) Although Patrick blames the trial court for the absence of a reporter, he fails to explain why he did not request a continuance when he realized no reporter was present.
Even if the court erred in not providing a court reporter at the July 12, 2002, hearing, Patrick does not explain how he has been harmed by the error. Patricks motion to vacate raises largely the same issues regarding the trial courts vexatious litigation order as the present appeal. We have considered these claims and found them without merit. The absence of a transcript does not appear to have compromised his case on appeal. Given the written motion, we find no reasonable probability a transcript of the hearing would change the outcome.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed. Timothy shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J. and ROBIE, J.