eges that she slipped and fell in a puddle located on an exterior landing of premises owned, managed and/or operated by defendants, and that two yellow caution cones had been placed against the wall, to her right and left, as she exited, but not in the area of the liquid condition. The presence of caution cones here created a triable issue of fact as to prior actual notice of the condition, as defendants' witness admitted that they would place such caution cones to alert others to a slippery condition and plaintiff denied that the cones were being used to prop open a door, as had been alleged by defendants' witness ( see Felix v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 64 A.D.3d 499, 883 N.Y.S.2d 40 [2009]; Hilsman v. Sarwil Assoc., L.P., 13 A.D.3d 692, 786 N.Y.S.2d 225 [2004] ). Additionally, while the hearsay portions of a witness affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion, which referred to an unidentified person or persons having admitted prior notice of the condition, were inadmissible ( see Cassanova v. General Cinema Corp. of N.Y., 237 A.D.2d 155, 654 N.Y.S.2d 758 [1997]; Pascarella v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 280 A.D.2d 279, 720 N.Y.S.2d 461 [2001] ), the witness's first hand account of providing defendants with notice of the condition at least 45 minutes before the accident raised triable issues of fact as to prior actual and constructive notice of the condition.

Before: Sullivan, P.J., Nardelli, Williams, Tom, Friedman, JJ. The motion was properly granted since plaintiffs failed to submit competent evidence that defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazard, i.e., creamy perfume on the floor of its cosmetics department, prior to plaintiff's alleged slip and fall. Alleged statements by unidentified employees of defendant purportedly made to plaintiff, that they had seen the foreign substance on the floor prior to the incident and had asked someone to clean it up, were not competent evidence to defeat defendant's summary judgment motion since, inter alia, the alleged statements were not shown to have been made within the scope of the employees' authority (see, Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of New York New Jersey, 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 1041; Cassanova v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 237 A.D.2d 155). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

Plaintiff Bernard Koenig alleges that, while attending a wedding reception catered by defendant Zanetti and held in the back yard of premises owned by defendant Shostal, he sustained injuries when he slipped and fell on a wet and muddy walkway. We agree with the motion court's determination to dismiss the action since it is clear from the record that neither defendant created the muddy condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence ( see, Cassanova v. General Cinema Corp., 237 A.D.2d 155). While it had rained steadily on the day of the wedding reception, that circumstance does not fairly demonstrate or even raise a factual issue as to whether defendants had notice of the specific hazard alleged by plaintiff to have caused his harm, much less does it demonstrate that defendants had or are chargeable with sufficient advance knowledge of the hazard to enable them to take precautionary measures ( see, Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836). Concur — Milonas, J. P., Wallach, Williams, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.

A finding of liability in a case like this requires evidence that defendant created the dangerous condition which caused the accident, or had actual or constructive notice of that condition. See Cassanova v General Cinema Corp. of New York, Inc., 237 AD2d 155 (1st Dept 1997). To constitute constructive notice, a defective condition must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant to discover and remedy it.