Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05AS01890
BUTZ, J.In this action for discrimination and harassment under the California Fair Employment Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), plaintiff Tamara Cason appeals from a postjudgment order granting the motion of defendants Child and Family Institute (CFI) and Michael Dougherty for attorney fees pursuant to section 12965, subdivision (b). Despite the abysmal quality of Cason’s briefs, we shall reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings because the trial court clearly erred in failing to make any written findings in support of its fee award. (Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 867-868 (Rosenman).)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 5, 2006, Cason filed a second amended complaint against CFI and Dougherty alleging sexual discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation of the FEHA, as well as common law tort causes of action. The principal allegations were directed against Dougherty, who was acting general manager for CFI while Cason was employed there prior to her termination. Cason alleged that Dougherty retaliated against her for her knowledge about a company sexual harassment investigation of him, demeaned and harassed her while she was on medical leave for carpal tunnel syndrome, and replaced her with a “less experienced and less qualified male” after her termination.
Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment. In its minute order granting the motion, the trial court determined that defendants had produced evidence establishing that the material allegations of the complaint were baseless and that plaintiff had not presented any counter evidence raising a triable issue of fact.
Judgment was entered against Cason on February 22, 2007. On April 10, defendants moved to recover their attorney fees under section 12965, subdivision (b), claiming that the lawsuit was “unreasonable, without merit, frivolous and was brought and maintained in bad faith.” Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for fees, attaching the same declaration that she had filed in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
On May 9, 2007, the trial court granted the motion for attorney fees in the amount of $57,388.50. The minute order says simply, “The motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Government Code section 12965 is granted. The evidence discloses that the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.”
Cason filed a notice of appeal from the order granting fees. She has purposely chosen not to pursue an appeal from the order granting summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Briefing
Cason’s briefs are, for the most part, devoid of cognizable legal argument. They mostly consist of a verbatim replication of the declaration Cason filed in opposition to defendants’ motion for attorney fees, coupled with extensive quotations from a federal district court decision purportedly rendered by Judge Edward Garcia in another case dealing with fees. Even if this decision were relevant to the issues on appeal, Cason’s briefs furnish us with no citation that would enable us to locate the decision and read it.
When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; San Mateo County Coastal Landowners’ Assn. v. County of San Mateo (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 523, 559; Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) “When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary.” (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700,citing Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1120 and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. State Bd. of Equalization (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1294.)
Normally, these principles would cause us summarily to dispose of this appeal. However, at the very end of her opening brief, Cason raises a meritorious issue. She states, “[T]he Trial Court offers no guidance as to which standard was purportedly offered by Plaintiff’s/Appellant’s conduct in pursuing the litigation. The Trial Court does not delineate if said conduct was specifically ‘unreasonable’ or ‘frivolous’ or ‘meritless’ or ‘vexatious’ or some combination of said grounds. [O]ur only guidance, as to the Trial Court’s basis in granting the draconian sanction, is that certain unspecified conduct was violative of one or more of the four grounds for an award of fees. [¶] Such a punitive act certainly requires some degree of specificity as to the specific facts and bases of said sanction.” A similar argument appears in Cason’s reply brief.
These passages may fairly be deemed a claim that the trial court erred in failing to render written findings explaining the basis for its fee award. Although Cason’s briefs fail to support the contention with a single citation, our own research has revealed the existence of such authority. Exercising our discretion, we choose to address the issue, since the fee award represents a significant monetary sanction against Cason personally and we do not feel she should be penalized for her attorney’s laxness or ineptitude.
II. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Render Written Findings
Given the similarity between the California and federal anti discrimination acts, our appellate courts have determined that the standards for making an attorney fee award under the FEHA are the same as those articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412 [54 L.Ed.2d 648] (Christiansburg), a case in which the Supreme Court applied an analogous federal statute. (See Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 918,921-922; Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1386-1388 (Cummings).)
Under this test, a defendant should be awarded attorney fees “‘not routinely, not simply because he succeeds, but only where the action brought is found to be unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.’” (Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 421 [54 L.Ed.2d at p. 656].) As Christiansburg also noted, however, “vexatious” does not imply that plaintiff’s subjective bad faith is a prerequisite. (Id. at p. 421 [54 L.Ed.2d at pp. 656-657].)
In Cummings, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, Division Seven indicated that a trial court awarding fees to a prevailing defendant should make express findings concerning the lack of merit of a plaintiff’s discrimination claim. (Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388.) In Rosenman, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 859, the same court expanded on this principle, imposing “a nonwaivable requirement that trial courts make written findings reflecting the Christiansburg/ Cummings standard in every case where they award attorney fees in favor of defendants in FEHA actions.” (Rosenman, at p. 868, italics added; accord, see Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 814, 831.) As the Rosenman court explained, “requiring such findings will go a long way towards limiting defendants’ receipt of attorney fees awards to the extreme cases envisioned by Cummings and Christiansburg.” (Rosenman, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.) Where the required findings are not made by the trial court, the matter must be reversed and remanded for findings, unless the appellate court determines no findings reasonably could be made from the record. (Ibid.)
The trial court’s order granting fees provides no insight as to the basis for its award. It merely iterates the statutory language, without specifying how or in what manner the court found the action to be “unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.”
This is not a case where no findings could reasonably be made from the record. Defendants’ motion was based largely on Cason’s deposition testimony, wherein she admitted she had no evidentiary support for many of the key factual assertions in her complaint and in her answers to interrogatories. Thus, the trial court had plenty of raw material for issuing written findings in support of its order.
Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand to the trial court with directions to make written findings. Such findings will permit meaningful appellate review of the fee award. (See Rosenman, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 867, fn. 39.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting attorney fees is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to render written findings in accordance with Rosenman, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pages 867-868. Cason is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J., DAVIS, J.