Opinion
Index No. 150366/2022 Motion Seq. No. 001
09-08-2022
DHARSHINI CASINATHEN Plaintiff, v. TERRASCEND USA INC., Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
PRESENT: HON. DAVID B. COHEN, Justice.
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
HON. DAVID B. COHEN, Justice.
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL.
In this employment discrimination and breach of contract action, defendant TerrAscend USA Inc. moves, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (2), and (8), for an order dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff Dharshini Casinathen opposes the motion. After consideration of the parties' contentions, as well as a review of the relevant statutes and case law, defendant's motion is decided as follows.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a former Senior Vice President of defendant, a company that grows and sells cannabis products (Doc No. 1 at 1). Plaintiff commenced this action after defendant terminated her employment in April 2021 (Doc No. 1 at 10). Plaintiffs first cause of action was for breach of contract, and the second and third causes of action sounded in gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New York Human Rights Law and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, respectively (Doc No. 1 at 12). Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that her termination was retaliatory since it occurred after she lodged a formal sexual harassment complaint against one of defendant's other employees (Doc No. 1 at 10-11). She further alleged that her termination resulted from gender discrimination given a pattern of women in leadership positions being replaced by male colleagues (Doc No. 1 at 10-11).
Defendant now moves, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (2), and (8) for an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint, arguing that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it and that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs New York Human Rights Law claim (Doc Nos. 5-6). Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York and that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the gender discrimination claim (Doc No. 20).
Legal Conclusions Defendant's Request for Dismissal Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2)
"Whether New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonresident plaintiffs claims under the [Human Rights Law] turns primarily on [his or] her physical location at the time of the alleged discriminatory acts, and not on [his or] her taxpayer status" (Benham v eCommission Solutions, LLC, 118 A.D.3d 605, 606 [1st Dept 2014]; see Wolf v Imus, 170 A.D.3d 563, 564 [1st Dept 2019], Iv denied 34 N.Y.3d 907 [2019]). Nonresidents must allege and demonstrate that the discriminatory acts occurred within New York and that such acts "had an impact in New York" (Hoffman v Parade Pubis., 15 N.Y.3d 285, 291 [2010]; see Hardwick v Auriemma, 116 A.D.3d 465, 466-467 [1st Dept 2014], Iv denied 23 NY3d908 [2014]). To sufficiently demonstrate impact, a plaintiff must specifically allege how the alleged discriminatory act negatively affected "the terms, conditions or extent of [his or] her employment" within New York (Hardwick, 116 A.D.3d at 467-468; accord Jarusauskaite v Almod Diamonds, Ltd., 198 A.D.3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2021], Iv denied 38 N.Y.3d 904 [2022]). "The fact that the alleged discriminatory acts and unlawful decision to terminate plaintiffs employment occurred in New York is insufficient to plead impact in New York" (Pakniat v Moor, 192 A.D.3d 596, 597 [1st Dept 2021] [citations omitted], Iv denied 37 N.Y.3d 917 [2022]; see Jarusauskaite, 198 A.D.3d at 459). Further, "[w]ithout more, [a] plaintiffs mere employment in New York does not satisfy the impact requirement" (Hardwick, 116 A.D.3d at 467 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Because plaintiff worked in New York, she was subject to the protections of the New York Human Rights Law (see Griffin v Sirva, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 174, 188 [2017]; Iwankow v Mobil Corp., 150 A.D.2d 272, 273 [1st Dept 1989]; Matter of Walston & Co. v New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 41 A.D.2d 238, 241 [1st Dept 1973]). However, plaintiff is clearly a nonresident, since she admits that she resided in New Jersey when defendant terminated her employment (Doc No. 1 at 10-11; Doc No. 12 at 5). Therefore, she must demonstrate that the discriminatory acts occurred within New York and impacted her in the state as well (see Hoffman, 15 N.Y.3d at 291). Yet, in her complaint and affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion, she does not identify where defendant's discriminatory acts occurred. She only indicates that she was fired in an April 2021 meeting with two of defendant's corporate officers (Doc No. 1 at 10-11; Doc No. 12). She also fails to assert any factual allegations that defendant's discriminatory acts impacted her in New York (Doc No. 1 at 9-12; Doc No. 12). Thus, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over her New York Human Rights Law claim against defendant (see Pakniat, 192 A.D.3d at 597; Hardwick, 116 A.D.3d at 467-468).
Defendant does not raise the issue of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs New Jersey Law Against Discrimination claim (Doc No. 1 at 12; Doc No. 6 at 25-27).
Defendant's Request for Dismissal Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8)
As the party seeking to assert jurisdiction over defendant, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York (see Cotia (USA) Ltd. v Lynn Steel Corp., 134 A.D.3d 483, 484 [1st Dept 2015]). However, she "need not present definitive proof of personal jurisdiction, but only make a sufficient start in demonstrating such jurisdiction by reference to pleadings, affidavits, and other suitable documentation" (Avilon Auto. Group v Leontiev, 168 A.D.3d 78, 89 [1st Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 185 A.D.3d 22, 30 [1st Dept 2020]).
"CPLR 302(a)(1) permits a court to exercise [specific] personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state" (Magwitch, L.L.C. v Pusser'sInc., 84 A.D.3d 529, 531 [1st Dept 2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], Iv denied 18 N.Y.3d 803 [2012]). "[This] jurisdictional inquiry is twofold: ... the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state, and ... the claims must arise from the transactions" (Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 N.Y.3d 316, 323 [2016]; see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst, 24 N.Y.3d 370, 376 [2014]). "Once both [of] those prongs are satisfied, there is a further inquiry to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play, substantial justice, and due process" (English v Avon Prods., Inc., 206 A.D.3d 404, 406 [1st Dept 2022]; see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 466-467 [1988]).
Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York. In opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiff submits, among other things, an affidavit discussing her employment with defendant, her employment offer letter, her pay stubs, and her W-2 tax form (Doc Nos. 12, 15, 18-19). In her affidavit, she avers that she witnessed and interacted with two of defendant's CEOs who were based in New York City (Doc No. 12 at 2-5). Plaintiffs offer letter indicates that she was to work in the New York office or remotely from her home (Doc No. 15 at 1). Her pay stubs and W-2 form also list Manhattan addresses for defendant (Doc Nos. 18-19).
Viewing this information collectively, accepting all of the allegations in plaintiffs complaint and affidavit as true, and drawing inferences in her favor (see Wilson v Dantas, 128 A.D.3d 176, 182 [1st Dept 2015], affd 29 N.Y.3d 1051 [2017]), plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that defendant transacted business in New York (see C. Mahendra (NY), LLC v National Gold & Diamond Ctr., Inc., 125 A.D.3d 454, 457 [1st Dept 2015]; cf. Minella v Restifo, 124 A.D.3d 486, 486 [1st Dept 2015]). Additionally, plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a substantial relationship between those transactions and her claims, because the alleged breach of contract and discrimination involved her employment with defendant in New York (see New York Helicopter Charter, Inc. v Borneman, 168 A.D.3d 509, 509 [1st Dept 2019]; Wilson, 128 A.D.3d at 184-185).
This Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant also comports with due process. Plaintiffs prima facie showing demonstrates that defendant had a New York office at the time it terminated plaintiffs employment (Doc Nos. 12, 15, 18-19). Therefore, defendant should have reasonably anticipated being sued in New York, because it purposefully availed itself of the privileges that come with conducting business within the state (see English, 206 A.D.3d at 407; Brax Capital Group, LLC v WinWin Gaming, Inc., 83 A.D.3d 591, 592 [1st Dept 2011]).
Because defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York, there is no need to address whether it is also subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state. The parties' remaining contentions are either without merit or need not be addressed given the findings set forth above.
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff s claim for violation of the New York Human Rights Law is granted, and plaintiffs second cause of action is dismissed, and the motion is otherwise denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs second cause of action against defendant for violation of the New York Human Rights Law is severed, and the remainder of the action shall continue against defendant; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant is directed to serve an answer to the complaint within 20 days after plaintiffs service of a copy of this order with notice of entry upon defendant; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for the moving parties shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119); and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Case (accessible at the "E-Filing" page on the court's website at the address www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh).