Opinion
Case No.: CV-S-02-0834-RLH (PAL)
April 2, 2003
ORDER (Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment #6)
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (#6), filed January 28, 2003. The Court has also considered Plaintiff's Opposition (#11), filed February 25, 2003, and Plaintiff's Complaint (#1), filed June 17, 2002.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Complaint asks this court to grant two requests: 1) To "declare invalid" a collection due process determination made by the IRS against her; 2) To order reimbursement by Defendant of Plaintiff's costs associated with bringing this action.
Plaintiff filed Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the 1996 and 1997 tax years. Following a pattern of behavior the Court has yet to understand, although the included Forms W-2 showed income received by the Plaintiff both Returns contained zeroes on all lines reflecting income earned or taxes due. Plaintiff attached to both Returns statements outlining the basis for her belief that she had no income to report and did not, therefore, owe federal income tax. Plaintiff alleges that; correspondence to her was not personally signed by the Secretary of Treasury, rendering it invalid, and that the Due Process hearing officer failed to provide proof of the assessment and copies of the demand notices sent to her.
Defendant claims that the United States complied with all applicable laws, that the Plaintiff received valid correspondence and the Due Process hearing was conducted appropriately.
On August 23, 1999, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6702, the IRS assessed two $500 civil penalties on Plaintiff for filing the stated returns. Section 6702 assesses a $500 civil penalty if an to individual "files what purports to be a return" but which contains "information that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is substantially incorrect" and is due to "a position which is frivolous."
The IRS posted a Notice of Federal Tax Lien for unpaid civil penalties pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §§ 6321, 6322, and 6323 and informed Plaintiff of the lien by mail on November 1, 2001 (Complaint #1 Motion #6). Plaintiff then requested from Defendant a collection due process hearing regarding the frivolous return penalties and collection alternatives which was held on April 10, 2002, a transcript of which is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint.
Finally, on May 16, 2002, the IRS sent Plaintiff, by certified mail, a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (Notice of Determination) informing Plaintiff that the proposed levy to collect the frivolous return penalty would not be restricted (Complaint #1). Accompanying the Notice of Determination was "Collection Due Process Explanation of Items" explaining that the decision was based on the determination that the IRS fully complied with all applicable laws, regulations, and administrative procedures. The Notice of Determination also informed Plaintiff that any dispute of the determination could be made within 30 days in the appropriate United States District Court. . . . .
Plaintiff timely filed with this Court and Defendant now moves for Dismissal and for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment with what appears to be a "cut and paste" document identifying herself as Richard E. Hardy and using the pronouns he and him. Plaintiff continues to allege she did not receive the Notice and Demand assessment. She concedes that the Secretary of Treasury does not need to personally sign the Due Process hearing notice, but insists that the Defendant must provide proof of delegation of such authority. Additionally, Plaintiff continues to suggest Form 4340 is invalid verification of the Secretary of Treasury's assessments and notice of levy. Further, she claims that, at her Due Process hearing, she should have been able to expand the scope of the hearing beyond collection alternatives to proof of delegation, identity of agents, as well as being allowed to discuss matters relating to her responsibility to pay income tax in the first place.
DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may dismiss; a complaint for "failure . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997). All factual allegations set forth in the complaint "are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to [p]laintiffs." Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 917, 115 S.Ct. 295, 130 L.Ed.2d 209 (1994)). Dismissal is appropriate "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988).
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only "where the record before the court on the motion reveals the absence of any material. issue of fact and [where) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983). "A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing version of the truth." Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and the court must view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the responding party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). See also Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983). Once this burden has been met, "[t]he opposing party must then present specific facts demonstrating that there is a factual dispute about a material issue." Zoslaw, 693 F.2d at 883 (citation and internal quotes omitted).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff first asks that the collection due process determination made against her by the IRS be declared invalid. Since the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to consider frivolous return penalties, See Van Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324 (2000), the matter is appropriately before this court. 26 U.S.C. § 6320(c), 6330(d)(1)(B).
26 U.S.C. § 6702 assigns liability in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) to a person filing a frivolous tax return. The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, such as the IRS. assesses this penalty in the same manner as a tax, and any reference to a "tax" in Title 26 also includes this penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 6671. Section 6201 of the Code authorizes the Secretary to in make any necessary tax assessments. In the case of a frivolous return penalty, the deficiency procedures of Title 26, Chapter 63, subchapter B, do not apply. 26 U.S.C. § 6703(b). Rather, the failure to pay the penalty results in a lien on the person's property. 26 U.S.C. § 6321. To ensure the validity of the lien, the Secretary files the lien with, in this case, the Clark County Recorder, 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(1)(A), and sends a notice of filing of the lien to the person, 26 U.S.C. § 6320(a). The Secretary must also inform the person of his right to a hearing at the same time. 26 U.S.C. § 6320(a)(3)(B). For the purposes of this Order, the procedures of the collection due process hearing, 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c), apply to the lien hearing, 26 U.S.C. § 6320(c). if the person requests a hearing, the hearing officer must "obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met." 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(1). At the hearing, the person may also raise any relevant issue, including spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the collection action, and any collection alternatives. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A). The person "may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
The Court will use the collective term "Secretary" to refer to the Secretary of the Treasury and any delegates. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11)(B). The Secretary of the Treasury may delegate much of his authority and responsibilities to others by prescribing rules and regulations, among other methods. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-9, 301.7701-10.
The "underlying tax liability" in this case is the frivolous return penalty. See 26 U.S.C. § 6771; see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6321-1. Plaintiff properly challenged the validity of the frivolous return penalties at the collection due process hearing because the statutory deficiency procedures do not apply to frivolous return penalties, 26 U.S.C. § 6703(b), and thus Plaintiff had no prior opportunity to dispute the penalties. The validity of the income taxes that Plaintiff owes for 1996 and 1997 is not at issue in this action. On the other hand, the tax returns that Plaintiff filed are relevant because they determine whether assessment of the frivolous return penalty was proper.
. . . .
Section 6330(d) is silent on the standard that the Court should use to review the determination of the collection hearing. However, the legislative history indicates that if the validity of the underlying tax liability was properly at issue, then review is de novo. H. Conf. Rep. 105-599 (1998); see also Dogwood Forest Rest Home, Inc. v. United States, 181 F. Supp.2d 554, 559 (M.D.N.C. 2001); MRCA Info. Servs. v. United States, 145 F. Supp.2d 194, 198-99 (D. Conn. 2000); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). The Court will use that standard of review.
There is no doubt as to the validity of the penalty. Plaintiff submitted Form 1040 for 1996 and 1997 with zeros in the income section and Forms W-2 showing income considerably more than zero. She also attached an explanation of how no provisions of the Internal Revenue code make her liable for the income tax, how her wages are not income, and other matters. Wages are income, 26 U.S.C. § 61, upon which Plaintiff owes a tax, 26 U.S.C. § 1, and courts — including this one — have found arguments to the contrary to be tired and frivolous long before Plaintiff filed the tax returns at issue. See, e.g., Sisemore v. United States, 797 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1986): Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1986); Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Hopkins, 192 B.R. 760, 762-63 (D. Nev. 1995); and other cases too numerous to cite. On its face, Plaintiff's tax returns were substantially incorrect and frivolous, thus making Plaintiff liable for the frivolous return penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 6702. The assessments of the frivolous return penalties are valid.
No genuine issue of material fact exists over the verification of all legal and administrative requirements. The hearing officer properly relied on Forms 4340 for such verification. See Huff v. United States, 10 F.3d 1440, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219 (1994); Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 538-40 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41 (2000). The Forms 4340 show that the frivolous return penalty had been assessed, that notices had been mailed to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff had requested a hearing and such hearing was conducted April 10, 2002. Because, as noted above, the tax returns are clearly frivolous, the hearing officer did not err in her verification that the requirements of any applicable law and administrative procedures had been met. Therefore, the collection due process determination is valid.
Without declaring defendant's collection due process determination invalid, the Court has no reason to reach Plaintiff's requests for costs or damages.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Dismissal and for Summary Judgment (#6) is GRANTED.