Opinion
1-22-0671
06-30-2023
KATHERINE CASEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CARLING/THE MICHAELS ORGANIZATION, a corp., MARIA ENRIQUEZ, ERIKA AYALA, ERICKA WILLIAMS, and PATRICIA MARTINEZ, Respondents-Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Petition for Direct Administrative Review of a Decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission Charge No. 2021 CH 823
JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices C.A. Walker and Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
TAILOR JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the decision of the Human Rights Commission sustaining the Department of Human Rights' dismissal of petitioner's housing discrimination charge where she failed to perfect it by signing it.
¶ 2 Petitioner Katherine Casey appeals pro se from a final decision of the Human Rights Commission (Commission) sustaining the Department of Human Rights' (Department) dismissal of her housing discrimination charge where she failed to perfect it by signing it. We affirm.
The petition for direct administrative review filed in this court names both Katherine Casey and Stephen Lyte as petitioners. However, Lyte was not a party to the administrative action; only Casey was a complainant before the agency. Based upon our review of the record on appeal, it appears Lyte acted periodically as petitioner Casey's non-attorney representative in her communications with the agency. The petition for administrative review similarly identifies Lyte as "representing" Casey. Thus, Lyte is not a proper party in this administrative review action and, pursuant to this court's practice, the caption of the appeal reflects only the parties before the agency.
¶ 3 On December 30, 2020, Casey filed a charge of discrimination against respondent The Carling/The Michaels Organization alleging violations of sections 3-102(A), 3-102(E), and 3-102.1(A) of the Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/3-102(A), (E), 102.1(A) (West 2020)) and federal laws. Casey stated that she was physically and mentally disabled. She alleged that, on September 1, 2020, she applied to rent a unit at The Carling Apartments and spoke to property manager Ericka Williams about low-income units. Williams stated that "there were no such apartments" and Casey was never contacted about her application. Casey had mentioned her disabilities to Williams, and that low income "Housing Tax Credit" units were advertised online. Casey alleged that because of her disabilities she was denied the opportunity to rent and was told no units were available even though "they were available[.]"
Although the Department's notice of dismissal states that Casey filed the charge on December 28, 2020, the document that Casey appears to have used to file her charge is dated December 30, 2020.
According to the record, The Carling/The Michaels Organization is the parent organization of The Carling Apartments. In the charge, The Carling/The Michaels Organization is also identified as Carling LLC. We also note that Williams's given name is spelled Erica in the charge, and Ericka in the petition for review filed in this court. For clarity, we use the spelling used in the petition for review.
¶ 4 The "Housing Discrimination Complaint" form setting forth Casey's charge states, in bolded text, at the bottom of the second page, "Please sign and date this form." The statement is followed by a certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020)), that the signer certifies that the statements in the complaint are true and correct. Below this is a signature line and a space for the date. "Katherine Casey" is typed below the signature line. However, the form does not contain Casey's manual signature, nor is it dated. We note that, according to the Department, the form charge was drafted by the Department based on information that Casey provided and was sent shortly thereafter to Casey to be signed and dated.
¶ 5 On January 6, 2021, the Department sent Casey a notice by mail stating that the charge was unperfected. The Department asked that Casey review the charge and, if it was correct, to "sign where indicated" and return it as soon as possible.
¶ 6 On April 16, 2021, the Department sent Casey a letter stating that the investigation into her charge had not been completed within 100 days of its filing because Casey had not signed the charge and raised issues that only the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) could investigate.
¶ 7 On June 30, 2021, the Department dismissed Casey's charge due to her failure to proceed, noting that correspondence between January and June 2021 repeatedly asked her to sign the charge, and that, as of June 29, 2021, she had not returned the signed charge.
¶ 8 The notice of dismissal listed correspondence between Department staff and Casey regarding the charge. This included a January 6, 2021, letter and a January 21, 2021, email each requesting that Casey review and sign the charge. After Casey indicated, through her representative, Stephen Lyte, that she wished to edit the charge to include a federal claim, the Department sent Casey an email on February 17, 2021, stating that the Department was limited to issues over which it had jurisdiction. Thereafter, on March 22, 2021, the Department sent Casey a letter by "regular" and certified mail requesting she sign and return the charge or contact the Department within 10 days and stating that the charge would be dismissed if it was not signed and returned. On April 7, 2021, the Department emailed Casey a copy of the March 22, 2021, letter and stated that "today" was the last day to sign the charge or it would be dismissed. In an April 7, 2021, email, Casey declined to sign the charge as it did not identify certain "federal funds received by Respondent."
Although the notice of dismissal indicates that each piece of correspondence is attached as an exhibit, the majority of the listed documents are not included in the record on appeal. This has not affected our review of Casey's appeal.
Based upon the context, this court concludes that "Respondent" refers to The Carling Apartments and The Carling/The Michaels Organization.
¶ 9 On May 10, 2021, the Department emailed Casey stating that the Department had learned that HUD had discussed the case with Casey, that the Department would investigate the charge, and that HUD would not accept the case for investigation. The Department therefore asked Casey to sign the charge so that the investigation could begin. On May 15, 2021, Casey emailed the Department stating that she and a representative had sent the Department a corrected version of the charge, but that it was declined because the changes referenced federal issues. On May 17, 2021, the Department emailed Casey stating that HUD agreed to "take care of the federal issues." Then, on June 1, 2021, the Department emailed Casey asking that she sign and return the charge within 10 days, stating an investigation could not commence until she signed and returned the charge. The Department noted that failure to sign and return the charge within 10 days would result in a recommendation that the charge be dismissed. In a June 4, 2021, email, Casey declined to sign and asked that HUD investigate all issues.
¶ 10 The notice of dismissal stated that Casey had not returned the signed charge as of June 29, 2021, and therefore, the charge was dismissed for failure to "adequately respond" to the Department's reasonable requests.
¶ 11 On September 30, 2021, Casey filed a request that the Commission review the dismissal. The Department filed a response detailing its attempts to have Casey sign the charge. On December 30, 2021, Casey replied in the form of an email which consisted of correspondence from the Department and HUD, and several copies of the charge. One copy of the charge bears Casey's typed signature and is dated July 9, 2021.
¶ 12 On April 12, 2022, the Commission sustained the dismissal of the charge for failure to proceed, noting that after Casey filed an unsigned charge in December 2020, the Department contacted her on January 6, 2021, and January 21, 2021, asking that she sign it. When Casey stated that she wished to amend the charge to include federal claims, the Department informed Casey that its jurisdiction was limited to issues covered by the Act. Thereafter, the Department contacted Casey on March 22, 2021, and April 7, 2021, asking her to sign the charge or it would be dismissed. After HUD agreed to investigate Casey's federal claims, the Department again asked her to sign the charge, but as of June 29, 2021, Casey had not signed.
¶ 13 In sustaining the dismissal, the Commission noted that, pursuant to the Act, a person must file a charge "in writing under oath or affirmation." 775 ILCS 5/7B-102(A)(1) (West 2020). Here, Casey never signed the charge, despite the Department's numerous warnings, over six months, that, absent her signature, the charge would be dismissed for failure to proceed. Although the Department explained to Casey that HUD was investigating her federal claims and that the Department lacked jurisdiction over those claims, she refused to sign the charge unless the federal claims were included. Accordingly, under the Act, Casey's failure to cooperate warranted dismissal of her charge.
¶ 14 Casey filed a timely petition for direct review in this court on May 12, 2022. See 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B)(1) (West 2020) (a petitioner may "obtain judicial review of a final order of the Commission *** by filing a petition for review in the Appellate Court within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision *** was served upon the party affected").
¶ 15 On appeal, Casey alleges that the Commission "should have applied the law" to find that "it was impracticable for HUD to meet the 100-day deadline." Moreover, Casey alleges that this case, in its entirety, should be transferred to HUD for investigation.
¶ 16 As a preliminary matter, our review of Casey's appeal is hindered by her failure to fully comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which "governs the form and content of appellate briefs." McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. Although Casey is a pro se litigant, this status does not lessen her burden on appeal. "In Illinois, parties choosing to represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys." Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. Rule 341(h) provides that an appellant's brief should contain a statement of "the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment," and an argument "which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on." Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Pursuant to the rule, a reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with "cohesive arguments" presented and pertinent authority cited. Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill.App.3d 677, 682 (1993).
¶ 17 Here, Casey's brief provides no citations to the record and fail to articulate a legal argument that would allow a meaningful review of her claims. An appellant is required to cite to the pages and volumes of the record on appeal upon which she relies "so that we are able to assess whether the facts [which the appellant] presents are accurate and a fair portrayal of the events in this case." In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 58; see also Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In the case at bar, Casey's briefs lack an organized and cohesive argument. See People v. Hood, 210 Ill.App.3d 743, 746 (1991) ("A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository into which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research."). "Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43.
¶ 18 Considering the content of Casey's briefs, it would be within our discretion to dismiss the instant appeal. See Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill.App.3d 36, 42 (2005) ("Where an appellant's brief fails to comply with supreme court rules, this court has the inherent authority to dismiss the appeal."). However, because it is clear that Casey challenges the dismissal of her charge of housing discrimination, and we have the benefit of a cogent appellee's brief, we choose to consider the discernible merits of the appeal. See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App.3d 509, 511 (2001).
¶ 19 Pursuant to the Act, it is a civil rights violation to discriminate on the basis of disability in a real estate transaction or in the rental of a dwelling, including representing that "real property is not available for inspection, sale, rental, or lease when in fact it is so available." 775 ILCS 5/3-102(A), (E) (West 2020); 775 ILCS 5/1-103(Q) (West 2020).
¶ 20 A person who believes she has been discriminated against in such a manner may file a charge of discrimination with the Department. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 2020). The charge must be made "in writing" and signed by the complainant "under oath or affirmation." Id.; 56 Ill. Admin. Code 2520.330(e) (eff. Dec. 14, 2020). The requirement that a complainant make her allegations under oath or affirmation may minimize frivolous filings. Gonzalez v. Human Rights Comm'n, 179 Ill.App.3d 362, 370 (1989). As such, a charge that was not signed under oath or affirmation is considered" 'unperfected,'" and the Department is under no obligation to proceed on it until the "missing element" is supplied. See Muraoka v. Human Rights Comm'n, 252 Ill.App.3d 1039, 1045 (1993).
¶ 21 The Department may dismiss a charge if the complainant fails to perfect it by signing it under oath or affirmation, provided the Department has first notified the complainant in writing that he or she must do so, stating the "elements which must be supplied." 56 Ill. Admin. Code 2520.350 (eff. Nov. 20, 2006). When the complainant fails or refuses to perfect a charge, their charge may be dismissed. See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 2520.430(c) (eff. Oct. 19, 2007) (a complainant "must cooperate with the Department" and "provide necessary information"; the failure to "respond to reasonable requests by the Department" may result in dismissal of the charge); 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 2520.560 (eff. Dec. 14, 2020) (a charge may be dismissed based upon failure to proceed, with the dismissal specifying the manner in which the party failed to proceed). If the Department dismisses a charge, then the complainant may request review of the dismissal from the Commission. 775 ILCS 5/8-103(A) (West 2020). The Commission's final decision is subject to direct administrative review by this court. See 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B)(1) (West 2020).
¶ 22 On appeal, we review the decision of the Commission, rather than that of the Department. Alcequeire v. Human Rights Comm'n, 292 Ill.App.3d 515, 519 (1997). The Commission's decision to sustain the dismissal of a charge of discrimination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Young v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 2012 IL App (1st) 112204, ¶ 33. An abuse of discretion will be found where no reasonable person could agree with the Commission's decision. Id. Under this standard, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Commission. Id.
¶ 23 Here, the Commission sustained the dismissal of Casey's charge of housing discrimination based on mental and physical disabilities for failure to proceed as she had not signed the December 2020 charge, despite the Department's repeated requests to do so, by June 29, 2021. In its order, the Commission noted that a charge of discrimination must be signed under oath or affirmation in order to be perfected, and the Department may not proceed with its investigation until the charge has been perfected.
While the record contains a copy of the charge bearing a typed signature and the date of July 9, 2021, Casey makes no argument regarding that document on appeal. See Ill. S.Ct. R 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) ("Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing."). In any case, the date on this document postdates the Department's notice of dismissal of June 30, 2021.
¶ 24 After reviewing the record, we conclude that Casey has failed to demonstrate that the Commission abused its discretion by sustaining the dismissal of her charge of discrimination for failure to proceed. The record supports the finding that, despite the Department's repeated requests between January and June 2021 that Casey sign the December 2020 charge, the charge was unsigned as of June 29, 2021. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 2020) (the charge must be made "in writing" and signed by the complainant "under oath or affirmation"). While Casey's arguments on appeal challenge the Commission's decision, they do not address the reason that her claim was dismissed and are unsupported by relevant authority. Specifically, we note that Casey made no argument before the Commission and makes no argument on appeal that her typed name below the signature line on her form charge of discrimination, which as noted above was prepared by the Department based on information that Casey provided the Department, satisfied the requirement that the charge be made "in writing" and signed by the complainant "under oath or affirmation." 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 2020); 56 Ill. Admin. Code 2520.330(e) (eff. Dec. 14, 2020). Accordingly, that issue is forfeited. Even if the issue was not forfeited, any such argument would fail because we understand that Casey's name was typed by the Department below the signature line to indicate where she was required to sign. Casey did not type her name herself on the charge of discrimination. As such, we find that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the Department's dismissal of the charge, and Casey's challenge to the Commission's decision therefore fails. See Young, 2012 IL App (1st) 112204, ¶ 33.
¶ 25 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the decision of the Commission.
¶ 26 Affirmed.