Even after the expansion of the doctrine by the Supreme Court, UnitedMine Workers of America v. Gibbs (1966), 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218, a majority of the courts have continued to apply this rule, although there appears to be a substantial minority viewpoint conversely. See, e.g.: Hymer v. Chai, C.A.9th (1969), 407 F.2d 136, 137[1, 2], [3]; Williams v. United States, C.A.9th (1969), 405 F.2d 951, 955, [8]; Casey v. Purser, D.C.Okla. (1974), 385 F. Supp. 621, 624; Jacobs v. United States, D.C.Ariz. (1973), 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1277[1, 2]; Jones v. City of Houma, D.C.La. (1972), 339 F. Supp. 473, 475, [3]; Howmet Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping Co., D.C. Del. (1971), 320 F. Supp. 975, 979; Rosenthal Rosenthal, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., D.C.N.Y. (1966), 259 F. Supp. 624, 630-631, [5]; Gautreau v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., D.C.La. (1966), 255 F. Supp. 615, 617-618; Letmate v. Baltimore O. R.R., D.C.Ind. (1970), 311 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-1062[1, 2], [3]. Although the Supreme Court has not dealt precisely with this problem, it has (in the civil rights setting) noted the distinction between the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs, supra, and that sought to be invoked herein against Carter County by stating: