Messrs. Culbertson and Whitesides, of Laurens, for Appellant, cite: As to the Trial Court's erring in requiring thePlaintiff wife to take a divorce to which she was entitledwithout her consent: 6 Ohio, St.2d 31, 35 Ohio Ops.2d 42, 215 N.E.2d 698; 16 A.L.R. 3d 271, Syllabus 31; 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394; 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330; 4 Terry 422, 43 Del. 422, 48 A. 3d 497; 44 R.I. 429, 117 A. 649; Section 10-108 of the Code of Laws for South Carolina, 1962; 202 S.C. 1, 23 S.E.2d 817; 217 S.C. 77, 59 S.E.2d 645. As to theTrial Judge's lacking authority to amend his order requiringRespondent to pay support to Appellant: 191 S.C. 14, 3 S.E.2d 243, 244; 196 S.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 545; 194 S.C. 270, 9 S.E.2d 721; 243 S.C. 586, 135 S.E.2d 84; 4 Am. Jur.2d Appeal and Error, Section 377, page 849; 68 S.C. 494, 47 S.E. 689; 61 S.C. 1, 39 S.E. 192; 219 S.C. 307, 65 S.E.2d 112. Messrs. Townsend and Thompson, of Laurens, forRespondent, cite: As to the Trial Court's not having erredin requiring the Plaintiff wife to make known to the Courtwhether or not she desired the Court to issue a writtendivorce decree or desired to withdraw her demand for adivorce: 243 S.C. 447; 370 Mich. 103, 121 N.W.2d 452; 16 A.L.R. 3d Divorce-Voluntary Dismissal, Section 22, Page 331. As to the Trial Judge's not having erred

Messrs. C. Ben Bowen and C. Robert Faucett, of Abrams,Bowen Townes, Greenville, for the Appellant, cite: Asto a plaintiff withdrawing a demand for a relief in a divorcesuit: Rule 45, Rules of Practice for the Circuit Courts of South Carolina; 247 S.C. 378, 147 S.E.2d 638; 231 S.C. 134, 137, 97 S.E.2d 505; 159 S.C. 506, 512, 157 S.E. 830; 243 S.C. 447, 452, 134 S.E.2d 394; Sec. 20-110, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962. Marvin R. Watson, Esq., of Watson Ayers, Greenwood, for Respondent cites: As to whether or not the presidingjudge erred in failing to grant Appellant's motionbased on the circumstances, conditions and past orders: Circuit Court Rule 45.

First Union Nat'lBank v. Hitman, Inc., 306 S.C. 327, 329, 411 S.E.2d 681, 682 (Ct.App. 1991), aff'd, 308 S.C. 421, 418 S.E.2d 545 (1992) (citing Rule 58(a), SCRCP). See alsoCase v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964) (judgments in general are not final until written and entered); Bayne v.Bass, 302 S.C. 208, 394 S.E.2d 726 (Ct.App. 1990) (divorce decree is not final until written and recorded). "Until written and entered, the trial judge retains discretion to change his mind and amend his oral ruling accordingly." Ford v. State Ethics Comm'n, 344 S.C. 642, 646, 545 S.E.2d 821, 823 (2001); First Union Nat'l Bank, 306 S.C. at 329, 411 S.E.2d at 682.

SeeBayne, 302 S.C. at 210, 394 S.E.2d at 727 ("`The [d]ecree must be in writing and until such time the [j]udge may modify, amend or rescind such an oral [o]rder.'") ( quoting Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 451, 134 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1964)). The circuit court also expressly found the contract between Coker Builders and RDC contained no arbitration provision and Coker Builders and RDC had not agreed to arbitrate any claims.

As both court rule and this Court's precedent provide, a judgment is effective only when reduced to writing and entered into the record. Rule 58(a)(2), SCRCP; see also Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 451, 134 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1964) (providing that an oral decision "is not a final ruling on the merits nor is it binding on the parties until it has been reduced to writing, signed by the Judge [sic] and delivered for recordation."). Because the Department failed to include the trial court's final order in the record on appeal, the court of appeals properly decided the case without reaching the merits.

Until written and entered, the trial judge retains discretion to change his mind and amend his oral ruling accordingly. First Union, supra; Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964). The written order is the trial judge's final order and as such constitutes the final judgment of the court.

The final hearing for the divorce of Murray's second marriage was held on April 30, 1971 and the divorce decree was signed by the judge and filed with the family court on the same day. The order, however, was not forwarded to the Court of Common Pleas from which jurisdiction had been transferred until May 10, 1971. This situation may be distinguished from decisions such as Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964). The decision in Case stands for the proposition that a complaining party may rescind or withdraw a request for a divorce even after a hearing has been held and an oral decree has been rendered.

A moving party may rescind his divorce action even after the order is orally rendered. Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964); Harmon v.Harmon, 257 S.C. 154, 184 S.E.2d 553 (1971); Holman v. Holman, 262 S.C. 469, 205 S.E.2d 382 (1974). Here, however, the husband was not the moving party, and objected only to the property settlement.

The husband has appealed, alleging that the judge erred in enforcing the agreement, because it was made in contemplation of a divorce which is now uncertain. He further asserts that the judge failed to examine the adequacy of the consideration flowing to him, and asserts that it involved a collusive divorce. The judge, citing Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964), held that the husband had the right to withdraw his action for divorce. The wife does not contest this facet of his ruling, and we agree that the husband had this option. This leaves the wife's action for divorce in a status of "to be litigated."

February 13, 1978.Samuel J. Abrams and Henry B. Richardson, Jr., of Sumter, for Appellant, cite: As to the Judge's Order being voidand of no force or effect because it contains no findings offact or conclusion of law in support of the relief thereingranted: South Carolina Code Section 10-1510, as amended, (1962 Code of Laws); 263 S.C. 279, 210 S.E.2d 230; 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394; Section 10-1510, Code of Laws of S.C. 1962. As to Respondent's motion andnotice being void for the reason such motion was not accompaniedby the mandatory certificate of merit: 107 S.C. 482, 93 S.E. 189. David F. McInnis, of Sumter, for Respondent.