Opinion
C.A. NO. 03-4081
January 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Raul Casanova filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383 (c)(3), requesting review of the Commissioner's denial of claims for Social Security Disability ("SSD") and Social Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"). The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we find that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") was supported by substantial evidence.
"Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is "more than a scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance." Woody v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 859 F.2d 1156, 1159 (3d Cir. 1988).
Mr. Casanova filed for SSD and SSI on May 29, 2001, claiming his psychological disorders limited his ability to work (Tr. 83-107, 274-76). In his application, Mr. Casanova complained that he was unable to work because of nervousness, forgetfulness, depression, and difficulties maintaining concentration (Tr. 84-85). His application was initially denied on August 31, 2001 (Tr. 17, 58-61, 278-81). Following an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Casanova was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act (Tr. 11-24).
In determining whether this constituted an impairment under the Act, the ALJ correctly applied the five step sequential analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (Tr. 18). First, the Act requires the ALJ determine whether the applicant is currently working. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimed impairment is "severe." See id. at § 404.1520(c). Third, the ALJ must decide whether the impairment equals or exceeds the severity of impairments described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. See id. at § 404.1520(d). Fourth, the ALJ must consider whether the applicant has sufficient "residual functional capacity." See id. at § 404.1520(c). Finally, the ALJ must decide whether the applicant can perform any other substantial gainful work within the economy, considering the applicant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. See id. at § 404.1520(d).
In this case, the ALJ ended his analysis at step two, when he concluded Mr. Casanova's impairment was not severe (Tr. 24). An impairment is severe if medical evidence establishes that the applicant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities is significantly limited. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The Commissioner has determined this threshold to be very low; a claim is severe if medical evidence establishes anything more than a slight abnormality. See SSR 85-28.
The ALJ concluded Mr. Casanova's medical evidence established only a slight abnormality. In making his decision, the ALJ considered medical evidence from Mr. Casanova's two treating psychiatrists, Doctor Vallejo and Doctor Ballas (Tr. 18-24). The ALJ also considered evidence provided by Commissioner's evaluating psychologist, Doctor Perch (Tr. 22). Finally, the ALJ briefly considered testimony of Mr. Casanova's daughter, Delia Casanova (Tr. 23). These sources provide substantial evidence for the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Casanova is not disabled under the Act.
At the outset, Mr. Casanova claims the ALJ erred in failing to credit the testimony of his daughter, Delia Casanova. The ALJ must consider and weigh all non-medical testimony. Burnett v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). In considering non-medical testimony, the ALJ may make credibility determinations. See id. (citing Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981). If the ALJ chooses to wholly reject non-medical testimony, he must explain why. See id.
We find that the ALJ properly discounted parts of Ms. Casanova's testimony. The ALJ did not wholly reject Ms. Casanova's testimony, but relied on some of it (Tr. 23). The testimony the ALJ credited was internally consistent as well as consistent with the medical testimony, while other parts of her testimony were not (Tr. 44-48). For example, although Ms. Casanova testified her father was afraid to go out in public, she also claimed he was able to go to the gym and jog outdoors (Tr. 23, 47). The ALJ also found Mr. Casanova was able to walk five blocks to therapy (Tr. 23). Thus, the ALJ properly discredited those portions of Ms. Casanova's testimony regarding her father's fear of public spaces.
Second, Mr. Casanova claims the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence. In this case, Mr. Casanova's two treating psychiatrists came to different conclusions about the existence of any psychosis (Tr. 22). When there is a conflict in the medical evidence presented, "the ALJ may choose who to credit but `cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.'" Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. I993)). In such a case, the ALJ must consider all the evidence and explain some reason for rejecting the evidence. See id. (citing Stewart v. Secretary of HEW, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983)). The ALJ may find a treating physician's opinion less probative if that opinion is not based on supporting explanations. See id. (citing Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283.286 (3d Cir. 1984)). Further, the ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion outright if there is contradictory medical evidence. See id.
Mr. Casanova began his treatment in December 2000 with Doctor Vallejo at Girard Medical Center (Tr. 130). In April 2001, Mr. Casanova left Girard and began treatment with Doctor Ballas at Northeast Community Medical Center (Tr. 138). He continued treatment there from May 2001 to March 2002 (Tr. 143-61, 231-71). Doctor Ballas diagnosed Mr. Casanova with anxiety disorder, while Doctor Vallejo found no psychological disorder, and expressed a concern of possible malingering (Tr. 19-21).
The ALJ concluded that Doctor Vallejo's opinion should be given greater weight (Tr. 22). The ALJ credited Doctor Vallejo's opinion over Doctor Ballas' opinion because it was "consistent with and well supported by the substantial evidence of record and not reliant on the claimant's subjective complaints" (Tr. 22). The ALJ also noted that Doctor Ballas' conclusions were "not supported by or consistent with . . . his own treatment records" (Tr. 21-22).
Doctor Ballas' notes consistently found Mr. Casanova `Vague" when discussing his psychosis (Tr. 21, 204-05). At times Doctor Ballas found Mr. Casanova's psychosis was stable, while at other times he found the existence of any psychosis unclear (Tr. 202-03). Furthermore, treatment records from Northeast found that Mr. Casanova was alert and well groomed, and that he consistently denied suicidal and homicidal ideation (Tr. 22, 202-08). Despite his own findings otherwise, Doctor Ballas ultimately concluded Mr. Casanova suffered from Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Psychosis Not Otherwise Specified, and alcoholism (Tr. 232). The ALJ concluded Doctor Ballas' opinions were not supported by his own records, or the records of the treatment center. Given the content of the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to reject Ballas' opinion in favor of the contradictory opinion of Mr. Casanova's other treating psychiatrist.
Accordingly, we conclude the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence in his decision that claimant was not disabled at step two of the five step analysis.
ORDER
Plaintiff Raul Casanova's motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED.Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.
Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Raul Casanova.
IT IS SO ORDERED.