Furthermore, they contend that Supreme Court erred in concluding that there were questions of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled because plaintiff provided proof of continuous treatment by defendants from the time of his 2001 surgery until approximately November 2003. Specifically, while defendants do not dispute that plaintiff began treatment with them when his renal carcinoma was discovered after his May 21, 2001 office visit, they maintain that treatment ended, at the latest, on July 18, 2002, when plaintiff missed a followup appointment related to his nephrectomy and did not reschedule. Plaintiff was not seen by Chang again until November 2003 and, therefore, defendants contend that any ongoing course of treatment was terminated by this 16-month gap. Notably, "[t]he continuous treatment doctrine serves to toll the [s]tatute of [limitations during a patient's course of treatment with his or her physician" ( Casale v. Hena, 270 AD2d 680, 682) so long as the treatment sought is continuous and is "`for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure' originally complained of" ( Plummer v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 98 NY2d 263, 267, quoting CPLR 214-a; see Cox v. Kingsboro Med. Group, 88 NY2d at 906; Labshere v. Petroski, 32 AD3d 645, 646; Waring v. Kingston Diagnostic Radiology Ctr., 13 AD3d at 1025; Lemmerman v. Delmar Dental, 3 AD3d 771, 772). While this Court has held that treatment does not necessarily terminate at a patient's last visit, further treatment by both the patient and doctor must be contemplated ( see Waring v. Kingston Diagnostic Radiology Ctr., 13 AD3d at 1026; Casale v. Hena, 270 AD2d at 682). Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party ( see Labshere v. Petroski, 32 AD3d at 647), we find that Supreme Court did not err in concluding that a question of fact exists with respect to the applicability of the conti

By comparison, in July 2008, decedent was referred to Clift for complaints of lower abdominal pain and rectal bleeding. We conclude that the record does not support either a finding that treatment was rendered for the same illness or that there was a mutual anticipation of future treatment ( see Casale v. Hena, 270 A.D.2d 680, 682, 704 N.Y.S.2d 361 [2000]; compare Aulita v. Chang, 44 A.D.3d 1206, 1208–1209, 845 N.Y.S.2d 828 [2007] ). It follows that any claim for services rendered by Clift in 2006 is barred by the statute of limitations. In response to plaintiff's timely claims with regard to the treatment he provided in 2008, Clift submitted an affidavit wherein he set forth the treatment he provided in July 2008, when decedent had a CT scan that revealed diverticulitis but no mass, and August 2008, when he scheduled a colonoscopy based on decedent's complaints of rectal bleeding.

Nor was there any showing of any contemplation of further treatment for the lump condition, as evidenced by the fact that the decedent did not schedule any other appointment with Karanfilian until he returned to see him in 2005, because his new dermatologist expressed concern and suggested he see a surgeon. Karanfilian's statement to the decedent to return if there were any changes in his condition does not indicate that further treatment was contemplated ( see Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 78 N.Y.2d 255, 573 N.Y.S.2d 434, 577 N.E.2d 1026;Casale v. Hena, 270 A.D.2d 680, 704 N.Y.S.2d 361). Further, the May 4, 2005, visit cannot be considered a part of continuing treatment since the decedent initiated this return visit with Karanfilian only at his dermatologist's suggestion that he see a surgeon ( see Massie v. Crawford, 78 N.Y.2d 516, 519, 577 N.Y.S.2d 223, 583 N.E.2d 935). Under these circumstances, where the decedent had no knowledge of a medical condition and, therefore, had no reason to expect ongoing treatment for it from Karanfilian, there is no reason to apply the continuous treatment doctrine ( see Young v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 91 N.Y.2d 291, 296, 670 N.Y.S.2d 169, 693 N.E.2d 196;Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 78 N.Y.2d 255, 573 N.Y.S.2d 434, 577 N.E.2d 1026;Davis v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257, 379 N.Y.S.2d 721, 342 N.E.2d 516;Robertson v. Bozza & Karafiol, 242 A.D.2d 613, 662 N.Y.S.2d 324).

A "continuous treatment" toll occurs when "further treatment is explicitly anticipated by both physician and patient as manifested in the form of a regularly scheduled appointment for the near future, agreed upon during that last visit, in conformance with the periodic appointments which characterized the treatment in the immediate past." (Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 NY2d 896, 898-99 [1985][emphasis added]; Cox v. Kingsboro Medical Group, supra; Aulita v. Chang, 44 AD3d 1206 [3d Dept. 2007]; Casale v. Hena, 270 AD2d 680 [3d Dept. 2000]).

A "continuous treatment" toll occurs when "further treatment isexplicitly anticipated by both physician and patient as manifested in the form of a regularly scheduled appointment for the near future, agreed upon during that last visit, in conformance with the periodic appointments which characterized the treatment in the immediate past." (Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 NY2d 896, 898-99[emphasis added]; Cox v. Kingsboro Medical Group, supra; Aulita v. Chang, 44 AD3d 1206 [3d Dept. 2007];Casale v. Hena, 270 AD2d 680 [3d Dept. 2000]).

If an action is commenced after two years and six months following the date of care or treatment at issue, it is time-barred.Casale v Hena, 270 AD2d 680, 682 (3d Dept 2000).Plummer v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 98 NY2d 263, 267 (2002), quoting CPLR 214-a; see also Cox v Kingsboro Med. Group, 88 NY2d 904 (1996).