Subsequently, the State did introduce evidence of the radar test results without any concurrent objection from Nairon. Under Carver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 405, 406 ( 430 S.E.2d 790) (1993), "a defendant must invoke an evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of radar evidence in order to preserve the adverse ruling on their objection for appeal." Carver was decided after the March 1992 trial in the present case and overruled Johnson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 192 ( 375 S.E.2d 290) (1988), which held that no objection to radar evidence at trial was necessary in order to preserve the admissibility issue for appeal. Accordingly, we will apply the rule existing when the case was tried and address Nairon's arguments regarding the admissibility of the radar evidence, despite his failure to object when the evidence was introduced.
( In the Interest of B. C. P., 229 Ga. App. 111(3) ( 493 S.E.2d 258) (1997)); if a party would otherwise "suffer for what his counsel neglected to do[,]" ( Griffin v. State, 228 Ga. App. 200 ( 491 S.E.2d 437) (1997)); "to the extent it is necessary to do so to resolve this appeal[,]" ( Mann v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 215 Ga. App. 747 ( 452 S.E.2d 130) (1994)); or, if given "a liberal reading of [the enumeration of errors] and a review of [the] appellate brief . . . [it is] clear [what] defendant challenges on appeal . . ." ( Carver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 405(1) ( 430 S.E.2d 790) (1993)). See also Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816(2) ( 503 S.E.2d 28) (1998), and Sanders v. State, 212 Ga. App. 832 ( 442 S.E.2d 923) (1994) (where all the issues raised in one enumeration were addressed without explanation).
This evidence, and defendant's admission that he willfully obstructed law enforcement efforts to monitor his speed, overwhelmingly supports the jury's guilty verdict. See Harris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 366, 368 (3) ( 436 S.E.2d 231), and Carver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 405, 408 (5) ( 430 S.E.2d 790). 2.
Id. at 493 (1). See Harris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 366, 368 (3) ( 436 SE2d 231) (1993); Brown v. State, 204 Ga. App. 629 ( 420 SE2d 35) (1992) ("[o]pinion testimony of an eyewitness may be used to establish speed, its credibility being for the [factfinder] to determine") (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds, Carver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 405, 406 (1) ( 430 SE2d 790) (1993). 2. Next, B.D.S. argues that the officer unlawfully operated the laser speed detection device within 600 feet of a reduction in speed limit sign, in violation of OCGA ยง 40-14-9.
Because Van Nort failed to invoke a ruling by the trial court on the issues he now seeks to raise, there is nothing for us to review. See Carver v. State, 208 Ga.App. 405, 406(1), 430 S.E.2d 790 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds, Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 540, 523 S.E.2d 1 (1999). Nairon v. State, 215 Ga.App. 76, 77(2), 449 S.E.2d 634 (1994); Carver, supra.
See Wiggins v. State, 249 Ga. 302, 304 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 427) (1982) (setting forth the conditions).Carver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 405 (1) ( 430 S.E.2d 790) (1993). See Hixson v. Barrow, 135 Ga. App. 519, 522 (2) ( 218 S.E.2d 253) (1975) (opinion testimony of an eyewitness is sufficient to authorize a jury to conclude that the speeding laws have been violated).
Even if the State failed to lay the necessary foundation for introduction of radar evidence of Harris' speed, the arresting officer's testimony that he observed Harris driving at an estimated speed of 90 mph was sufficient to support the speeding conviction. Brown v. State, 204 Ga. App. 629 ( 420 S.E.2d 35) (1992), overruled on other grounds, Carver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 405 ( 430 S.E.2d 790) (1993); Taylor v. State, 205 Ga. App. 84 ( 421 S.E.2d 104) (1992), overruled on other grounds, Carver v. State, supra. 4.