Watkins' argument necessarily “ignores the language of the indictment, which based each count on different conduct.” Carver v. State, 331 Ga.App. 120, 122(4), 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015). Count 1 charged Watkins with aggravated child molestation “by placing his mouth on the vagina of [the victim].

See also Coates v. State , 304 Ga. 329, 330, 818 S.E.2d 622 (2018). The Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis in its unpublished opinion here, in the published Frazier opinion that it cited, see 241 Ga. App. at 126, 524 S.E.2d 768, and in its other published opinions holding that multiple counts of child molestation did not merge, see, e.g., Carver v. State , 331 Ga. App. 120, 122, 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015) ; Chalifoux v. State , 302 Ga. App. 119, 119-120, 690 S.E.2d 262 (2010) ; Metts v. State , 297 Ga. App. 330, 336, 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009) ; Parker v. State , 283 Ga. App. 714, 721-722, 642 S.E.2d 111 (2007) ; Lunsford v. State , 260 Ga. App. 818, 820-821, 581 S.E.2d 638 (2003) ; Eggleston v. State , 247 Ga. App. 540, 543, 544 S.E.2d 722 (2001). In some of those cases, where the acts of child molestation appear to have occurred in discrete incidents, precisely identifying the applicable unit of prosecution may not affect the merger decision.

asions over a three-year period," no merger). See also Spires v. State, 357 Ga. App. 440, 850 S.E.2d 854 (2020) (rejecting defendant’s ar- gument that his two child molestation convictions arising out of touching the victim’s buttocks and vagina should merge into his aggravated child molestation convictions arising out of oral sodomy and sexual intercourse, respectively, because the indictment alleged that the various sexual contact occurred over an extended period of time rather than "a single course of conduct occurring over a relatively short time frame"); Watkins v. State, 336 Ga. App. 145, 151 (4), 784 S.E.2d 11 (2016) (no merger where indictment charged the defendant with aggravated child molestation " ‘by placing his mouth on the vagina of the victim’ " and child molestation " ‘by touching the vagina of the victim,’ " victim’s testimony established that the defendant kissed her vagina on one occasion, and that, on separate occasions, the defendant touched the victim’s vagina); Carver v. State, 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4), 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation based on acts occurring on multiple occasions over the course of a summer, "each of the counts was for a separate and distinct crime" and did not merge). Compare Barclay v. State, 306 Ga. App. 766, 768 (2), 702 S.E.2d 907 (2010)

In Scott I , the Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis" in opinions addressing the merger of aggravated child molestation and child molestation convictions. 306 Ga. at 510 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426, citing Carver v. State , 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4), 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation convictions and two child molestation convictions), and Metts v. State , 297 Ga. App. 330, 336 (5), 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation conviction and chid molestation conviction). Accordingly, in determining whether Shropshire's convictions for aggravated child molestation and child molestation merge, we will apply a unit-of-prosecution analysis.

Scott , 306 Ga. at 510 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426. In so instructing, the Supreme Court cited Carver v. State , 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4), 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015) ; Metts v. State , 297 Ga. App. 330, 336 (5), 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009). Scott , 306 Ga. at 510 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426.

Jones argument is correct if both counts are based on the same incident. If both counts were based on a single incident, then the required evidence test would not be satisfied and the counts would merge. However, if the counts were based on separate incidents of conduct they do not merge. Carver v. State, 331 Ga.App. 120, 122(4), 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015).The trial court stated at sentencing that it had evidence before it of “at a minimum, two different incidents, two different occurrences, Count 4, on May 1, Counts 1, 2, and 3 sometime between the summer of 2009 and April 30th, 2010.”

The opinion then cited seven cases, five of which involved the merger of multiple counts of child molestation only. See id One of those cases involved the merger of one count of aggravated child, molestation and two counts of child molestation, see Carverv. State, 331 Ga. App. 120, 120, 769 S.E.2d 722 (2015), and another involved the merger of one count of aggravated child molestation and one count of child molestation, see Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 336, 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009). See Scott, 306 Ga. at 510, 832 S.E.2d 426.