" 386 Mich at 623-624. Defendant in this case observes that the 120-day notice provision currently in effect as a result of 1970 PA 155, was not considered in Reich, and that this Court's opinion in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich. 96; 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973), held that statutory notice provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. We agree.

For reasons which will become evident, this Court opines that the six-month notice provision of the Court of Claims Act applies to the instant plaintiffs, and is not constitutionally infirm. We conclude, moreover, that the Supreme Court decision in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich. 96; 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973), dictates that the accelerated judgment be set aside, and the cause remanded for a hearing to ascertain whether the State Highway Department was prejudiced by plaintiffs' failure to give notice. The instant action was dismissed because plaintiffs failed to comply with the following notice provision in the Court of Claims Act:

Id. at 94, 247 N.W.2d 754. In deciding whether the plaintiff's claim was barred, the Hobbs Court relied on two cases: Reich v. State Hwy. Dep't , 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972), and Carver v. McKernan , 390 Mich. 96, 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973). In Reich , the Court held that an earlier version of the GTLA's notice provision violated equal-protection guarantees by treating plaintiffs injured by the government differently from plaintiffs injured by private tortfeasors.

[ 386 Mich at 626.] The next year, in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), the Court retreated from Grubaugh and Reich and, in a novel ruling, held that application of the six-month notice provision in the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act (MVACA), MCL 257.1118, was constitutional, and that the provision was thus enforceable, only where the failure to give notice resulted in prejudice to the party receiving the notice, in that case the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF). The reasoning was that while some notice provisions may be constitutionally permitted some may not be, depending on the purpose the notice serves.

We must now determine whether the 120-day notice provision is reasonable. Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich. 96; 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973). In Carver, the Court held that a notice provision with a legitimate purpose "does not necessarily violate the constitution."

Rowland, 477 Mich. at 201, 731 N.W.2d 41. The Court expressly overruled Hobbs v. Dep't of State Hwys., 398 Mich. 90, 247 N.W.2d 754 (1976), and Brown v. Manistee Co. Rd. Comm., 452 Mich. 354, 550 N.W.2d 215 (1996), and implicitly overruled Carver v. McKernan, 390 Mich. 96, 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973), Reich v. State Hwy. Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972), and Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).Rowland, 477 Mich. at 211, 731 N.W.2d 41.

We held today in Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich. 90; 247 N.W.2d 754 (1976), that the provisions of the governmental liability act, 1964 PA 170, MCLA 691.1402, MCLA 691.1411; MSA 3.996(102), MSA 3.996(111), control cases such as this, exclusive of the Court of Claims Act. We also held that the rationale of Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich. 96; 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973), applied, and we remanded to the Court of Claims to provide an opportunity for the state to show that it was prejudiced by the failure of the plaintiff to provide timely notice. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case as well, and remand to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

We held today in Hobbs v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich. 90; 247 N.W.2d 754 (1976), that the provisions of the governmental liability act, MCLA 691.1402, 691.1411; MSA 3.996(102), 3.996(111), control cases such as this, exclusive of the Court of Claims Act. We also held that the rationale of Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich. 96; 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973), applied, and remanded to the Court of Claims to provide an opportunity for the state to show that it was prejudiced by the failure of the plaintiff to provide timely notice. The complaint in the case at bar was filed within the two-year statute of limitations period contained in MCLA 691.1411; MSA 3.996(111), as were those in Hobbs, supra, and Kerkstra v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich. 103; 247 N.W.2d 759 (1976).

This Court far exceeds its proper function when it declares this enactment unfair and unenforceable. [Reich, 386 Mich at 626 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).]The next year, in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), the Court retreated from Grubaugh and Reich and, in a novel ruling, held that application of the six-month notice provision in the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act (MVACA), MCL 257.1118, was constitutional, and that the provision was thus enforceable, only where the failure to give notice resulted in prejudice to the party receiving the notice, in that case the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF). The reasoning was that while some notice provisions may be constitutionally permitted some may not be, depending on the purpose the notice serves. Thus, if notice served a permissible purpose, such as to

The constitutionality of the GTLA notice provision was again addressed in Hobbs v. Dept. of State Hwys. , 398 Mich. 90, 247 N.W.2d 754 (1976). By the time that case was heard, the Legislature had amended MCL 691.1404 so as to provide for a 120-day notice period, see MCL 691.1404(1), as amended by 1970 PA 155, and the Supreme Court in Carver v. McKernan , 390 Mich. 96, 100, 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973), had upheld a 120-day notice provision in a different statute. In Hobbs , 398 Mich. at 96, 247 N.W.2d 754, the Supreme Court overruled Reich 's absolute bar on notice provisions and held that the 120-day notice provision in MCL 691.1404(1) was constitutional when the government could show prejudice.