This statutory time limit is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1980)).
This Court defers to the Board's exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally or contrary to law. Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir.1995); Lainez-Ortiz v. INS, 96 F.3d 393, 395 (9th Cir.1996). The Board's determination of purely legal questions is reviewed de novo except to the extent that deference is owed to its interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations.
This Court defers to the Board's exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally or contrary to law. Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (Cir.1995); Lainez-Ortiz v. INS, 96 F.3d 393, 395 (Cir.1996). The Board's determination of purely legal questions is reviewed de novo except to the extent that deference is owed to its interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations.
That Membreno timely petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of her motion to reopen is irrelevant because of the Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. INS that an order of removal "is final, and reviewable, when issued," and that "[i]ts finality is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider." 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995); see also Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's decision we review the IJ's decision as if it were the BIA's decision. Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
We review the BIA's denial of Ambriz De Lopez's motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir.1995). We conclude this denial did not constitute an abuse of discretion because petitioner did not demonstrate that her proffered evidence was previously unavailable.
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir.1995). We deny the petition for review.
Because the transitional rules apply, Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. ยง 1105a(a). We review for abuse of discretion, Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir.1995), and we dismiss in part, and deny in part the petition for review. We lack jurisdiction to consider Medrano's challenges to the BIA's September 23, 2002, order because she did not timely appeal that decision to this Court.
We will defer to the BIA's decision unless it "acted in a manner `arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.'" Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). We review the BIA's factual findings for substantial evidence, and its purely legal determinations de novo. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547.
We defer to the decision of the BIA unless it acted in a manner that was "arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law." Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1995). For the reasons announced below, we deny in part and grant in part the petition for review, and remand to the BIA for clarification.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion because the record indicates that it did not act arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law. See Caruncho v. INS, 68 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1995). Yu's argument that his due process rights were violated because he was deprived of a neutral adjudicator is unsupported by the evidence.