A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he: . . . (3) (i)ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime. . . .' OCGA § 16-2-20 (Code Ann. § 26-801)." Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3), 178 ( 308 S.E.2d 438). In the case sub judice, the evidence authorized findings that defendant was either the assailant or the assailant's accomplice.

We find no error, as it has been repeatedly held that a conspiracy may be proven and a jury charge may be given on conspiracy and parties to a crime even though a defendant is not indicted under those theories. Bruster v. State, 228 Ga. 651, 652 ( 187 S.E.2d 297) (1972); Lerch v. State, 234 Ga. 857, 858 (6) ( 218 S.E.2d 571) (1975); Battle v. State, 231 Ga. 501, 502 ( 202 S.E.2d 449) (1973); Williams v. State, 200 Ga. App. 84, 85-86 (1-2) ( 406 S.E.2d 498) (1991); Bozeman v. State, 196 Ga. App. 743, 745 (7) ( 397 S.E.2d 30) (1990); Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 438) (1983); Hamby v. State, 158 Ga. App. 265 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 715) (1981). Moreover, even assuming that there was a variance between Huey's indictment and the proof at his trial, we conclude that it was not fatal, as Huey's defense was not prejudiced and as he is protected from another prosecution for the same offense.

OCGA § 16-2-20 (a), (b) (3). See, e.g., Short v. State, 276 Ga. App. 340, 344 (1) (b) ( 623 SE2d 195) (2005) (defendant, who observed codefendant rape kidnapping victim but did nothing to stop it, was guilty of rape and aggravated sodomy); Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 178 (3) ( 308 SE2d 438) (1983) ("[a]lthough appellant was not [in pickup truck while codefendant sodomized victim], his actions as an aider and abettor in the commission of that crime allow him to be charged with and convicted of the crime") (citation omitted). 2.

]" Thompson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 734, 736 (4) ( 310 S.E.2d 725) (1983). See also Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 72 (4) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997); Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 178 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 438) (1983). There was no fatal variance between the allegata and the probata.

Rather, the victim testified that appellant forced her to perform oral sex upon him, and that he thereafter committed an act of anal intercourse upon her. The jury immediately noticed this variance, and a colloquy occurred between the jury foreman and trial judge, which in our view, served only to further compound confusion. This case is distinguishable from those cases in which an indictment avers several different manners in which the offense was committed, and there exists evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt as to one of these averred manners (e.g., Lubiano v. State, 192 Ga. App. 272 (1) (a) ( 384 S.E.2d 410)); and, those cases where an appellant was an aider and abettor to the crime as averred (e.g., Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 438)). In this case, appellant was the only averred perpetrator and only one manner of crime commission was averred.

A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he: ... (3) (i)ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime ...' OCGA § 16-2-20 (Code Ann. § 26-801)." Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3), 178 ( 308 S.E.2d 438). Although defendant Lubiano did not point Trooper Little's ".357 magnum revolver" at William Jackson Tubb and order him to leave the scene, he assisted defendant Murray in obtaining the trooper's weapon and he took advantage of the aggravated assault upon William Jackson Tubb to flee the scene.

The jury was authorized to find that Echols had aided and abetted the rape and was therefore a party to the commission of the crime. See Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 438) (1983). Hence, Echols' second enumeration is also without merit.

1. The general grounds are enumerated. After a review of the entire record, we find that a rational trior of fact could reasonably have found, from the evidence adduced at trial, proof of appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of either the actual commission or the aiding and abetting of the commission of acts of child molestation. See generally Padgett v. State, 175 Ga. App. 818 ( 334 S.E.2d 883) (1985); Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 438) (1983). 2.

He recognizes that a showing of direct involvement is not necessary and that a defendant may be convicted as a party to a crime under OCGA § 16-2-20 absent physical presence at the scene. Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 438) (1983). OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) provides: "Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime.

This evidence was clearly admissible. Gravely v. State, 169 Ga. App. 757 ( 315 S.E.2d 271) (1984); Lord v. State, 156 Ga. App. 492, 493 (2) ( 274 S.E.2d 641) (1980); Morgan v. State, 161 Ga. App. 67 (2) ( 288 S.E.2d 836) (1982); Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177 (2) ( 308 S.E.2d 438) (1983). 2.