Central States Joint Board, 117 Ill. App.3d at 606, 453 N.E.2d at 936. But see, Roadside Auto Body, Inc. v. Miller, 285 Ill. App.3d 105, 114, 673 N.E.2d 1145, 1151 (1996); Commerical National Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 131 Ill. App.3d 977, 982, 476 N.E.2d 809 (1985); Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 319-20, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1983) (all indicating that when defendants make positive statements of material fact in intentional tort cases, the plaintiffs' negligence in failing to uncover the truth is not fatal). One of the most important of the surrounding circumstances is timing.
Eldon's statements discouraged investigation of the water damaged area and, plaintiffs argue, justified plaintiffs' reliance on Eldon's representation that the roof was in good condition. Plaintiffs look for support to the rule that where a plaintiff's inquiries are inhibited through a defendant's statements which create a false sense of security or block further investigation, the plaintiff's failure to investigate further is not fatal. ( Carter v. Mueller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 457 N.E.2d 1335.) Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that any negligence on their part in not investigating the damage they saw does not mitigate defendants fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs cite Broberg v. Mann (1965), 66 Ill. App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, for the rule that "a person who is guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation cannot interpose a defense that the person defrauded was negligent in failing to discover the truth." ( 66 Ill. App.2d 134, 140-41, 213 N.E.2d 89, 92.) Plaintiffs acknowledge that the rule is qualified in that the defrauded party must first show he had a right to rely on the misrepresentations.
"'" Id. (quoting Chicago Title Trust Co. v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 118 Ill.App.3d 401, 73 Ill.Dec. 626, 672, 454 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1983) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 108, at 715 (4th ed. 1971))). A plaintiff's duty to investigate further is absolved, however, when the defendant's deliberate misrepresentations have lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security, or when his assurances were intended to block further inquiry. Marino v. United Bank, 137 Ill.App.3d 523, 92 Ill.Dec. 204, 207, 484 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1985); Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill.App.3d 314, 75 Ill.Dec. 776, 781, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1983); Duhl v. Nash Realty Inc., 102 Ill.App.3d 483, 57 Ill.Dec. 904, 911-12, 429 N.E.2d 1267, 1274-75 (1981); Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 238 (1979); cf. Citizens Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 214 N.E.2d 612, 616 (1966). For example, in Carter, the plaintiff had no duty to examine an apartment before renting it because the defendant had told the plaintiff that the apartment would be in the same condition as a model apartment, and that "everything had been done."
Hanover Insurance additionally points to numerous instances in which this court has explained the RLTO's significance as a remedial ordinance that protects the rights of tenants (citing e.g. , Trutin v. Adam , 2016 IL App (1st) 142853, ¶ 33, 403 Ill.Dec. 617, 54 N.E.3d 277 ; Shadid v. Sims , 2015 IL App (1st) 141973, ¶ 5, 396 Ill.Dec. 694, 40 N.E.3d 347 ). ¶ 24 Hanover Insurance points out that we have observed that a leasing tenant is someone who is purchasing services and, therefore, is a "consumer" (citing Carter v. Mueller , 120 Ill. App. 3d 314, 322-23, 75 Ill.Dec. 776, 457 N.E.2d 1335 (1983) ). We have made the finding that a residential tenant is a "consumer" in connection with our jurisprudence that a tenant is entitled to pursue claims against a landlord under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ( 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2016)).
Stamatakis, 165 Ill. App.3d at 881-82. Plaintiff also relies on Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 457 N.E.2d 1335 (1983). In Carter, the court held that a landlord's assurance to a tenant that everything would be taken care of prior to the tenant taking possession, in addition to a later statement that everything was taken care of, constituted a scheme.
) The Stamatakis court then went on to hold that the plaintiff's allegations in its complaint, that the defendant's promises to make good on a contract for the purchase of equipment when he knew the company could not pay, as well as his promise to enter into an employment contract for five years with a covenant not to compete when he intended not to perform, properly alleged a scheme against plaintiff, and that the actual existence of a scheme was a question for the trier of fact. ( Stamatakis, 165 Ill. App.3d 879, 520 N.E.2d 770.) Similarly, in Carter v. Mueller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 457 N.E.2d 1335, this court, on appeal after trial, found that a landlord's assurance to a tenant that everything would be taken care of prior to the tenant taking possession, in addition to a later statement that everything was taken care of, constituted a scheme. Carter, 120 Ill. App.3d at 319-20, 457 N.E.2d at 1340.
The statement that only one leak existed, however, may have left the buyers with a false sense of security. Where a plaintiff's inquiries are inhibited by a defendant's statements which create a false sense of security, the plaintiff's failure to investigate further is not fatal. ( Carter v. Mueller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 457 N.E.2d 1335.) Steinbach relies on Central States Joint Board v. Continental Assurance Co. (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 600, 453 N.E.2d 932, where the court held that a person may not enter into a transaction with his eyes closed to available information. Steinbach argues that plaintiffs did not "seek to look behind the [basement wall] panelling which covered the disclosed defects."
In Illinois a liar may not lull the victim into a false sense of security and then say that the reliance was not justifiable. See AMPAT, 896 F.2d at 1041-43; West v. Western Casualty Surety Co., 846 F.2d 387, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1988); Linington v. Strong, 107 Ill. 295, 302-03 (1883); Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App.3d 154, 166, 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 548, 510 N.E.2d 409, 416 (1st Dist. 1986); Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 319, 75 Ill.Dec. 776, 781, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1st Dist. 1983). Astor did not stick its head in the sand.
Several points raised by Grace are shallow: 1. The fact that Continental may have been deficient in alertness in failing to notice the item in the press release about Pursue Ridgeway might be relevant if this were a suit for negligence, but it is a suit for deliberate fraud, and contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. See, e.g., Tan v. Boyke, 156 Ill. App.3d 49, 57, 108 Ill.Dec. 229, 234, 508 N.E.2d 390, 395 (1987); Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 319-20, 75 Ill.Dec. 776, 781, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1983); Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill. App.3d 37, 51-52, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 328-29, 390 N.E.2d 393, 405-06 (1979); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central National Bank, 773 F.2d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 1985) (construing Illinois law); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1985); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 462 (5th ed. 1984). 2.
However, Bank's misrepresentations were deliberate, and GMAC's contributory negligence is not a defense to liability for an intentional tort. See Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 177, 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982); Commercial National Bank of Peoria v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 131 Ill.App.3d 977, 982, 87 Ill.Dec. 107, 111, 476 N.E.2d 809, 813 (3d Dist. 1985); Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill. App.3d 314, 320, 75 Ill. Dec. 776, 781, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1st Dist. 1983). Although a reasonable finance company, based on the information already possessed by GMAC, might have taken earlier steps to secure its position, the district court found that GMAC did not take such steps because of the false statements by Bank. It is conceivable that a company could embark on a course of foolhardy lending and then, after the debtor's collapse, attempt to place the burden of its own irresponsibility on another creditor that, by chance, had supplied it with incorrect information — however, that is not this case. Bank played a direct and active role in causing GMAC to treat Dealership as a company in better financial position than it was. Bank's deliberate failure to report the $90,000 loan to Smith, which was in turn deposited in Dealership's account, as well as Bank's other misrepresentations, created a false impression of Dealership's financial soundness.