This has been the characteristic view of the courts. Carter v. Lechty, 72 F.2d 320 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1934); In re Michigan Brewing Co., 24 F. Supp. 430 (W. D. Mich. 1938), aff'd, 101 F.2d 1007 (C.A. 6th Cir. 1939); In re Rude, 101 F. 805 (D.C. D. Ky. 1900); In re Christensen, 101 F. 243 (D.C. N. D. Iowa 1900). See also In re Wood and Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 258; Pirie v. Chicago Title Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 455-456.
Every defendant may, of course, set up any defense personal to him. Compare Lidderdale v. Robinson, 12 Wheat. 594; Wright v. Rumph, 238 F. 138 (C. C.A. 5); U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Naylor, 237 F. 314 (C. C.A. 8); Carter v. Lechty, 72 F.2d 320 (C. C.A. 8); Allen v. Fairbanks, 45 F. 445 (C.C.D. Vt.); see M'Donald v. Magruder, 3 Pet. 470, 477; Southern Surety Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 31 F.2d 817, 819 (C. C.A. 3). Since the enactment of ยง 280, as before, a bill in equity against a stockholder transferee is a remedy available to the Commissioner to enforce the tax liability of the corporation.
She was entitled to prove for only half that amount, however, against the estate of the other payee indorser. Joint payees who indorse an instrument are deemed to indorse jointly and severally. Bagby's Maryland Code, art. 13, ยง 87. And, if one is called upon for payment, the other is liable by way of contribution only for his proportionate part of the amount so paid. Carter v. Lechty (C.C.A.8th) 72 F.2d 320; Southern Surety Co. v. Com. Cas. Ins. Co. (C.C.A.3d 31 F.2d 817; Wright v. Rumph (C.C.A.5th) 238 F. 138; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444, 67 A.L.R. 1176. The fact that one of the joint payees when called upon to pay under such an indorsement takes an assignment of the instrument does not, of course, enlarge the liability of the other or others or give the assignee any advantage over them. With respect to the claim for $4,588, it appears that this is based on the value of stock claimed to have been loaned by Mrs. Reamer to Henry F. Wingert, Miller Wingert, and William Wingert and to have been pledged by them as security for a loan and never to have been returned to Mrs. Reamer or her executors.
One parallel could be contribution claims for a series of loan payments, but courts appear divided on when such a claim accrues. Compare, e.g., Willis v. Willis, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12487, at *51-53 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 1980), aff'd on other grounds by 655 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that party "first possessed a claim for contribution with respect to obligations incurred on [loan] note" when "the note had been honored in full"), with, e.g., Carter v. Lechty, 72 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1934) (reasoning that the right of contribution is based on an implied agreement between parties to pay their shares of all obligations as they come due). Moreover, there may be meaningful differences between a typical loan and the fee obligations at issue here, which did not have a fixed end date or amount due.
The Seventh Amendment guarantee does not extend to actions lying in equity. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-37, 86 S.Ct. 467, 476-77, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 126, 133-34, 26 L.Ed. 672 (1881); Carter v. Lechty, 72 F.2d 320, 321 (8th Cir. 1934). In determining whether a given proceeding in bankruptcy lies at common law or in equity for Seventh Amendment purposes, some courts have focused solely on the nature of the relief sought, in the literal language of the prayer for relief.