Recitals in deeds have been held admissible under Rule 803(15) of state evidence rules. McGuire v. Walker, 188 W. Va. 214, 423 S.E.2d 617 (1992) (ancient document); Carter v. Girasuolo, 34 Conn. Sup. 507, 373 A.2d 560 (1976) (recital in deed); Apo v. Dillingham Investment Corp., 57 Haw. 64, 549 P.2d 740 (1976). See McCormick, Evidence, 2d Ed. (1972) § 323; McCormick, Evidence, 4th Ed. § 323 (1992).

Standard 4.2 of the Connecticut Bar Association, Connecticut Standards of Title (1980), provides in pertinent part that "[a] grantor who has conveyed by an effective, unambiguous deed cannot by executing a subsequent deed, make a substantial change in the name of the grantee, decrease the size of the premises or the extent of the estate granted, impose a condition or limitation upon the interest granted, or otherwise deviate from the first deed, even though the latter deed purports to correct or modify the former." As the Appellate Court has recently noted, however, "[t]he standards of title `establish the custom in the legal community . . . [but] are not controlling, contractually or otherwise.' Carter v. Girasuolo, 34 Conn. Sup. 507, 510, 373 A.2d 560 (1976)." Cardillo v. Cardillo, 27 Conn. App. 208, 212 n. 5, 605 A.2d 576 (1992).

See also Apo v. Dillingham Inv. Corp., 57 Haw. 64, 67, 549 P.2d 740, 743 (1976) (declaration in a deed about family history or pedigree are among the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule). Defendants contend that the HRE Rule 803(b)(15) hearsay exception applies exclusively to a statement of fact and that because the deed recital upon which the court based its opinion is a statement of law, the exception does not apply. Carter v. Girasuolo, 34 Conn. Sup. 507, 511, 373 A.2d 560, 563 (1976) (when dealing with deed recitals as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the statement should involve matters of fact and not conclusions of law). Defendants, however, mischaracterize the deed's recital as a statement of law.

The standards of title "establish the custom in the legal community . . . [but] are not controlling, contractually or otherwise." Carter v. Girasuolo, 34 Conn. Sup. 507, 510, 373 A.2d 560 (1976). The plaintiff's claim for relief, which asked that the court enter a decree that the plaintiff own the property in fee simple, must fail for the same reason. It is axiomatic that an action to determine title to real estate must include all parties in interest.

This claims is not correct as the deeds show that George B. Francis and John Douglass were owners to the south, the former of of lot C and the latter of Lot E. Even if it were correct, it would not create a genuine issue of material fact as a construction of the deeds bearing on this recognize, as we have shown, George B. Francis as an abutter to the South of Lot F. Here, and throughout our discussions of construing the deeds involved we not only keep in mind the legal principles already recited but also the Connecticut Bar Association Standards of Title (1980) (Standards). In recognizing that the Standards have certain applicability our Appellate Court has said "The Standards of Title" establish the custom in the legal community, [but] are not controlling, contractually or otherwise. . . Carter v. Girasulo, 34 Conn. Sup. 507, 513 (1976)" Cardillo v. Cardillo, 27 Conn. App. 208, 213 (1992). In Cole v. Steinberg, 144 Conn. 629 (1957) our Supreme Court referred to the Standards in determining the marketability of title.