Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-1913
11-08-2024
ANTHONY CARTER, Plaintiff, v. RICH FITZGERALD, ORLANDO HARPER, ALLEGHENY COUNTY, CITY OF PITTSBURGH, ALLEGHENY HEALTH NETWORK, PITTSBURGH POLICE, CHIEF OF PITTSBURGH POLICE, DR. PATCH, POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE, SGT. JANE DOE, SGT. JOHN DOE, C/O JOHN DOES #1-4, CAPTAIN JOHN DOE, JACK DOE, AND DR. JOHN DOE, Defendants.
Marilyn J. Horan United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS ECF NOS. 34, 37, AND 40
Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
Plaintiff, Anthony Carter (“Carter”), is a pretrial detainee confined in Westmoreland County Prison. ECF 9, ¶ III. The events giving rise to this lawsuit, however, involve Carter's arrest on February 12, 2022, by a City of Pittsburgh police officer and his subsequent confinement as a pretrial detainee at Allegheny County Jail. Id., ¶ IV.C. Carter has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 7.
Carter has named eighteen defendants: Rich Fitzgerald, Orlando Harper, Allegheny County, City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny Health Network, Pittsburgh Police, Police Officer John Doe, Sgt. Jane Doe, Sgt. John Doe, C/O John Does # 1-4, Captain John Doe, Dr. Patch, Jack Doe, Chief of Pittsburgh Police, and Dr. John Doe. Carter claims Defendants have violated his First, Fourth, Eighth, Fourteenth and “due process clause of these Amendments, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” ECF No. 9, III(B). He seeks nominal, compensatory and punitive damages. ECF No. 9, ¶ 12. All Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. Id., ¶ 22.
In the factual background of the Complaint, Carter also states he was denied his “ADA rights.” ECF No. 9, p. 5, ¶ IV. D. However, in the Jurisdiction and Venue section of the Complaint, he states that “[t]his is a civil action authorized, by 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to redress the deprivation, under color of state law of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.” He does not invoke the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 122181-12189, as a basis for jurisdiction.
Carter alleges he was arrested by Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe on February 12, 2022, and following his arrest was brought to Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”), where he was detained until March 18, 2022. He alleges Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe violated his constitutional rights during his arrest. He also brings several claims related to his confinement in the ACJ contending that his constitutional rights were violated by ACJ corrections officers and medical personnel.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Pending before the Court are three motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6): a motion filed by Allegheny County, Rich Fitzgerald, and Orlando Harper (collectively, the “County Defendants”); a motion filed by Allegheny Health Network (“AHN”), and a motion filed by the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Police, and Chief of Pittsburgh Police (collectively, the “City Defendants”). ECF Nos. 34, 37, and 40. Carter filed an omnibus response in opposition, which added additional facts to his Complaint. ECF No. 60. The County Defendants, AHN, and the City Defendants each filed reply briefs. ECF Nos. 61, 62, and 63. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for consideration.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). This matter was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy. Upon Judge Eddy's retirement, the matter was reassigned on April 23, 2024, to Chief Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo. On July 3, 2024, pursuant to Administrative Order 2024-07, the matter was reassigned to this member of the Court.
For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended the County Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part, AHN's motion be granted, and the City Defendants' motion be granted. It is also recommended Defendant Police Officer John Doe be dismissed pursuant the Court's screening authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). And it is further recommended that Carter be granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days that includes all the allegations and claims he seeks to bring against AHN.
II. Report
A. Factual Background
The allegations below are in the Complaint and are accepted as true with all reasonable inferences drawn in the light most favorable to Carter. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
On February 12, 2022, Carter was arrested by Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe. Carter alleges that the police officer gave Carter's keys to Carter's ex-girlfriend without his permission. ECF No. 9, p. 17, ¶ 1. Carter contends that because of the police officer giving his keys to his ex-girlfriend, she stole from his family and crashed his car. Id., p. 14, ¶ 8.
After his arrest, Carter was brought to ACJ. Id., p. 17, ¶ 1. He states he arrived at ACJ in a wheelchair as he could not “walk without the assistance of a walker, wheelchair or hard bottom shoes.” Id. Defendant Jack Doe, described as a “health official,” said he did not believe Carter could not walk and stated to a corrections officer that Carter did not need a wheelchair. Id. C/O John Doe #1 then took the wheelchair away and Sgt. John Doe told Carter to get up and go into the shower. Id., p. 18, ¶ 2. Carter replied that he would not go into the shower without shower shoes and a walker. Id. C/O John Doe #1 proceeded to flip Carter out of the wheelchair, causing Carter to “do a face plant.” Id. At that point, Sgt. John Doe and C/O John Does #1 - 4 attempted to perform a cavity search of Carter. Id. Carter began to struggle and in the process Carter tried to bite John Doe #3. Id. Carter bases his PREA claim for sexual assault and rape on this event. Id.
After the cavity search was complete, C/O John Doe #4 started punching and kneeing Carter. Id., ¶ 3. Sgt John Doe handcuffed him and told C/O John Does #1-4 to take Carter to the Disciplinary Housing Unit (“DHU”). Id. While in the DHU, Carter had no access to a wheelchair and was “forced to hop around” on one leg with the assistance of the corrections officers. Id., p, 19, ¶ 3.
While in the DHU, Carter alleges he was “forced to sit in feces and without a shower for 2 days.” Id. His requests to speak to someone about his PREA claims were ignored. Id., ¶ 4. Carter alleges that while in the DHU he slipped and fell in the shower area because he did not have slip resistant showers shoes. Id., p. 20, ¶ 5. He hit his head and neck on the shower entrance and was not able to move or feel anything below his neck. Id. Sgt. Jane Doe found him on the floor and instructed corrections officers to “pick him up by all 4 of my limbs and carry me to my cell all while she had her taser pointed at me” and yelling obscenities. Id. While being carried to his cell, Carter's head hit the ground several times as his head was not being held. Id. Sgt. Jane Doe instructed the corrections officers to “drop [Carter] at the entrance of [his] door cell.” Id. He was placed on the cold floor, naked and wet. Id. Sgt. Jane Doe told him to dress himself or get on the mattress and get warm. Id. Eventually the nursing staff arrived and “dragged him out [his] cell,” put him on a stretcher, and transported him to the hospital. Id., pp. 20-21, ¶ 5.
Carter remained in the hospital for almost a full day. Id., p. 21, ¶ 6. He eventually got the feeling back in his legs and was discharged back to ACJ. Id. Upon arrival back at ACJ, he was moved to the Medical Housing Unit. Id. He requested assistance to go to the toilet, but the nurse told him to get to the toilet on his own. Id. He attempted to do that, but fell out of his wheelchair, and laid “in feces screaming for help on the ground for about 15 minutes.” Id. During this time, Warden Orlando Harper, Dr. Patch, and Dr. John Doe were talking privately outside his cell. Id. Corrections officers got him off the ground and into the shower. Id.
After his shower, Carter was told that Warden Harper and Dr. Patch had ordered that he be moved to the Mental Health Ward. Id., ¶ 7. While in the Mental Health Ward, he was placed in a suicide cell, stripped of his clothes, and given two suicide blankets, one to sleep on and the other to cover up. Id., p. 22, ¶ 7. His wheelchair was again taken away. Id. Carter alleges that while in the suicide cell, he was “forced to clean up feces, eat and sleep with feces on and around me.” Id., ¶ 8. Captain John Doe refused to give Carter toilet paper to clean up the feces and told him to use his hands. Id.
Carter went on a hunger strike for five or six days while in the Mental Health Ward. Id., p. 22, ¶ 9. A nurse asked him why he was on a hunger strike and he told her because he cannot walk without hard bottom shoes, a walker and/or a wheelchair. Id., p. 23, ¶ 9. He then showed the nurse his leg and, according to Carter, the nurse said, “Oh my God. I don't know why they would not give you anything to ambulate around on that you asked for with that type of injury to your leg.” Id. (quoted verbatim). The nurse then got Carter a walker and a tray of food and he ended his hunger strike. Id.
The next morning, Dr. Patch walked past Carter's cell and asked how he got a walker, as Dr. Patch had not approved it and he planned to take it away. Id., p. 23, ¶ 10. Dr. Patch then noticed Carter's leg and said, “Oh my God, don't try to take another step, how long have you been injured like this?” Carter replied, “I just started walking and this is the reason I needed hard bottom shoes, a walker and or wheelchair.” Dr. Patch told Carter that “the hospital kept saying I can walk, but never said anything about my leg. So they were under the impression I was faking or that it was a mental thing.... ” Id. (quoted verbatim). Carter was then immediately given hard bottom shoes and was able to keep the walker. Id., p. 24, ¶ 10. Carter was released from ACJ a few days later. Id., ¶ 11.
Because of the actions of the ACJ corrections officers, as well as medical personnel, Carter claims to have sustained several injuries including mental and emotional trauma, loss of feeling in his body, temporary paralysis, pain, and suffering, and cruel and unusual punishment. He also claims he has to have an MRI every six months because of the neck injury he suffered because of slipping and falling at ACJ, and that he suffers stress, duress, exasperation, pain in his neck, head and back and embarrassment. Id., p. 5. He seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00 from AHN, Allegheny County, City of Pittsburgh, and the Pittsburgh Police department and $100,000.00 in punitive damages against these defendants, jointly and severally. Id., p. 25. Against the individual defendants, he seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $50,000.00 from each individual. Id.
Carter asserts two additional allegations. First, he contends all of the belongings he came to ACJ with were either stolen or given away (i.e., prescription glasses, shoes and a cell phone). He made a report with Captain Joseph and was told to file a claim but has been told he would recover only 20% of the value of his belongings. He seeks “some form of preliminary injunctive relief” for “his glasses, shoes, and iPhone. Id., p. 24, ¶ 11. He also asserts he was kept in jail longer than he should have been because ACJ “lied to the courts on my court date and said that I that I had Covid-19 when I never had it they did to keep me incarcerated for the money they were getting to house me longer, from the government.” Id. As relief, he seeks $150.00 a day “from the day they lied and said I had Covid 19 ....” Id.
B. Standard of Review - Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and can be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A defendant bears the burden of showing a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element.'” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), nor a plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims - not if they will ultimately prevail. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
Finally, because Carter is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the Complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read Carter's Complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969). Despite this leniency, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).
With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to Carter's Complaint and Defendants' motions to dismiss.
D. Discussion
Carter brings his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in pertinent part:
Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 “is not a source of substantive rights but a vehicle for vindicating rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution or by federal statute.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, . . . .To prevail on a claim pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185,189 (3d Cir. 2005). “The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)(citations omitted). Carter claims Defendants have violated his First, Fourth, Eighth, Fourteenth and “due process clause of these Amendments, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” ECF No. 9, III(B).
The County Defendants, AHN, and the City Defendants each seek to dismiss all claims brought against them. The motions will be addressed in order.
1. The County's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 34
Carter has named as Defendants Allegheny County, Rich Fitzgerald, Allegheny County Executive; and Orlando Harper, the Warden of ACJ. Fitzgerald and Harper are named in both their individual and official capacities.
a) Allegheny County
Carter contends that Allegheny County is responsible for the “overall operation of the County and each institution under its jurisdiction including City of Pittsburgh and the Pittsburgh Police Department.” ECF No. 9, ¶ 4.
Under familiar standards, a municipality may be held liable for a Section 1983 violation based on a policy or practice, including inadequate training of officers. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Ordinarily, such a policy or practice must be alleged, at least generally. Here, however, Carter needs discovery to determine the identities of the Doe Defendants who he alleges violated his constitutional rights, to say nothing of their training.
For this reason, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss Allegheny County be denied pending development of the facts in discovery.
b) Rich Fitzgerald and Orlando Harper
At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Rich Fitzgerald was the County Manager for Allegheny County. Carter contends that Fitzgerald was responsible for “how the ACJ is run.” ECF No. 9, ¶ 10. Orlando Harper was the Warden of ACJ. Both are named in their official and individual capacities.
i. Official Capacities
Defendants contend that the claims against Fitzgerald and Harper in their official capacities should be dismissed because they are duplicative of the claims Carter has brought against the County.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985). As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Islands, 618 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, where the government entity for which the individual defendants work is a named defendant, claims against individual defendants in their official capacities may be dismissed as redundant. Burton v. City of Philadelphia, 121 F.Supp.2d 810, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). See Kentucky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.4 (1985) (“[t]here is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, supra, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”). See also Schor v. North Braddock Borough, 801 F.Supp.2d 369, 376-377 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“any claims against the [individual defendants] in their official capacities, are redundant and unnecessary”).
By bringing claims against Allegheny County and Fitzgerald and Harper in their official capacities Carter has, in essence, named Allegheny County as a defendant twice. As a result, Carter's claims brought against Fitzgerald and Harper in their official capacities are redundant. It is, therefore, recommended that these claims be dismissed with prejudice, with leave to amend denied as futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245.
ii. Individual Capacities
“‘A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.'” Evanchco v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (a supervisor can only be held liable if his or her own actions resulted in the constitutional injury). Supervisory liability will be found under one of several theories. First, supervisors may be liable if, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, they “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.'” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Or, second, they “participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.” Id. Under either theory, there must be both contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3rd Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
Here, the only allegation against Rich Fitzgerald is that as County Executive he was responsible for how the ACJ ran. ECF 9, ¶ 4. The Complaint contains no allegations that County Executive Fitzgerald established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused Carter constitutional harm or that Fitzgerald participated in violating Carter's rights, directed others to violate them, or had knowledge and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations. Therefore it is recommended that the motion to dismiss the claims against County Executive Fitzgerald in his individual capacity be granted and the individual claims against him be dismissed with prejudice, with leave to amend denied. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245.
The same, however, cannot be recommended with respect to Defendant Warden Harper. Carter alleges that Warden Harper saw him lying on his cell floor in pain and unable to move, and Harper failed to direct the corrections officers to assist him. ECF No. 9, p.21, ¶ 6. Whether Defendant Warden Harper actually participated in violating Carter's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' alleged violations is a question for discovery. But at this stage of the proceedings, Carter has sufficiently alleged that Warden Harper had personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. Accordingly, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss the claims against Warden Harper in his individual capacity be denied.
2. AHN's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 37
The Complaint is unclear, but it appears Carter is alleging that AHN was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The facts of the Complaint imply that Carter believes AHN, or its employees, failed to provide him necessary care, specifically in denying him a needed wheelchair or walker. The Complaint states AHN is “the company in which the county goes through to hire medical personel” and “is legally responsible for all actors employed by it and acting on its behalf.” ECF No. 9, at 14.
Medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed “under the standard used to evaluate similar claims brought under the Eighth Amendment[.]” Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 657 Fed.Appx. 134, 138 n.5 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003)). To succeed on an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that ‘the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs' and (2) an objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.'” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs includes “where prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . and such denial exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,'” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976)), and when medical care is intentionally not provided even when the need for it is known. Id. (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Deliberate indifference claims are typically brought under the Eighth Amendment, but, when the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, such claims are raised under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003).
At this early stage of the litigation, and when viewed in the light most favorable to Carter, the allegations of the Complaint sufficiently allege a “serious medical condition.” See Monmouth Cty., 834 F.2d at 347 (“The seriousness of an inmate's medical need may also be determined by reference to the effect of denying the particular treatment. For instance, Estelle makes clear that if ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' 429 U.S. at 103, results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the eighth amendment.”). Here, the Complaint states Carter entered ACJ in a wheelchair, that the wheelchair was improperly taken from him, and he was forced to hop around on one foot with help from corrections officers.
Assuming Carter has alleged a serious medical need, his claims against AHN turn on respondeat superior or vicarious liability for the alleged misconduct of its employees. Such claims are insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against AHN. Natale, 318 F.3d at 583. A private corporation performing a government function is liable under Section1983 if it had a custom or policy that caused the plaintiff's constitutional injury -in this context, a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (applying requirements of Monell to a private company providing medical services to inmates). See also Weigher v. Prison Health Servs., 402 Fed.Appx. 668, 669-70 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a private corporation providing medical service at a state correctional facility cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in a Section 1983 suit). Thus, to prevail on his Section 1983 claims against AHN, Carter must establish that “there was a relevant [AHN] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation” for which he seeks relief. Natale, 318 F.3d at 584.
The Complaint does not state sufficient facts to support a causal connection between the claimed constitutional violations and any AHN policy or custom. Because Carter's allegations fail to state a claim against AHN, it is recommended the Court grant AHN's Motion to Dismiss.
Given the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed the lower courts to permit a curative amendment if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002), it is also recommended the Court permit Carter to amend his Complaint, if he so desires, to bring a Monell against AHN. Carter is reminded that an amended complaint must be complete in all respects. Carter should be cautioned that if he elects to file an amended complaint, it must be filed within thirty days. Otherwise, his claims against AHN will be dismissed with prejudice.
In Carter's response to AHN's motion, he explains why he needed a wheelchair, who initially ordered the wheelchair, identifies Dr. Patch and Dr. John Doe as AHN employees, and contends AHN failed to properly supervise its staff at ACJ. ECF No. 60, at 2. In general, courts do not authorize piecemeal amendment or gradual supplementation of the operative time over time, which is essentially what Carter's response seeks to do. Therefore, it is recommended that in addition to allowing Carter leave to state a Monell claim, he be granted leave to amend the Complaint to include all allegations and claims he seeks to bring against AHN. The amended complaint must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed. See Argentina v. Gillette, No. 19-1348, 2019 WL 2538010, at *1 n.3 (June 20, 2019) (recognizing that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.”).
3. The City Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 40
Carter contends that during his arrest on February 12, 2022, Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe took his keys and then gave the keys to Carter's exgirlfriend, without Carter's consent. At some point later, the ex-girlfriend stole from Carter's family home and crashed Carter's car. He alleges the City of Pittsburgh is “legally responsible for all actors employed by it and acting on its behalf,” ECF No. 9, p. 14, ¶ 6, the Pittsburgh Police and the Chief of Pittsburgh Police are liable because they “gave power to police officer John Doe,” id., ¶ 7, and the Chief of Pittsburgh Police “is responsible for the actions of his officers because he is the head of the department.” Id., ¶ 15. The Complaint does not allege any specific constitutional right or Pennsylvania common law which Carter believes any of the City Defendants violated.
The City Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them arguing Carter has failed to state a cognizable claim under Section 1983 as he has failed to allege facts showing he was deprived of a constitutional right, ECF No. 41, pp. 4-5, failed to identify a custom or policy that caused his alleged constitutional injury, id., pp. 5-7, failed to plead any facts showing the Chief of Police's personal involvement, id., pp, 7-8, and alternatively, the Chief of Police is entitled to qualified immunity, id., pp. 8-10.
Carter's only response to this motion is,
I have a right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. I have a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures and I have a right for all my affects and belongings to be safe and secure in, around or on me at all times. The City of Pittsburgh is legally responsible for all actors employed by it and acting on its behalf.ECF No. 60, p. 4.
In carefully reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds that Carter has failed to allege any facts in the Complaint which state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City Defendants that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 55 U.S. at 570. The Complaint merely makes a statement about the John Doe police officer's actions and at no point in the Complaint is an actual claim alleged against the City of Pittsburgh, the Pittsburgh Police, or the Chief of Police. Carter has stated no facts that show his “right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment” and “right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures” or any constitutional right were violated. Merely stating in conclusory terms that the City Defendants violated his constitutional rights under Section 1983 is not enough to state a claim when there is no underlying constitutional claim established. Thus, it is recommended the City's motion to dismiss be granted and leave to amend be denied.
Alternatively, if the Complaint is found to have stated an underlying constitutional claim, it is recommended that the claims against the City Defendants be dismissed for various reasons. First, the “Pittsburgh Police,” as an agency of the City itself, is not a defendant against whom a Section 1983 claim may be asserted. Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997). See also Martin v. Red Lion Police Dept., 146 Fed.Appx. 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding the police department is a sub-division of the defendant borough and is not a proper party in an action pursuant to Section 1983 action).
Next, as for the claims against the City of Pittsburgh, it is settled law that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for asserting liability against a municipality. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Municipalities cannot be held liable under Section 1983, “unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the moving force behind the plaintiff's deprivation of federal rights.” Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (quotations omitted). Though “it may seem contrary to common sense,” municipal liability may be based on a failure to train police officers, because a city may “actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train its employees.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has described the “substantive elements” of a municipal liability theory as (1) a custom or policy of inadequate training, supervision, or hiring; (2) the municipality's deliberate indifference to that inadequacy; and (3) a causal nexus between the inadequacy and the constitutional deprivation. See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996).
The Court finds the Complaint fails to set forth any plausible basis to conclude that the City had a municipal custom, policy, or practice that was responsible for Carter's alleged constitutional injury. Carter offers no factual specificity that might bring his claims against the City of Pittsburgh from conceivable to plausible. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547.
And third, as for the claims against the Chief of Police, an individual supervisor, such as a police chief, “may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinates' violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Supervisory liability under Section 1983 is an individual capacity claim against a supervisor. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.2010). Such liability requires a showing of proximate causation, so a plaintiff must “demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus' or ‘affirmative link' between the [directions] and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.'” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)).
To the extent that Carter attempts to bring a claim against the Chief of Police in his official capacity for failure to supervise, that claim should be dismissed as redundant to the municipal liability claim against the City of Pittsburgh. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, (1991). While the Chief of Police may be a policymaker under Section 1983, any allegation based on the Chief of Police's status as a policymaker is encompassed within the municipal liability claim and cannot be properly categorized as a supervisory liability claim. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586.
The Court finds that Carter has not sufficiently plead personal participation by the Chief of Police in Defendant Officer John Doe's actions, and as a corollary, Carter has not sufficiently pleaded proximate causation. At no point in the Complaint does Carter allege any specific action by the Chief of Police. For example, Carter merely alleges that the Chief of Police “is responsible for the actions of his officers because he is the head of the department.” ECF No. 9, p. 15, ¶ 20. “Liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Carter has not pleaded with any particularity the Chief of Police's participation in, or actual knowledge of and acquiescence to the alleged actions of Defendant Officer John Doe.
Given the Court's recommended disposition of Carter's claims against the Chief of Police, the Court need not address the alternative argument that the Chief of Police is entitled to qualified immunity.
For all these reasons, it is recommended that all claims against the City Defendants be dismissed with prejudice with leave to amend being denied. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
It is further recommended under the Court's screening authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe be dismissed as the Complaint contains no facts to plausibly support a claim against Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe for a violation of any of Carter's constitutional rights. The only allegation against Officer John Doe is that the police officer took Carter's keys during an arrest and then gave them to Carter's ex-girlfriend without his permission, who later stole from Carter's family and crashed his car. This is not enough to show that Carter was deprived of a constitutional right by Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe. Thus, it is recommended that Pittsburgh Police Officer John Doe be dismissed with prejudice and leave to amend be denied as futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that (1) the County's motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part; specifically, the motion be granted as to all official capacity claims against Rich Fitzgerald and Orlando Harper, and all individual claims against Rich Fitzgerald, and the motion be denied as to Allegheny County and the individual claims against Orlando Harper; (2) AHN's motion to dismiss be granted, and (3) the City's motion be granted.
It is further recommended that Carter be granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days that includes all the allegations and claims he seeks to bring against AHN.
It is further recommended the Clerk of Court terminate from the docket the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Police, Chief of Pittsburgh Police, Police Officer John Doe, and Rich Fitzgerald.
Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Carter, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by November 25, 2024. Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by November 22, 2024. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011)(quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).