"Under the learned-intermediary rule, '[w]here the product is vended to a particular group or profession, the manufacturer is not required to warn against risks generally known to such group or profession.'" Fouch v. Bicknell Supply Co., 756 S.E.2d 682, 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 456 S.E.2d 661, 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)).

(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 217 Ga. App. 139, 140 (456 SE2d 661) (1995); see also Farmer, supra, at 355 (1). A similar rule "applies where it appears that the person using the product should know of the danger, or should in using the product discover the danger." (Footnote omitted.)

(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 217 Ga.App. 139, 140, 456 S.E.2d 661 (1995); see also Farmer, supra, 231 Ga.App. at 355(1), 498 S.E.2d 583. A similar rule “applies where it appears that the person using the product should know of the danger, or should in using the product discover the danger.”

D. The Carter Five-Part Test We also address Ellis's argument that her claims should be analyzed under the balancing test set forth in Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 217 Ga.App. 139, 456 S.E.2d 661 (1995). Under Georgia law, the balancing test "addresses when a supplier's duty to warn an ultimate consumer can be discharged by a warning given to an intermediary party."

These factors include "the burden of requiring a warning; the likelihood that the intermediary will provide a warning; the likely efficacy of such a warning; the degree of danger posed by the absence of such a warning; and the nature of the potential harm." Id. (quoting Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 456 S.E.2d 661, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)). The factors apply even where the manufacturer did not actually warn the intermediary but instead relied on the intermediary to forward information it already possessed or of which it had actual prior knowledge.

(a) The plaintiffs argue that Sterling Equipment owed Maxwell a duty under Restatement 2d of Torts, § 388, which this court adopted in Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga.App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948). See Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 217 Ga.App. 139, 456 S.E.2d 661 (1995). Section 388 provides:

Though we have applied the doctrine to limit liability in certain circumstances, we decline to extend it to this type of case. See Carter v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 217 Ga. App. 139, 140 ( 456 SE2d 661) (1995); Exxon Corp. v. Jones, 209 Ga. App. 373, 375 ( 433 SE2d 350) (1993); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 178 Ga. App. 438, 441 (2) ( 343 SE2d 715) (1986), aff'd but criticized on other grounds, 256 Ga. 255 ( 347 SE2d 568) (1986); Eyster v. Borg-Warner Corp., 131 Ga. App. 702, 704 (2) ( 206 SE2d 668) (1974). See also Presto v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 226 Ga. App. 547, 548 (1) ( 487 SE2d 70) (1997).

(Emphasis supplied.) Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 388 has been adopted as the law of Georgia; Carter v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 217 Ga. App. 139, 140 ( 456 SE2d 661) (1995), and is made applicable to manufacturers by Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 394. Dingier v. Moran, 224 Ga. App. 59, 60 ( 479 SE2d 469) (1996). This includes the definitions and comments applicable to Section 388.

Singleton v. Airco, Inc., 169 Ga. App. 662, 664 ( 314 S.E.2d 680) (1984); see also Hawkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 481, 482-483 (1) ( 249 S.E.2d 286) (1978); Parke, Davis Co. v. Mayes, 124 Ga. App. 224 ( 183 S.E.2d 410) (1971). The plaintiffs mistakenly claim that Carter v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 217 Ga. App. 139 ( 456 S.E.2d 661) (1995) weakens this rule. Carter involved plaintiffs who purchased clothing available to the general public without warnings regarding the fabric's flammability.

We should first explain that defendant's reliance upon a line of product liability cases is appropriate since the relevant duties of a lender, such as defendant, share a common origin with those of a manufacturer. The Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, § 388 (along with the substantially similar section of the same number in the first edition) has been adopted as the law of Georgia. Carter v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 139, 140 ( 456 S.E.2d 661); Beam v. Omark Industries, Inc., 143 Ga. App. 142, 146-147 ( 237 S.E.2d 607), and is made applicable to manufacturers by the Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, § 394, and to lenders by the Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, § 405. The Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, § 388 states: "One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier "(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and "(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and "(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condi