We first address Equifax's argument that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal in Case No. A03A1676. Equifax contends that the contempt order from which the appeal was filed in that case was not a final, directly appealable order because it gave HCG the opportunity to purge itself and imposed no punishment against HCG. On previous occasions, this Court has held that a civil contempt order which allows the contemnor to purge the contempt and does not impose a punishment is interlocutory in nature and thus not subject to a direct appeal. Carter v. Data Gen. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379, 380-381 (1) ( 291 SE2d 99) (1982); In re Crudup, 149 Ga. App. 214 ( 253 SE2d 802) (1979); Lake v. Hamilton Bank of Dalton, 148 Ga. App. 348, 349 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 177) (1978); Harrell v. Peteet, 134 Ga. App. 210 ( 214 SE2d 5) (1975). However, both our Supreme Court and this Court have allowed direct appeals under similar facts.

In that event, the trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with the case. Carter v. Data General Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379 ( 291 S.E.2d 99) (1982). Because the order disqualifying Mrs. Cherry's attorney was an interlocutory order, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction with the filing of the notice of appeal. Ewing Holding Corp. v. Egan-Stanley Investments, 154 Ga. App. 493 ( 268 S.E.2d 733) (1980).

See Manning v. MNC Consumer Discount Co., 212 Ga. App. 824(1) ( 442 S.E.2d 919) (1994). See, e.g., Carter v. Data General Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379, 380-381(1) (S.E.2d) (1982); Lake v. Hamilton Bank, 148 Ga. App. 348, 349(1)(B) ( 251 S.E.2d 177) (1978). 2.

Price's attempt to file a supplemental record which Price says would show that the road was a county project, and her attempt to conduct deposition and discovery on such question to supplement the record therewith during the pendency of this appeal in this court and while the trial court was without jurisdiction to proceed in such manner, as is very well established law, were improper, superfluous, irrelevant and frivolous. See OCGA §§ 5-6-46 and 5-6-34 (b); Walker v. Walker, 239 Ga. 175 ( 236 S.E.2d 263); Tyree v. Jackson, 226 Ga. 642 ( 177 S.E.2d 159); Carter v. Data Gen. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 291 S.E.2d 99). Moreover, evidence that Dougherty County built the road does not alter the fact that the county is immune from suit and OCGA § 32-2-6 (a) does not create a waiver of that immunity. The filing of a supplemental record allegedly containing evidence that Dougherty County built the road or otherwise was involved with the road project is but another attempt to confuse the issue in this case.

See Crute v. Crute, 86 Ga. App. 96 ( 70 S.E.2d 727) (1952). See generally Warehouse Carpet Sales c. v. S.C.J. Assoc., 170 Ga. App. 352 (2) ( 317 S.E.2d 328) (1984); Carter v. Data Gen. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379 (3) ( 291 S.E.2d 99) (1982). Finally, we find no issue of international law presented by the facts of this case.

See Drew v. Hagy, supra. Appellant's meritless motion for reconsideration did not affect the order compelling response nor did it toll the running of the thirty-day time period granted in the October 27, 1983 order. See generally Carter v. Data Gen. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379 ( 291 S.E.2d 99) (1982). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was authorized by OCGA §§ 9-11-37 (b) (2) (C) and 9-11-37 (d) (1) to dismiss appellant's complaint based upon her total failure to answer or to properly object.

Where the contempt is continuing, the trial court may order that the parties be imprisoned until they comply with the order. Accord Carter v. Data Gen. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379 ( 291 S.E.2d 99) (1982). See also Ensley v. Ensley, 239 Ga. 860 ( 238 S.E.2d 920) (1977); Hopkins v. Jarvis, 648 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1981).

Renfroe v.State of Ga., 104 Ga. App. 362, 365 ( 121 S.E.2d 811) (1961). Accord, Carter v. Data General Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379 (3) ( 291 S.E.2d 99) (1982). There was no such abuse of discretion in this case.