Opinion
No. 2080 C.D. 2012
06-24-2013
Lakenya Carter v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Department), appeals from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) sustaining the appeal of Lakenya Carter and rescinding the three-month suspension of her vehicle registration imposed pursuant to Section 1786(d) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (Law). The Department argues that the trial court erred by sustaining Carter's appeal because she failed to prove that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage for her vehicle was for a period of less than 31 days as required by Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Law.
75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d). Section 1786(d)(1) requires the Department to suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines that the requisite financial responsibility was not secured for the vehicle. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1).
75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(2)(i). Pursuant to Section 1786(d)(2)(i), a vehicle registration will not be suspended where the "registrant proves to the satisfaction of the department that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during the period of lapse in financial responsibility." Id.
By Official Notice mailed March 19, 2012, the Department notified Carter that her vehicle registration was suspended for three months effective April 23, 2012, because Carter failed to provide the Department with proof of financial responsibility for the vehicle. (Official Notice, March 19, 2012, at 1, R.R. at 24a.) Carter appealed the suspension to the trial court, which held a de novo hearing on October 12, 2012. At the hearing, the Department submitted into evidence a certified packet of documents which included the certified registration record for Carter's vehicle showing that Victoria Fire & Casualty Insurance had cancelled Carter's insurance coverage effective January 20, 2012 for non-payment. (Hr'g Tr. at 4, R.R. at 16a; Suspension Inquiry Detail, R.R. at 27a.) The Department informed the trial court that Carter provided an insurance identification card showing that she had acquired coverage for her vehicle from Safe Auto effective February 25, 2012, and that the Department was able to verify that Carter's policy with Safe Auto began on February 25, 2012. (Hr'g Tr. at 3-4, R.R. at 15a-16a.) However, the Department argued that Carter's vehicle registration suspension must be upheld because there was no evidence that she had obtained coverage within 31 days of the lapse. (Hr'g Tr. at 4, R.R. at 16a.)
After the Department presented its evidence, Carter requested to make a statement; however, because Carter was pro se, the trial judge asked her specific questions in order to develop the factual record. (Hr'g Tr. at 5, R.R. at 17a.) The trial court's questioning elicited the following information: (1) the insurance coverage for her vehicle was cancelled effective January 20, 2012; (2) she obtained coverage from Safe Auto effective February 25, 2012; (3) she made payment for the Safe Auto policy on or about February 19, 2012; and (4) she did not operate her vehicle between January 20, 2012 and February 25, 2012. (Hr'g Tr. at 5-7, R.R. at 17a-19a.) However, at the end of the trial court's questioning, Carter asked if she could "say one thing" to which the trial court replied "No." The trial court accepted Carter's unchallenged testimony and found "that payment was remitted for the replacement insurance policy, prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day period." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Therefore, the trial court found "that there was no prima facie case to be rebutted by [Carter]" because Section 1786(d) of the Law shall not apply if the "registrant proves that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than thirty-one (31) days and that registrant did not operate the vehicle during that period of lapse." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Accordingly, the trial court sustained Carter's appeal and rescinded the three-month suspension of her vehicle registration. (Trial Ct. Order.) This appeal followed.
"This Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion in reaching its decision." Dinsmore v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 932 A.2d 350, 353 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
The Department argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Carter's appeal. The Department asserts that the evidence shows that Carter's lapse in insurance coverage for her vehicle lasted 34 days. The Department argues that Carter did not offer any documentary proof, and her uncorroborated testimony is insufficient, to prove that she satisfied the statutory exception to suspension set forth in Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Law because she allegedly paid for her new policy prior to the expiration of the 31 day period. As such, the Department contends that the trial court's Order must be reversed and the suspension of Carter's vehicle registration reinstated.
Carter has been precluded from filing a brief in this matter. --------
As noted previously, Section 1786(d)(1) of the Law requires the Department to "suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured . . . ." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1). In order to sustain a suspension of a vehicle registration based upon Section 1786(d)(1), the Department must establish that: (1) "the vehicle is registered or of a type that is required to be registered under" the Law; and (2) "there has been either notice to the department of a lapse, termination or cancellation in the financial responsibility coverage as required by law for that vehicle." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(i), (ii). Once the Department meets its burden, the vehicle owner may avoid a suspension by producing clear and convincing evidence that financial responsibility was continuously maintained on the vehicle or that one of the statutory exceptions found in Section 1786(d)(2) of the Law applies. Fell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 925 A.2d 232, 237-39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (footnotes omitted). Pursuant to Section 1786(d)(2)(i), a vehicle registration will not be suspended where: (1) "the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days"; and (2) the vehicle was not operated "during the period of lapse in financial responsibility." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(2)(i).
Here, the Department's evidence proved that there was a cancellation in the financial responsibility coverage for Carter's vehicle effective January 20, 2012, when it was cancelled by Victoria Fire & Casualty Insurance for non-payment, and that the lapse in coverage lasted until February 25, 2012, the effective date of Carter's new policy with Safe Auto. (Hr'g Tr. at 4, R.R. at 16a; Suspension Inquiry Detail, R.R. at 27a.) Therefore, the presumption was established that Carter's vehicle lacked the requisite financial responsibility for a period of 34 days. To rebut this presumption Carter testified at the hearing that, while the policy she obtained from Safe Auto was effective February 25, 2012, she made payment for the Safe Auto policy on or about February 19, 2012. (Hr'g Tr. at 5-7, R.R. at 17a-19a.) Carter produced no other evidence to support her testimony, and was not asked by the trial judge whether she had any evidence to support her testimony.
"This Court has held that uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to meet the strict evidentiary standard required to overcome the statutory presumption." Fell, 925 A.2d at 239 (citing Fagan v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 875 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)). The Department points out that Carter did not offer any documentary proof to establish that she paid for the Safe Auto policy on or about February 19, 2012, such as a receipt from Safe Auto, a cancelled check, or a copy of an insurance binder to prove that she paid the premium prior to the February 25, 2012 effective date of the Safe Auto policy. The trial court made a valiant attempt to assist Carter, who was pro se, in making a factual record in this case. However, it appears from a review of the transcript that Carter did not have the opportunity to present any documentary evidence that she may have had regarding any alleged payment on February 19th. She was not asked about any documentation and, when she tried to add something to her testimony, she was not permitted to do so. As a result, it is impossible to know whether, even if unlikely, Carter had further evidence that would have been sufficient to support her testimony. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate and remand so that Carter can finish her testimony.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Order is vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, June 24, 2013, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County entered in the above-captioned matter is vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge