Opinion
No. 4-120 / 03-1188
Filed March 10, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, L. Vern Robinson, Judge.
Theodore and Joan Carter appeal the district court's denial of their petition for writ of certiorari in which they claimed certain conditions in a special use permit were illegal. AFFIRMED.
James Affeldt of Elderkin Pirnie Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Donald Hoskins, Marion, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The City of Robins Board of Adjustment (Board) granted Theodore and Joan Carter a special use permit authorizing the storage of recycling containers on their property. The Board imposed several conditions, including a requirement that the containers be surrounded by a fence. The Carters petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming the fencing condition was illegal. Following a de novo trial, the district court denied the petition, and this appeal followed.
The Carters contend that 1) the storage of recycling containers was a permitted principal use under the city's ordinance, rendering a special use permit with attendant conditions unnecessary, and 2) the Board was equitably estopped from claiming that the use of their property violated the ordinance. The Board counters that these arguments are not properly before the court. We agree that the equitable estoppel argument was not preserved for review. De Voss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002) (declining to consider issue for first time on appeal). The first argument, however, was raised in the district court. Our review of it is on assigned error. Lauridsen v. City of Okoboji Bd. of Adjustment, 554 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Iowa 1996).
The city's ordinance authorizes thirty-two uses for properties such as the Carters that are zoned "light industrial." They include "[c]onstructor's, architect's and engineer's offices, shops and storage yards," and "personnel storage lockers and warehouses." On appeal, the Carters focus on the warehouse clause. They argue that because the ordinance does not specify that items being warehoused must be inside rather than outside, this clause authorizes them to "warehouse" their recycling containers in the open.
In the district court, the Carters and the court focused on the "constructor's" clause, but the Carters also elicited testimony pertaining to the warehouse clause. Therefore, we will consider their warehouse argument. DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 62 (stating we may affirm on ground urged but not relied on by the court).
A warehouse is defined as "a building used to store goods and other items." Black's Law Dictionary 1578 (7th ed. 1999). Based on this definition, the Board reasonably could have concluded that warehouses are enclosed structures that do not encompass storage yards. See Ackman v. Board of Adjustment, 596 N.W.2d 96, 106 (Iowa 1999) (stating board's decision enjoys strong presumption of validity). Accordingly, the Board did not act illegally in requiring a special use permit with attendant conditions. AFFIRMED.
The City's motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.