erican Fish Oyster Co., 17 Cal.App. 212, 219, 119 P. 388, 390: "The law will not, of course, permit a principal to escape the liability which it attaches to him by reason of such circumstances as are present here upon the plea that the agent has violated or transcended some limitation that he has secretly or without the knowledge of those with whom his agent as such is to deal placed upon the latter's authority as such agent, and in this case it will imply from the conduct of appellant authority in Junta to make the agreement into which the jury found that he entered with Meng. * * * `Where the special character of the agency is not known, and the principal has clothed the agent with apparent powers, strangers, in dealing with the agent, may assume that such apparent powers are possessed. The principal cannot, by private communications with his agent, limit the authority which he allows the agent to assume.'" See in accord, Hope Mining Co. v. Burger, 37 Cal.App. 239, 244, 174 P. 932; Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15, 24, 33 P.2d 852; Bridge v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 129 Cal.App. 365, 19 P.2d 80; Logan v. Andrews, 25 Cal.App.2d 683, 78 P.2d 748; Syar v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 51 Cal.App.2d 527, 125 P.2d 102. "Thus if the principal has by his express act, or as the logical and legal result of his words or conduct, impressed upon the agent the character of one authorized to act or speak for him in a given capacity, authority so to speak and act, follows as a necessary attribute of the character, and the principal having conferred the character will not be heard to assert, as against third persons who have relied thereon in good faith, that he did not intend to impose so much authority, or that he had given the agent express instructions not to exercise it."

(Italics added.) (See, e.g., United Motor etc. Co. v. Callander, supra, 30 Cal.App. 41, 46 ("make good in damages"); Bank of America v. Greenbach (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 220, 238 [ 219 P.2d 814] ("money damages"); Carter v. Carr (1934) 139 Cal.App. 15, 27 [ 33 P.2d 852] ("consequential damages," citing Hines v. Brode, supra); Lobdell v. Miller (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 328, 343 [ 250 P.2d 357] ("consequential damages," citing Carter v. Carr,supra); cf. Utemark v. Samuel (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 313, 317 [ 257 P.2d 656] ("defendants . . . elected to take the consequences, . . ."). In Lobdell, which involved rescission for fraud, the court observed: "The remedy of rescission necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract.

theory of relief; that upon his return of the $1,000 which he had received and his reimbursement of Kurofsky in the amount of $150, which the latter had expended in repair of the involved property, plaintiff was entitled to the recovery of said property plus damages for its loss of use in the sum of $1,122, which amount was computed at the rate of $2.00 per day for 561 days — from September 6, 1943, the date of the removal of the equipment from plaintiff's shop, to March 22, 1945, the date of decision in plaintiff's favor. Such judgment, designed to place the parties in status quo, comports wholly with the principles of rescission and the equities of the case as the court resolved the controverted issues. (12 C.J.S. § 77, pp. 1077-1079; § 79a, p. 1083; Black on Rescission and Cancellation, 2d ed., vol. 3, § 695, p. 1653; Stewart v. Crowley, 213 Cal. 694, 700-701 [ 3 P.2d 562]; see, also, Kent v. Clark, supra, 20 Cal.2d 779, 785; Pendell v. Warren, 101 Cal.App. 407, 410 [ 281 P. 658]; Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15, 27 [ 33 P.2d 852].) [7] In this state of the record no force can be assigned to the inconsistent recital in the findings that plaintiff's "rescission was not prompt nor timely."

[4] It is the general rule that extrajudicial declarations of an agent are not admissible to prove either the fact of an agency or the extent of his authority. ( Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal.App. 372, 381 [ 291 P. 591]; Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15 [ 33 P.2d 852]; 2 Cal.Jur.2d p. 692, § 46.) In the instant case there was other competent evidence produced on the subject and appellants made no objection to the admission of the evidence at the time, on the ground indicated.

The measure of damages recoverable in an action for rescission is essentially different from that in a simple action for damages caused by fraud. [17] In the rescission action a plaintiff is entitled to recover the consideration he gave on restoration or offer of restoration of that which he received. He is also entitled to recover compensation for whatever consequential damages he may have suffered by reason of having entered into the contract. [18] In the latter case, a plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together with additional damage arising from the particular transaction. ( Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15, 27 [ 33 P.2d 852].) This question was fully discussed in Bank of America v. Greenbach, supra, and it was there said, at page 240:

(House v. Piercy, 181 Cal. 247, 251, 183 P. 807; Fulmele v. Los Angeles Inv. Co., 51 Cal.App. 417, 420, 196 P. 923. Having elected to sue on counts one and three, this constituted a waiver of their rights to rescind the contract and recover damages for fraud in inducing the contract. (Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15, 26 et seq., 33 P.2d 852; Merrill v. Merrill, 103 Cal. 287, 290, 35 P. 768, 37 P. 392. Cf. Murphy v. Hellman Commercial etc. Bank, 43 Cal.App. 579, 587, 185 P. 485; also Connelly v. J. D. Millar Realty Co., 131 Cal.App. 67, 70, 20 P.2d 781. Therefore the trial judge should have directed a verdict in favor of each defendant on count two of the complaint.

Based upon that evidence, the loss on the fixtures was $1700 while the loss on the merchandise was $1661, making a total of $3,361.60. Since the measure of damages under section 3343, Civil Code, is the difference between the purchase price and the actual value of the property received plus special damages ( Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15 [ 33 P.2d 852]) it would then appear that the damage suffered by plaintiff was $3,361.60, the difference between the price paid and the true value of the property purchased under the influence of the fraud. This is a loss definitely established.

[4] The findings of the trial court that the appellants were in fact the owners of the nursery stock, that the nursery stock was sold by their agent, and that their agent acted within the scope of his authority, being supported by the evidence, are not subject to attack merely because there is evidence in the record which is conflicting with the evidence supporting the findings. ( Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15 [ 33 P.2d 852]; Paff v. Ottinger, 32 Cal.App. 439, 441 [ 163 P. 230]; Hope Min. Co. v. Burger, 37 Cal.App. 239, 244 [ 174 P. 932]; Interstate Grocery Co. v. George William Bentley Co., 214 Mass. 227 [ 101 N.E. 147].) We are of the opinion that the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the evidence.

And after prima facie proof of agency, the better rule is that extrajudicial declarations of an agent are admissible. Courts assign different reasons, more than one of which might fairly be assigned in this case. In Carter v. Carr et al., 139 Cal.App. 15, 33 P.2d 852, 857, a case in which the facts are somewhat similar to the case at bar, the court said: "It must, we think, be conceded that the fact of agency may not be established by proof of purely extrajudicial statements of one who assumes or pretends to act as an agent and that evidence of such statements is incompetent and inadmissible for such purpose. Spoon v. Sheldon, 27 Cal.App. 765, 768, 151 P. 150. It does not follow, however, that evidence of such statements is inadmissible for any purpose. It has been decided, for example, that, when it has been shown that a person was given actual or ostensible authority to act for another in a particular matter, any declarations made by the agent at the time of the transaction of the business intrusted or apparently intrusted to him, and relating to such business, is admissible as a part of the res gestae.

Where, as here, the wrong measure of compensation was applied but the record supports the finding of liability, we may reverse and remand solely for a new determination of the amount of compensation. (Pretzer v. California Transit Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 202, 209; Housley v. City of Poway (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 801, 814; Carter v. Carr (1934) 139 Cal.App. 15, 30; see alsoCrockett & Myers, supra, 583 F.3d at p. 1239 [vacating judgment and remanding for recalculation of amount of restitution in quantum meruit case in which trial court used wrong measure of restitution].) We do so here.