Daniel A. Speights, Esq., of Glenn, Porter and Sullivan, Columbia, for Respondent, cites: As to the doctrine of sovereignimmunity not being applicable to the instant suit: S.C. Code § 46-344 (Supp. 1974); 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241; 262 S.C. 314, 204 S.E.2d 384; 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42; 180 S.C. 329, 185 S.E. 491; 172 S.C. 174, 173 S.E. 284; 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470; 211 S.C. 442, 45 S.E.2d 841; 207 S.C. 324, 35 S.E.2d 586; 185 S.C. 353, 194 S.E. 143; 261 S.C. 52, 198 S.E.2d 256; 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466; 219 S.C. 313, 65 S.E.2d 232; 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470; 207 S.C. 324, 35 S.E.2d 586; 149 S.C. 52, 146 S.E. 686; 78 S.C. 211, 58 S.E. 811; 78 S.C. 217, 58 S.E. 811; 253 S.C. 76, 169 S.E.2d 148; 166 S.C. 481, 165 S.E. 197; 180 S.C. 329, 185 S.E. 491. Jan. 20, 1976.

Messrs. Douglas McKay, of Columbia, and Rosen Horger, of Orangeburg, for Appellant, cite: As to trial Judgehaving no right to assume role of Chancellor and take jurisdictionof law case after verdict rendered by jury: 190 S.C. 529, 3 S.E.2d 606; 183 S.C. 360, 191 S.E. 223; 6 S.C. 209; 9 S.C. 147; 11 S.C. 445; 16 S.C. 331; 83 S.C. 49, 64 S.E. 1015; 106 S.C. 32, 90 S.E. 325; 149 S.C. 12, 146 S.E. 601; 190 S.C. 529, 3 S.E.2d 606; 193 S.C. 422, 8 S.E.2d 737; 203 S.C. 353, 27 S.E.2d 504; 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577; 39 Am. Jur. Sec. 154, 422; 17 S.C. 411; 36 S.C. 172; 24 S.C. 39; 88 S.C. 480, 71 S.E. 40; 42 S.C. 92, 19 S.E. 1009; 63 S.C. 38, 40 S.E. 1023; 80 S.C. 250, 60 S.E. 673; 81 S.C. 554, 62 S.E. 399; 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117; 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470; 79 S.C. 473, 60 S.E.2d 470; 79 S.C. 473, 60 S.E. 1114; 160 S.C. 307, 158 S.E. 258; 191 S.C. 105, 3 S.E.2d 816; 188 F.2d 1022; 153 N.W. 336; 208 S.W. 603, 3 A.L.R. 150; 19 Am. Jur. 704, Estoppel; 260 F. 724; 198 S.C. 380, 18 S.E.2d 366; 216 S.C. 201, 57 S.E.2d 255; (S.C.) 62 S.E.2d 829; 182 S.C. 51, 189 S.E. 885; As to trial Judge having power to grant anew trial only, even if the cause of action were equitable innature: 183 S.C. 360, 191 S.E. 223; 190 S.C. 529, 3 S.E.2d 606. As to trial Judge erring in failing to holdthat the direct and proximate cause of flooding of Plaintiff'swarehouse was its own inadequate drainage system: 210 S.C. 458, 43 S.E.2d 201; 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.E.2d 466; 117 S.C. 516, 109 S.E. 123. As to trial Judge erringin failing to hold that the flooding of the warehouse on thetwo occasions alleged in the complaint were caused by "Actsof God": 65 S.C. 502, 44 S.E. 77; 186 S.C. 167, 195 S.E. 247; 169 S.C. 403, 169 S.E. 84; 2 Words and Phrases 1951 Pocket Part 43; 189 S

The common pleas court took into consideration several factors which are not present here including the fact that during excavation the Weishners found evidence that would warn them of golf balls landing on their property. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950), a case from the Supreme Court of South Carolina is directly on point. In Carter, trustees of the Lake City School District leased an athletic field to a semi-professional baseball club. Residents whose homes bordered the field brought an action in equity to enjoin the playing of baseball at night.

While it is undoubtedly the correct rule that a court of equity will not interfere by injunction in cases of nuisances, trespasses, and like injuries to property when the parties can have complete redress in a court of law, still if it appears that irreparable mischief will be done by withholding the process, or where the damages that will result to the complainants are incapable of being adequately measured, or where the mischief is such, from its continuous and permanent character, that it must occasion constantly recurring grievances, which cannot be otherwise prevented, a court of equity ought to interfere by injunction to stay the wrong and protect the complainants' property and personal rights from hurt or destruction.Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470, 478 (S.C. 1950) (citation omitted). In the present case, Plaintiff has alleged that it does not wish images of Dixie Plantation which are only viewable from within Dixie Plantation itself to be widely disseminated to the public, and that the sale and distribution of "Plantation Road" forces Plaintiff against its will to violate the prohibition on commercial use of the property, a condition upon which the property was devised.

In South Carolina, the fact that a person voluntarily comes to a nuisance by purchasing property after the nuisance is created does not bar him from recovering damages for injuries sustained therefrom or deprive him of the right to enjoin its maintenance. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950). See alsoConestee Mills v.City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931) (one who purchases land burdened by a nuisance will have a right of action for damages for successive injuries caused by the negligent operation of the enterprise).

While it is undoubtedly the correct rule that a court of equity will not interfere by injunction in cases of nuisances, trespasses, and like injuries to property when the parties can have complete redress in a court of law, still if it appears that irreparable mischief will be done by withholding the process, or where the damages that will result to the complainants are incapable of being adequately measured, or where the mischief is such, from it continuous and permanent character, that it must occasion constantly recurring grievances, which cannot be otherwise prevented, a court of equity ought to interfere by injunction to stay the wrong and protect the complainants' property and personal rights from hurt or destruction. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., 218 S.C. 255, 271-272, 62 S.E.2d 470, 477 (1950) (citation omitted). Under the facts and circumstances here, injunctive relief was proper.

Other jurisdictions have held that if a school district or board of education has the power or duty to contract, lease, issue bonds, sue and be sued, and hold both real and personal property then it is a body corporate and politic. Bd. of Education of City of Chicago v. Upham, 357 Ill. 263, 191 N.E. 876, 94 A.L.R. 813 (1934); Patrick v. Maybank, 198 S.C. 262, 17 S.E.2d 530 (1941); Commonwealth v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 343 Pa. 394, 23 A.2d 496 (1942); Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950). The local school district here is administered by the county or municipal board of education as provided for in §§ 73-9-1 and 73-10-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repealed by Ch. 16, § 301, N.M.S.L. 1967).

exceptions: 241 S.C. 516, 129 S.E.2d 431; 231 S.C. 301, 98 S.E.2d 534; 1 Strob. Eq. 257, 26 S.C.R. 126; 183 S.C. 75, 190 S.E. 104; 5B C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1786. As to when the neighborhoodin which an automobile junk yard is to be located has aprimarily residential character, then location of such a junkyard therein constitutes a nuisance per accidents: 239 S.C. 429, 123 S.E.2d 528; 84 A.L.R.2d 564, Sec. 653; 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835, 56 A.L.R.2d 756; 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673; 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577. As to in equity cases where findings ofthe Court are without evidence to support them, or areagainst the clear preponderance of the evidence, the SupremeCourt not only has the power to reverse, but the duty: (S.C.) 32 S.E.2d 889. As to in reaching a conclusionin a case of this kind it is necessary to bear in mind theparticular facts involved: 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577; 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673. As to error on part of trialJudge in failing to grant the injunction: 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470; 39 Am. Jur. 472, Sec. 197. As to error onpart of trial Judge in misconstruing the relief requested byAppellants: 209 S.C. 1, 38 S.E.2d 910. Messrs. Wofford Snyder and Love, Thornton, Arnold Thomason, of Greenville, for Respondents, cite: As tothe Respondents challenging by proper exceptions all thematerial findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendationsof the special referee: 239 S.C. 109, 121 S.E.2d 427; 183 S.C. 519, 191 S.E.2d 704. As to it beingclear that the locale of Respondent's land is not impressedwith a "residential" character: 84 A.L.R.2d 654, Sec. 643. As to trial Judge properly refusing to grant the requestedinjunction: 240 S.C. 244, 125 S.E.2d 628; 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363. As to equity not interferingwhere the anticipated nuisance is doubtful, contingentor conjectural: 240 S.C. 244, 125 S.E.2d 628; 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363. As to the business of wreckingautomobiles and salvaging parts therefrom being legitimate,and such business is not a nuisance per

Messrs. Haynsworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion Johnstone, of Greenville, for Appellant, cite: As to a jury awardof nominal damages not being the basis for injunctive relief: 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673; 216 S.C. 255, 57 S.E.2d 420; 240 S.C. 244, 125 S.E.2d 628; 29 Am. Jur. 332, Sec. 47; 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363; 28 Am. Jur. 519, Sec. 29. As to the testimony not being susceptibleof any other inference than that the Defendants useof its property did not unreasonably interfere with the Plaintiff'suse and enjoyment of his property: 24 A.L.R.2d 194; 240 S.C. 244, 125 S.E.2d 628; 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363. As to trial Judge abusing his legaldiscretion in refusing to order a reference or to receive furtherevidence relative to the equitable issue: 30-A C.J.S. 498. As to rule that a decree should not enjoin more thanthat which constitutes the nuisance and should not go beyondthe requirements of the particular case: 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470. Messrs. Neely Otter, of Anderson, for Respondent, cite: As to social and economical conditions changing, but theprinciples of law, of justice and right do not change andinjunctive relief is required here: 49 S.C. 95, 26 S.E. 970; 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117. As to evidence being sufficientto show need of injunctive relief: 211 S.C. 422, 45 S.E.2d 841.

circumstances: 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371; 130 Conn. 485, 35 A.2d 845; 300 Ky. 34, 187 S.W.2d 839; 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085. Messrs. Andrew B. Marion and W. Francis Marion, of Greenville, and John A. Marion, of York, for Respondents, cite: As to rule that the findings of the referee, concurred inby the Circuit Judge, must not be disturbed if there is evidenceto support them and they are not against the clearpreponderance of testimony: 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897; 8 S.E.2d 838, 194 S.C. 1; 18 S.E.2d 215, 198 S.C. 396; 32 S.E.2d 889, 206 S.C. 1. As to the law of thiscase being settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in 2d 646. As to rule that any lawful business may be enjoinedas a nuisance when it is inappropriately located, particularlywhen a business use in a residential district injuriouslyaffects the health, safety, or property values of thoseresiding in the vicinity: 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577; 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673; 92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687; 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907; 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470; 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280. May 3, 1962.