Opinion
No. 40466.
April 15, 1957.
1. Wills — right of wife to renounce will in certain cases — where wife has separate estate — statutory formula correctly applied.
Where widow, who had separate estate at time of husband's death, renounced her rights under his will and claimed her statutory share, upon her death her heirs were entitled to difference between one-half of net estate of her husband and net value of her separate estate at time of his death. Secs. 669, 670, Code 1942.
2. Husband and wife — wills — joint tenancies — joint and survivorship bank accounts — properly included in valuation of widow's separate estate in computing her statutory share.
Joint and survivorship bank accounts of husband and wife became property of wife upon death of husband, and such accounts were properly included in valuation of widow's separate estate in computing amount to which she was entitled upon renunciation of husband's will. Sec. 670, Code 1942.
Headnotes as approved by Hall, J.
APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Clarke County; WILLIAM NEVILLE, Chancellor.
Ethridge, Minniece Bourdeaux, Meridian, for appellants.
I. Under the provisions of Section 669 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, Sarah Blanks was entitled to one-half of the real and personal estate of Jube Blanks without regard to Section 670 of the Code of 1942. Cain v. Barnwell, 125 Miss. 123, 87 So. 481; Davis v. Miller, 202 Miss. 880, 32 So.2d 871; Kelly v. Allred, 4 So. 551; Whitney v. Stephenson, 38 Miss. 112; Chap. 43 Arts. 1, 2 Secs. 1, 2, 46, Code 1848 (Hutchinson's; Chaps. 5, 40 Arts. 162, 163, 169 Secs. 5, 22, Code 1857; Secs. 1281, 1282, 1287, 1294, 1789, Code 1871; Secs. 2, 1167, 1170-74, Code 1880; Secs. 668-70, Code 1942.
II. If the Court holds that the rights of Sarah Blanks under Section 669 were limited by Section 670, or that she was only entitled to rights under Section 668, which are limited by Section 670, then appellants are still entitled to an undivided one-third interest in the real estate and one-third of the net distribution of the personal property of the decedent. Cain v. Barnwell, supra; Davis v. Miller, supra.
III. Even though Section 670 applies, and even though the funds on deposit to the joint bank account be properly considered as part of the separate property of Sarah Blanks, still the Chancellor misapplied the formula set out in Section 670, and these appellants were at least entitled to one-third of one-half of the real estate of Jube Blanks and one-third of one-half of the personal property to be distributed, or one-sixth of each. Davis v. Miller, supra; Vol. I, Page on Wills, Chap. 15 Sec. 511.
Riddell Dabbs, Quitman, for appellees.
I. Under the provisions of Section 669 of Mississippi Code of 1942, as amended, Sarah Blanks was not entitled to one-half of the real and personal estate of Jube Blanks without regard to Section 670 of Mississippi Code of 1942, as amended. Kelly v. Alred, 65 Miss. 495, 4 So. 551; Whitley v. Stephenson, 38 Miss. 113; Cain v. Barnwell, 125 Miss. 123, 87 So. 481; Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 48 So. 903.
II. Appellants are not entitled to an undivided one-third (1/3) interest in the real estate and one-third (1/3) of the net distribution of the personal property of the decedent. Davis v. Miller, 202 Miss. 880, 32 So.2d 871; In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So.2d 20; Shearin v. Coleman, 201 Miss. 193, 28 So.2d 841; Stewart v. Barksdale, 216 Miss. 768, 63 So.2d 108; In re Ware's Estate, 218 Miss. 694, 67 So.2d 704; Edwards, Admr. of Estate of O.R. Edwards, deceased, v. Jefcoat, 230 Miss. 56, 92 So.2d 342; Sec. 5205, Code 1942; 13 Words and Phrases 25.
III. The Chancellor did not misapply the formula set out in Section 670, and appellants were not entitled to one-third of one-half of the real estate of Jube Blanks and one-third of one-half of the personal property to be distributed, or one-sixth of each.
(Hn 1) On December 21, 1949, Jube Blanks executed a last will and testament whereby he devised to Effie Kirksey, Emma Frost and Lifey Floyd, the sum of $500 each, and unto his brother Hilyard Blanks and his sister Martha Blanks all of the balance of his personal property of every kind, character or description, including cash, bonds and choses in action, and also to his said brother and sister a life estate in and to all of his real property, with the remainder of said real property to the living children of his said brother and sister. After the execution of said will Jube Blanks married Sarah Carter and subsequently Jube died on January 18, 1955, and his said will was admitted to probate in common form. On March 23, 1955, Sarah Carter Blanks renounced the will as provided by Section 668, Code of 1942. Thereafterward Sarah died on August 11, 1955.
This suit is between the beneficiaries in Jube's will and the heirs at law of Sarah.
It was agreed and stipulated that the gross value of the estate of Jube Blanks was $15,133.87, of which amount $6,515 constituted the value of his real property and $8,618.87 constituted the value of his personal property.
It was also stipulated that on the date of Jube's death Sarah owned a separate estate of $5,199.28, consisting of real property in the amount of $2,315 and personal property, exclusive of cash, in the amount of $150, and it was further stipulated that there was an additional sum of $2,734.28 on deposit in two banks to the account of "Jube Blanks or Sarah Carter Blanks", both being joint and survivorship accounts but the stipulation provided that said joint account was claimed by the appellees to be a part of the estate of Jube Blanks.
It was also agreed that from the gross total of $15,133.87 included in the estate of Jube Blanks, Sarah in her lifetime was alloted by the appraisers and received from the estate of Jube the total sum of $1,853, consisting of cash in the amount of $900 and all of the personal property of Jube Blanks in the total amount of $953, excepting cash and bonds. It was also stipulated that Jube owed debts in the amount of $612.50 and that his funeral expenses were owing in the amount of $950.61 and that the administrative expenses of the estate of Jube would amount to $750.
On this stipulation the chancellor entered a decree, first adjudging the gross value of the estate of Jube Blanks to be as above set out, and further adjudged the net value, after deducting the widow's allowance, debts of deceased, funeral expenses and administrative expenses, to be $10,967.76.
He further adjudged that at the time of Jube's death the estate of Sarah amounted to $5,199.28, which amount includes the said joint account and the court found that said account was the property of the survivor Sarah and that it should be and was included in the valuation of Sarah's estate.
The chancellor further adjudged that one-half of the net estate of Jube Blanks is $5,483.88, and that this amount is $284.60 more than the net value of Sarah's estate at the time of Jube's death.
The chancellor further found that the estate should be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Section 670, Code of 1942, and that, applying the formula as laid down in said section, the heirs at law of Sarah are entitled to the sum of $284.60, being the difference between one-half of the net estate of Jube Blanks and the net value of the estate of Sarah and that said amount should be paid to the heirs at law of Sarah from the funds on hand by the executor of the estate of Jube, and that after paying said amount and all debts and administrative expenses, the balance of the estate of Jube should be distributed in accordance with the terms of his will. From that decree the heirs and administrator of Sarah appeal.
The appellants contend that under the provisions of Section 669 of the Code of 1942 Sarah Blanks was entitled to one-half of the real and personal estate of Jube Blanks without regard to Section 670, and that in any event they were entitled to an undivided one-third interest in the real property and one-third of the net distribution of the personal property of the deceased. In the case of H.H. Myers v. Jerry Nell Brumfield Laird, et al., No. 40,443, in an opinion handed down on March 25, 1957, which has not yet been reported, we held contrary to these contentions of the appellant. That opinion is so recent that we do not consider a further discussion of the point to be necessary.
(Hn 2) Appellants further contend that the funds on deposit in the joint bank accounts were not properly a part of the separate estate of Sarah Blanks, which contention was also answered adversely in the case just referred to, as well as in the case of Shearin v. Coleman, 201 Miss. 193, 28 So.2d 841, and Edwards v. Jefcoat, 92 So.2d 342, not yet reported in the State Reports.
Appellants contend that even though the funds in the joint bank account might be properly considered as a part of the separate estate of Sarah Blanks, still the chancellor did not correctly apply the formula set out in Section 670 and that under said section the appellants were at least entitled to one-third of one-half of the real estate and personal property. We think that the chancellor applied the exact formula set forth in Code Section 670 as interpreted by this Court in the case of Davis v. Miller, 202 Miss. 880, 32 So.2d 871.
Affirmed.
Roberds, Holmes, Ethridge and Gillespie, JJ., concur.