Opinion
6:21-CV-965 (TJM/TWD)
10-12-2021
THOMAS CARSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE HACKERS, CIA HANDLER, Defendants.
THOMAS CARSON, JR. PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
THOMAS CARSON, JR. PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Thomas Carson, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against “Google Hackers” and a “CIA Handler” (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff concurrently filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Dkt. No. 2). He also filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Dkt. No. 3.)
With respect to his IFP Application, a court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, his IFP Application is granted.
Plaintiff should note that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
Turning to his complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert hackers infiltrated his email in March 2020, and stole personal information from his computer. (See generally, Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff also asserts his “mind was hacked” and he is a victim of government experiments and torture. Id. at 2-3. In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff requests “freedom from Google hacker and artificial intelligence and also sue google and the CIA handler.” Id. at 4.
The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”). However, the current status of Plaintiff's complaint is so convoluted and difficult to interpret that the Court cannot accept it as filed.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8's purpose “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)). Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . .Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Sandler v. Capanna, 1992 WL 392597, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1992) (citation omitted).
A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims, ” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). “Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court recommends the complaint be dismissed because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Plaintiff's claims are entirely unclear. However, considering his pro se status, the Court further recommends Plaintiff be given one opportunity to amend the complaint to comply with the basic pleading requirements set forth above. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff has also filed an application for appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 3.) However, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate why he is entitled to appointment of counsel at this time. Further, Plaintiff merely states that he has “contacted may attorneys and got no help” but did not list with whom he spoke. Id. Thus, it is unclear if he has even attempted to secure pro bono counsel related to this action. Id. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff's request as premature. See Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff may renew his application for appointed counsel if he can demonstrate he has attempted to find pro bono counsel on his own and if he can establish why he is entitled to such assistance.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 3) is DENIED with leave to renew; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).