Opinion
Civil Action No. 00A-09-001
August 28, 2001
Bobby G. Carson
Stephen W. Spence, Esquire, Rosalind D. Williams, Esquire, Phillips, Goldman, Spence, P.A.
Dear Mr. Carson and Counsel:
Pro se claimant Bobby G. Carson ("Claimant") appeals a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") dated September 1, 2000. The Board denied the Claimant's request for unemployment benefits on the grounds that Dewey Beach Club had "just cause" for terminating the Claimant's employment. This is the Court's decision on the appeal.
FACTS
Dewey Beach Club employed the Claimant for ten years as a cook. This was a full time position where the Claimant earned $807.52 bi-weekly after taxes. After being suspended on July 22, 1999, the Claimant was discharged by Dewey Beach Club on July 27, 1999.
On July 22, 1999, the owner and her husband returned to the restaurant between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. Upon returning, several employees approached them complaining about the Claimant's behavior. There were allegations that the Claimant was drunk, did not perform his job duties, and was verbally abusive. The owner testified that she and her husband went into the kitchen to speak with the Claimant and found him still visibly drunk, smelling of alcohol and stumbling around the kitchen. The owner told the Claimant of the reports and her husband told him he needed to leave and would be suspended for three days. The owner told the claimant that she would make a decision after talking with the other employees about what happened in her absence. During the three-day suspension, the owner obtained statements from other employees indicating that the Claimant was indeed drunk, could not perform his job duties, and was possibly drinking sherry in the kitchen while on duty. The owner decided to end the Claimant's employment with Dewey Beach Club.
The owner testified that two years earlier there was another major incident involving the Claimant reporting to work intoxicated. After that incident, the Claimant was given a written plan stating that he would be discharged if he ever again reported to work in an intoxicated condition. The Claimant signed this document. The owner testified that the Claimant may have reported to work in those two years after drinking but not until July 22, 1999, did he report to work in a visibly intoxicated condition.
The Claimant testified that he was not intoxicated at work on July 22, 1999. He had not been drinking before work nor did he drink while on duty. The Claimant does not recall any of the allegations stated by the owner. He remembers doing his job that evening with no complaints. The Claimant testified that the owner's husband approached him saying he had to leave because he was causing problems. The Claimant asked what problems and then they went into the kitchen to discuss the situation. The owner's husband told him to take a couple days off to think about it.
On April 2, 2000, the Claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. This claim was denied on April 11, 2000, after the Claims Deputy found that Dewey Beach Club had "just cause" for terminating the Claimant's employment. The Claimant appealed this decision to the Appeals Referee on April 19, 2000. The Claimant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for May 11, 2000, and the appeal was dismissed. The Claimant then requested another hearing on May 18, 2000. This request was granted and the hearing before the Appeals Referee was held June 19, 2000.
The Appeals Referee found that on July 22, 1999, the owner and her husband returned to the Dewey Beach Club around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. After employees approached them with complaints about the Claimant, the owner went to the kitchen to talk with him. After finding the Claimant staggering around the kitchen and smelling of alcohol, the owner discerned that he was intoxicated and sent him home for a couple of days. Subsequently, the owner spoke with other employees about the incident that occurred on July 22, 1999 and decided to end the Claimant's employment with Dewey Beach Club on July 27, 1999. In December 1999, the Claimant was given a written statement warning that if he ever came to work intoxicated he would be discharged.
The Appeals Referee concluded that the Claimant was discharged from his work for "just cause" in connection with his work. The decision of the Claims Deputy was affirmed and the Claimant was disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits.
The Claimant appealed the decision of the Appeals Referee to the Appeals Board on July 1, 2000. The hearing before the Board was held August 30, 2000. On September 1, 2000, the Board affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee denying the Claimant unemployment benefits. In its decision on appeal, the Board stated:
The record of the above case having been reviewed, and additional testimony having been heard by the Appeal Board, based on the testimony heard before the Referee and by the Appeal Board, the pertinent findings of fact of the Referee are adopted as the findings of fact of the Appeal Board and the decision of the Referee is affirmed and the benefits are denied.
The Claimant then brought this timely appeal on September 1, 2000.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decisions. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-7 (1965); General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 19 Del. C. § 3323(a).DISCUSSION
The Court must now determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board decision that the Claimant was discharged for "just cause" and therefore, is not entitled to unemployment benefits.
Title 19 Del. C. § 3315(2) of the Delaware Code provides:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(2) For the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount.
The employer bears the burden of showing that an employee was terminated for "just cause" before an employee will be disqualified from receipt of benefits. Jones v. Health Care Center, Del. Super., C.A. No. 92A-12-003, Toliver, J. (Jan. 5, 1994) Mem. Op. at 3. "Just cause" for discharge refers to a willful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interests or of the employee's duties or of the employee's expected standard of conduct. Abex Corp. v. Todd, Del. Super., 235 A.2d 271 (1967). Willful misconduct requires a showing of actual, specific or evil intent, whereas wanton misconduct requires a showing of heedless, malicious or reckless conduct but not a bad motive or an intent to cause harm. Delaware Admin. For Regional Transit v. Jones, Del. Super., C.A. No. 94A-04-027, Babiarz, J. (Jan. 23, 1995) Mem. Op. Willful or wanton conduct that constitutes "just cause" to discharge an employee requires a showing that the employee was conscious of the employee's conduct and recklessly indifferent to its consequences. It does not necessarily mean bad motive, ill design or malice. Coleman v. Dept. of Labor, Del. Super., 288 A.2d 285 (1972).
The record facts indicate that the Claimant acted in violation of both the employer's interests and his duties and expected standard of conduct. The record contains substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the Claimant was intoxicated at work. There are several statements from coworkers indicating that the Claimant was intoxicated and failed to do his job, as well as, testimony from the owner concerning her observations of the Claimant that evening. The Claimant's intoxication at work prevented him from performing his job adequately. Because the Claimant caused commotion in the kitchen that affected the waitstaff and the customers, the employer's interests were negatively affected.
Moreover, the Appeals Referee found that before this incident the Claimant was given and signed a document stating that if he showed up for work intoxicated again he would be terminated. In 1996, the employer made it clear that it would not tolerate behavior akin to the behavior demonstrated by the Claimant on July 22, 1999.
The Claimant's conduct was conscious and reckless. In Coleman v. Department of Labor, 288 A.2d at 288, the Court found that "the very act of becoming intoxicated is such a conscious act as to foreclose petitioner from disclaiming responsibility on those grounds." The Claimant reported to work and remained at work intoxicated and clearly in violation of his expected standard of conduct.
Claimant was discharged due to his own misconduct. There was substantial evidence for the Board to conclude that the employer showed "just cause" for the Claimant's discharge.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.