Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-001608-MR
10-13-2017
MELVIN CARSON APPELLANT v. GARY BECKSTROM, WARDEN APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Melvin Carson, pro se West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Allison R. Brown Department of Corrections Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CR-00118 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. CLAYTON, JUDGE: Melvin Carson appeals the Morgan Circuit Court order dismissing his petition for declaration of rights. After careful review, we affirm.
While working in a gymnasium in the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex, Recreation Leader Okel Ferguson noticed the inmates looking at the stairwell. Upon his approach, he saw about twenty inmates run out of the stairwell. After he discovered blood on the stairs, he called for the yard supervisor. Lieutenant Steve Havens and Correctional Officers Mark Noble and Travis Evans responded. None of the inmates left the gymnasium prior to their arrival.
The officers lined the inmates against a wall to check for signs of an altercation. The only inmate with injuries was Carson, who had a skinned elbow and a bleeding mouth. During the ensuing investigation, Carson admitted to Lieutenant Havens that he was involved in an altercation with an inmate he did not know. Correctional Officer Evans transported Carson for a medical examination. As an explanation for how he received his injuries, Carson told the medical examiner he "was horseplaying in the gym."
Carson was charged with "[p]hysical action or force against another inmate if no injury has occurred, including horseplay" pursuant to Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) 15.2(II)(C)(III)(11). Adjustment Officer Darren F. Elam (AO) presided over the disciplinary hearing. During that hearing, Carson stated that someone hit him and that he could not provide any additional information because he had been knocked unconscious. Citing the disciplinary report, the AO found Carson guilty. The AO sentenced Carson to 15 days' disciplinary segregation and ordered Carson to pay "restitution of [$]72.00 for exposure panel and any other medical exspense [sic] incurred by this incident." Eventually, Carson would be required to pay $2,346.50 in restitution as a result of his injuries. Warden Gary Beckstrom denied Carson's appeal, noting that Carson's injuries were consistent with being in an altercation and that Carson admitted to being in an altercation to Lieutenant Havens.
Carson filed a petition for declaration of rights in Morgan County Circuit Court, arguing (1) his conviction was not supported by "some evidence"; (2) his disciplinary report was not written clearly and concisely; and (3) he should not have been required to pay restitution. The circuit court dismissed the action, concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support Carson's conviction and that CPP 15.2 permitted the prison to recoup the expenses for treating Carson's injuries. On appeal, Carson alleges (1) the AO's findings of fact were inadequate and not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) his disciplinary report was not written clearly and concisely; and (3) he should not have been required to pay restitution for his medical expenses because no injury occurred and the amount of restitution was not disclosed until after the hearing.
Carson's petition arises in the context of a petition for declaratory judgment under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 418.040. Our standard of review requires us to recognize that "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Webb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). In order to comport with due process, the findings of an AO must be supported by some evidence of record. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985).
First, Carson argues that the AO's findings of fact were not supported by "some evidence." Specifically, Carson asserts that the AO could not have relied on his admission that he was "horseplaying in the gym" when he was injured because that information was not contained in the AO's findings of fact. Carson also argues he did not admit to Lieutenant Havens that he was involved in an altercation; instead, Carson asserts he stated he had been knocked unconscious by another inmate. Carson collaterally argues that the AO's findings were insufficient.
Even excluding the statement that Carson was horseplaying in the gym, there was "some evidence" to support a finding that Carson engaged in "[p]hysical action or force against another inmate if no injury has occurred, including horseplay" under CPP 15.2(II)(C)(III)(11). Carson admitted to being involved in an altercation, and "[a]n admission is 'some evidence' sufficient to uphold the decision of the Adjustment Committee." Yates v. Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ky. App. 2003). Though Carson disputed Lieutenant Havens's statement in the disciplinary hearing, the AO, as the fact-finder, was not required to believe Carson's explanation of the incident. "[I]n its role as fact-finder, an administrative agency is afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, including its findings and conclusions of fact." Smith v. Teachers' Retirement System of Kentucky, 515 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Ky. App. 2017). This admission, coupled with the fact that Carson had injuries consistent with being in an altercation, was sufficient to meet the evidentiary standard in prison disciplinary cases. Carson's assertion that the AO's findings of fact were insufficient is also without merit. An AO's written findings may be brief, and the AO may incorporate by reference the findings in the report by the investigating officer. Yates, 120 S.W.3d at 731. Accordingly, no due process violation occurred.
Carson claims that the disciplinary report was not "clear and concise" as required by CPP 15.6(II)(C)(1)(a). We disagree. The purposes of these reports are (1) to produce a written record for judicial review and (2) "to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify what the charges are[.]" Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S. Ct. at 2978. Carson's report is plainly decipherable and it contains all the necessary information. The report was clearly and concisely written.
Next, Carson contends that, because he had a property interest in his inmate funds, he should not have been required to pay restitution. He argues it was error for the AO to require restitution for an amount that was not disclosed to him until four months after the hearing. He also asserts that he should not be required to pay restitution when no injuries resulted from the incident.
CPP 15.2(II)(G)(4)(e) provides, in part, that the "the Adjustment Committee, Adjustment Officer or Unit Hearing Officer may order restitution for . . . any other costs that have been incurred due to any rule violation."
In order to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a party must establish (1) that he enjoyed a protected "liberty" or "property" interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (2) that he was denied the process due him under the circumstances.Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Ky. App. 2003) (footnote omitted).
We agree with Carson that he has a property interest in his funds. See TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 386, 394 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted) ("[T]he property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money."). However, this does not end our analysis. When a protected liberty or property interest is at stake, an inmate is entitled to:
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.Hill, 472 U.S. at 454, 1055 S.Ct. at 2773 (citation omitted).
No procedural due process violation occurred in this in case. Carson was afforded notice of the charges against him over 24 hours before the hearing, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, and a written statement by his AO detailing the evidence relied upon. Additionally, as noted above, "some evidence" of his guilt exists in the record. Because these due process requirements were met, the prison could deprive Carson of his property interest. Additionally, because Carson's disciplinary conviction involved monetary expenses, the AO could order Carson to pay restitution under CPP 15.2(II)(G)(4)(e).
Finally, Carson claims the AO erred regarding CPP 15.2(II)(C)(III)(11), the disciplinary violation for "[p]hysical action or force against another inmate if no injury has occurred, including horseplay[.]" Specifically, he asserts he should not be required to pay restitution when he was injured and that provision requires no injury to have occurred. Again, there was "some evidence" that Carson was involved in an altercation with another inmate under CPP 15.2(II)(C)(III)(11). Furthermore, because Carson committed a disciplinary violation, the AO could order him to pay restitution under CPP 15.2(II)(G)(4)(e) for "any other costs that have been incurred due to any rule violation." (Emphasis added.) If CPP 15.2(II)(C)(III)(11) required no injury to have occurred to any party, as Carson suggests, it would essentially preclude prisons from disciplining an inmate involved in an altercation merely because that inmate was the only person injured. We also note that CPP 15.2(II)(C)(IV)(1), the provision relating to "[p]hysical action resulting in injury to another inmate[,]" is an offense of a higher category. Carson was charged with an offense of a lower category because his conduct did not result in an injury to another person. "Prison administrators [are] accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Haney v. Thomas, 406 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Carson's due process rights were not violated as a result of his prison disciplinary proceeding.
We affirm the order of the Morgan Circuit Court dismissing Carson's prison disciplinary action.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Melvin Carson, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Allison R. Brown
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky