Opinion
A-13749
08-31-2022
NATHAN ERIC CARROLL, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Marjorie E. Mock, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Seneca Theno Freitag, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District Trial Court No. 4FA-15-02647 CR, Fairbanks, Douglas L. Blankenship, Judge.
Marjorie E. Mock, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Seneca Theno Freitag, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HARBISON JUDGE
Following a jury trial, Nathan Eric Carroll was convicted of second-degree assault. Although the superior court entered an order granting Carroll's request to represent himself, it revoked this order seven days later and required Carroll to be represented by an attorney. At the second hearing, the court found that Carroll was "not competent to represent [himself]" because (1) Carroll declined the court's offer to allow him to wear "street clothes" rather than clothing identifying him as an inmate, and (2) Carroll was claiming self-defense, which made the case, in the court's mind, "a little bit more complex."
AS 11.41.210(a)(1).
On appeal, Carroll argues that the superior court erred when it denied his right to self-representation. He contends that the court did not conduct an adequate inquiry into Carroll's competency to self-represent and that the record does not support the court's finding that Carroll was incapable of representing himself. The State concedes error, noting that the record is "completely devoid of any conduct by Carroll in the intervening seven days . . . that justifies the court's reversal" of its initial order allowing Carroll to represent himself.
After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the State's concession is well-founded.
See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66,67-68 (Alaska 1972) (holding that an appellate court must independently assess whether a concession of error is supported by the record on appeal and has legal foundation).
A criminal defendant's right to self-representation is protected by the United States and Alaska Constitutions. The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the following procedure must be followed when considering a defendant's request for self-representation: First, the trial court should decide whether the defendant is "capable of presenting [their case] in a rational and coherent manner." Second, the court should determine whether the defendant "understands precisely what [they are] giving up by declining the assistance of counsel." And finally, the court should determine whether the defendant is "willing to conduct [themself] with at least a modicum of courtroom decorum." If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the trial court should grant the defendant's request to proceed without counsel.
See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Alaska Const, art. 1, § 11.
McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska 1974).
Once a court determines that a defendant's decision to forgo counsel is knowing and voluntary, the court may only deny the right of self-representation if the defendant demonstrates that they are not capable of conducting their defense without being unusually disruptive, unable or unwilling to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol, or if the defendant deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984); Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 472 (Alaska App. 2010).
In this case, Carroll made an unequivocal request to proceed to trial without an attorney, and there was no evidence adduced from which to question Carroll's ability to proceed pro se. Furthermore, the factors the court relied upon when denying Carroll the right to self-representation-that Carroll was planning to present a self-defense case and that he wanted to wear prison attire rather than "street clothes" to trial - were not demonstrative of obvious incompetency. We accordingly conclude that the superior court erred by denying Carroll the right to self-representation.
The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.