Carroll v. Krause

26 Citing cases

  1. People v. Bailey

    374 Ill. App. 3d 1008 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 12 times
    In Bailey, it was the State that asserted trial courts should look to the elements of the crime when determining if two offenses are of the same or similar class.

    Defendant maintains, and the postconviction court found, that defendant was prejudiced because Adams' grand jury testimony would have provided a significant opportunity for impeachment by omission of the State's key eyewitness and that the stipulation was inadequate because it had no context. "`[T]he omission of a witness to state a particular fact under circumstances rendering it incumbent upon him to, or likely that he would state such fact, if true, may be shown to discredit his testimony as to such fact.'" People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 320-21, 265 N.E.2d 876, 882 (1970), quoting Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 562 (1938); People v. Owens, 65 Ill. 2d 83, 357 N.E.2d 465 (1976); 3A J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1042, at 1058 (3d ed. 1940) ("the underlying test is, would it have been natural for the person to make the assertion in question?"). The admissibility of impeachment evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

  2. People v. Allen

    37 Ill. App. 3d 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 9 times

    In People v. Henry (1970), 47 Ill.2d 312, 320, 265 N.E.2d 876, our supreme court stated that an inconsistency in the literal sense is not always required for impeachment. The court cited the earlier case of Carroll v. Krause (2d Dist. 1938), 295 Ill. App. 552, 15 N.E.2d 323, where a witness testified that an auto in which the plaintiff was riding had but one headlight, although at an earlier inquest the witness had not mentioned this fact. The court in Krause held that the prior statement was admissible for impeachment purposes, even though the witness had not been asked about the auto's headlights at the inquest, saying:

  3. People v. Jendrzejak

    240 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)   Cited 12 times
    In Jendrzejak, the defendant contended that the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delicti.

    Further, it is inherently improbable that a husband, whose wife had just driven his car into a ditch and left him there with the car at about 2:00 a.m., would not have mentioned the incident to an investigating officer, either at the scene or in the lengthy conversations which ensued at the police station. Cf. Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 15 N.E.2d 323. Under all the circumstances of this case, it was not error for the trial judge to disbelieve and totally disregard the testimony of defendant and his wife. People v. Schehr, 88 Ill. App.2d 287, 292-293, 232 N.E.2d 566. The trial judge and not the reviewing court has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and is, therefore, in a superior position to evaluate credibility.

  4. Kinser v. Riss & Co., Inc.

    177 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1949)   Cited 3 times
    In Kinser v. Riss Co., Inc., 7 Cir., 177 F.2d 316, 319, a case in which this court applied the law of Illinois, we said: "Contributory negligence is ordinarily and pre-eminently a question of fact to be decided by a jury, and it becomes a question of law only when it can be said that all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion, under a particular factual situation, that the facts did not establish due care and caution on the part of the person charged therewith.

    The question was one of fact for the jury. Miller v. Burch, 254 Ill. App. 387, 394; Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 568, 15 N.E.2d 323; Wise v. Kuehne Mfg. Co., 322 Ill. App. 26, 31, 32, 53 N.E.2d 711; and Budds v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 326 Ill. App. 59, 61 N.E.2d 579. Finally defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing one of defendant's tendered instructions.

  5. State v. Hines

    130 Ariz. 68 (Ariz. 1981)   Cited 21 times
    Explaining that "inconsistency is to be determined, not by individual words or phrases alone, but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done"

    A prior omission will constitute an inconsistency only where it was made under circumstances rendering it incumbent upon the witness to, or be likely to, state such a fact. See Ball v. State, 43 Ariz. 556, 559, 33 P.2d 601, 602 (1934); Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 562, 15 N.E.2d 323, 328 (1938); Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 288, 474 P.2d 288, 292 (1970); Sims v. State, 530 P.2d 1176, 1179-1180 (Wyo. 1975). The rationale for allowing impeachment in these circumstances is that "a failure to assert a fact, when it would have been natural to assert it, amounts in effect to assertion of the non-existence of the fact."

  6. People v. Owens

    65 Ill. 2d 83 (Ill. 1976)   Cited 40 times
    In Owens, defendant argued that since both a "life and death" witness and a pathologist had testified, there was no probative value to the photographs depicting the deceased's wounds and the photographs could only arouse the emotions of the jury.

    "It would appear that no prior inconsistent statement in the usual sense was involved, but inconsistency in the literal sense is not always required for impeachment. In Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, the witness testified that an auto in which the plaintiff was riding had but one headlight. At an earlier inquest the witness omitted mention of the fact of a single headlight.

  7. Sims v. State

    530 P.2d 1176 (Wyo. 1975)   Cited 21 times
    In Sims v. State, 530 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 1975) an unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance resulted in a conviction from which defendant appealed on three grounds, one of which was whether intent to deliver could be inferred by the jury without specific instructions from the court.

    " 3A Wigmore, Evidence, p. 1056, § 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). The rule is stated another way in Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 562, 15 N.E.2d 323, 328: "* * * the omission of a witness to state a particular fact under circumstances rendering it incumbent upon him to, or likely that he would, state such a fact, if true, may be shown to discredit his testimony as to such fact."

  8. The People v. Henry

    47 Ill. 2d 312 (Ill. 1970)   Cited 95 times
    In People v. Henry, 47 Ill.2d 312, 316 (1970), we held the constitutional right to a speedy trial "cannot be defined in terms of an absolute or precise standard of time, within which an accused must be given trial."

    It would appear that no prior inconsistent statement in the usual sense was involved, but inconsistency in the literal sense is not always required for impeachment. In Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, the witness testified that an auto in which the plaintiff was riding had but one headlight. At an earlier inquest the witness omitted mention of the fact of the single headlight.

  9. Boehrer v. Thompson

    359 Mo. 465 (Mo. 1949)   Cited 7 times

    Moore v. East St. Louis Suburban Ry. Co., 54 S.W.2d 767; Rohrer v. Denton, 306 Ill. App. 325, 28 N.E.2d 572; Cunningham v. Toledo, St. L. W.R. Co., 260 Ill. 589, 103 N.E. 593. (7) Defendant Schuller cannot be permitted to say that he did not see the railroad tracks, when if he had properly exercised his faculties of sight, he could have seen it. Thomas v. Buchanan, 357 Ill. 270, 192 N.E. 215; Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193, 39 N.E.2d 976, affirming 308 A. 531, 32 N.E.2d 349; Dee v. City of Peru, 343 Ill. 36, 174 N.E. 901; Reed v. Lyford, 311 Ill. App. 486, 36 N.E.2d 610; Secrist v. Raffleson, 326 Ill. App. 489, 62 N.E.2d 36. (8) Under Illinois Statute defendant required to have lights on automobile visible 200 feet ahead of motor vehicle. Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 15 N.E.2d 323; Johnson v. Gustafson, 233 Ill. App. 216. (9) The evidence was sufficient tending to support the charge of willful and wanton conduct to make a jury question.

  10. Pollard v. Wittman

    183 P.2d 175 (Wash. 1947)   Cited 8 times

    [2] The duty imposed by the statute on the operator of a motor vehicle to drive with adequate lights at night is not merely for the benefit of such operator to enable him to see and avoid injury to others, but for benefit of others to enable them to avoid injury from approaching motor vehicles. Ramirez v. Salinas, 90 S.W.2d (Tex.Civ.App.) 891. Carroll v. Krause, 295 Ill. App. 552, 15 N.E.2d 323. [3] A motion for a directed verdict admits the truth of the opposing party's evidence and of inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom, and requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the moving party and in the light most favorable to the opposing party.