The sole point on appeal relates to the failure of the trial court to enter judgment for the defendants, as stated above, and the contention concerning a new trial is contained in the argument made on behalf of this point. It is well settled that, in order to obtain appellate review, alleged errors relied upon for reversal must be raised clearly, concisely and separately as points on appeal. See Lynch v. Tennyson, 443 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); McClendon v. International House of Pancakes, 381 So.2d 728, 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Anderson v. State, 215 So.2d 618, 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); see also Redditt v. State, 84 So.2d 317, 321-22 n. 1 (Fla. 1955) (emphasizes importance of points on appeal for proper judicial review), aff'd, 88 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1956) (en banc); Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(b)(5) (Committee notes from 1977 revision of sections (b), (c), (d), (e)); cf. Carroll v. Hertz Corp., 132 So.2d 624, 625 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) (disapproves of single "double-barrelled" points addressing two issues), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1962). The final judgment under review is, therefore, in all respects,
This court has said that it is error to enter a judgment for the defendant upon a verdict for the plaintiff. Carroll v. Hertz Corporation, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 624. Consequently, a judgment should have been rendered for the plaintiff, and costs should have been taxed against the defendant pursuant to § 58.04, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. Raffel v. Magarian, Fla.App. 1964, 165 So.2d 249. The judgment appealed is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment upon the jury verdict for appellant as well as costs for such sums as the court shall find are legally taxable.
The only judgment which the court could validly render on the verdict returned by the jury was one in favor of the appellant. See Carroll v. Hertz Corporation, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 624, and Jordan v. Reynolds, Fla.App. 1963, 154 So.2d 200. Inasmuch as a judgment in favor of the appellant should have been rendered on the verdict, it follows that costs should have been taxed against the appellee.
This is the only point for consideration by this court, as errors assigned and not argued are deemed abandoned. See: Carroll v. Hertz Corporation, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 624; Parsley Brothers Construction Co. v. Humphrey, Fla.App. 1962, 136 So.2d 257; Rule 3.7i, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A. Bearing in mind the factual situation as related in Schutzer v. City of Miami, Fla.App. 1958, 105 So.2d 492, at the time the cause came on for trial the appellant's evidence was deficient in 2 particulars: first, she could not establish that the protruding pipe was in fact the object over which she stumbled and, second, she made no attempt to prove for what period of time the pipe in question may have been protruding, in order to put the municipality on constructive notice [no contention of actual notice was made] of the dangerous situation.
Neither party, in setting out their points on appeal, has complied with the provisions of Rule 3.7f(3), Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., in reference to stating "points involved, in a clear and concise manner". See: Serotkin v. Flavin, Fla. App. 1959, 111 So.2d 483; Carrol v. Hertz Corporation, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 624. Following a review of the extensive record, appendices and able briefs of counsel, together with consideration of oral argument, it appears that the chancellor has arrived at a fair, equitable and just final decree in almost all particulars wherein error is alleged by either party.