When such a showing is not made, the plain and unambiguous words of a forfeiture clause of a policy must be given their reasonable intendment and, the forfeiture having already taken place, the agent would be without authority to bind his principal by any waiver thereof. See Carroll v. Garlington Hardwick Co., 79 Ga. App. 708 ( 54 S.E.2d 441); Life Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181 ( 27 S.E.2d 871); Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Muller, 63 Ga. App. 327 ( 11 S.E.2d 92); Thurmond v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W., 171 Ga. 453 ( 155 S.E. 760); Hutson v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 847 ( 50 S.E. 1000); Reese v. Fidelity Mutual Life Assn., 111 Ga. 482 ( 36 S.E. 637); Graham v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. 840 ( 32 S.E. 579); Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Griffin, 30 Ga. App. 217 ( 117 S.E. 261); Finleyson v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 16 Ga. App. 51 ( 84 S.E. 311); Plumer v. Continental Casualty Co., 12 Ga. App. 594 ( 77 S.E. 917). It would therefore appear that there must be some showing that the company had knowledge of the facts, or of some affirmative act upon its part, before a waiver could be assumed from the act of an agent which was beyond the scope of his authority and in violation of the written provisions of the contract, other than the mere acceptance of the premium by the agent, which under the te
He would not know whether he ought, in the meantime, to arrange for other insurance. See Putnam v. Deinhamer, supra; Carroll v. Garlingto-Hardwick Co., 79 Ga. App. 708, 54 S.E.2d 441. The plaintiff relies on Bessette v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 111 Conn. 549, 150 A. 706.