Carroll v. Eno

8 Citing cases

  1. Buttitta v. Greenwich House Co-op. Apartments

    11 A.D.3d 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 22 times
    In Buttitta, the lower court noted that plaintiffs, all shareholders, brought an action asserting seven causes of action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against their residential cooperative corporation.

    We further find, based on the documentary evidence, that plaintiffs were informed of the co-op's decision no later than July 2002, but did not commence this action until January 2003, more than four months later. In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to address whether the challenged bylaw constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation ( but see Carroll v. Eno, 237 AD2d 102), whether the Board was improperly constituted, or whether redemption was unauthorized absent a surplus. Concerning the fourth through sixth causes of action to compel issuance of a proprietary lease, plaintiffs fail to show that possessing a lease is a legal requirement or that not possessing one violates the covenant of quiet enjoyment or otherwise has caused them harm.

  2. Herrmann v. AMD Realty, Inc.

    8 A.D.3d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    Moreover, since the right of first refusal was triggered by the landlord's receipt of a bona fide offer, Herbert, as the named "Landlord," could only have received an offer during his lifetime, which right would have terminated upon his death. In any event, upon the plaintiffs' prima facie showing that the predetermined price of $75,000 was an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of Lot 3 because the amount was substantially below its market value of $300,000 ( cf. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 167-168), the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact by presenting evidence that the price served a reasonable business purpose ( see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557; cf. Carroll v. Eno, 237 A.D.2d 102; Becce v. Mark Spencer Affiliates, supra at 577). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment declaring that the right of first refusal was valid and granted the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment declaring that the right of first refusal was null and void.

  3. Reynolds v. Gagen

    292 A.D.2d 310 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    Pursuant to EPTL 9-1.3(b), it is presumed that an estate is intended by its creator to be valid. Unlike Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy ( 86 A.D.2d 435, 444, affd 58 N.Y.2d 867), where the option was granted to plaintiff, "its successors and assigns," the agreement here, as in Carroll v. Eno ( 237 A.D.2d 102), clearly limits the exercise of the option to plaintiff and defendant Vera Gagen within the "measuring lives" of the parties themselves and does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. The subsequent "heirs and assigns" language, as in Carroll v. Eno (supra ["heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns"]), merely provides that, in the event defendant Vera Gagen died, before plaintiff, her heirs or assigns would have to honor her commitment in the event plaintiff sought to exercise her option. In the event plaintiff died before she exercised her option, it would die with her.

  4. Reynolds v. Gagen

    287 A.D.2d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

    While it is true, as plaintiff contends, that pursuant to EPTL 9-1.3, it is presumed that an estate is intended by its creator to be valid, the presumption of validity is unavailing here in view of the parties' agreement which unambiguously affords Reynolds's heirs and assigns the option to purchase a one-half interest in the building (see, Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 86 A.D.2d 435, 444,affd 58 N.Y.2d 867). Since the agreement's purchase option by its express terms purports to create an estate which may not vest until more than 21 years after the termination of the measuring lives (i.e., the lives of the contracting parties), it is void as violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Carroll v. Eno ( 237 A.D.2d 102) is not to the contrary since it was clear from the factual context of the agreement there at issue that the preemptive rights arising therefrom were intended to be exercised within the relevant measuring lives (supra, 103). We modify only to declare in defendants' favor that the agreement is void pursuant to the statute (see, Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 334).

  5. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Gettner

    240 A.D.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 1 times

    However, while the court correctly disposed of the action in landlord's favor, rather than granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the court should have declared the rights of the parties. Thus, the order and judgment are modified to reinstate the complaint and grant judgment in favor of defendants, declaring the notice of early termination to be valid ( see, Carroll v. Eno, 237 A.D.2d 102). Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Milonas, Ellerin, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.

  6. Gee v. Zee Ying WNG

    29 N.Y.S.3d 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)

    Underlying the rule against perpetuities was the principle that “it is socially undesirable for property to be inalienable for an unreasonable period of time” (Symphony Space, 88 N.Y.2d at 475 ; see also Kaiser–Haidri, 85 AD3d at 732 ). Here, there was no intention that the parties' rights under the agreement would last indefinitely since, even though a closing date was left open-ended and was not specified, a reasonable time is implied (see Omar, 55 AD3d at 705 ; Carroll v. Eno, 237 A.D.2d 102, 103 [1st Dept 1997] ). Moreover, the agreement does not evince any intention that the parties' rights under the agreement would or could last indefinitely.

  7. Celauro v. 4C Foods Corp.

    30 Misc. 3d 1204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

    Allen, 2 N.Y.2d at 542;In re Gusman, 178 A.D.2d 597, 598 (2d Dept.1991), app. den.,80 N.Y.2d 753 (1992). See also Carroll v. Eno, 237 A.D.2d 102 (1st Dept.1997). A restraint on the transferability of stock will be upheld if it is reasonable, in accordance with public policy, and effectuates a lawful purpose.

  8. Celauro v. 4C Foods Corp.

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 52264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

    Allen, 2 NY2d at 542; In re Gusman, 178 AD2d 597, 598 (2d Dept. 1991), app. den., 80 NY2d 753 (1992). See also Carroll v. Eno, 237 AD2d 102 (1st Dept. 1997). A restraint on the transferability of stock will be upheld if it is reasonable, in accordance with public policy, and effectuates a lawful purpose.